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Introduction 
The research concerns whether current neuroscientific theories of memory destabilize the 
conception of memory as a source of factual truth and whether they challenge the ability to 
distinguish it from imagination. 
Memory relies on previous learning and relates to an actual past. It is perceived as a source of 
knowledge, a reliable reference to our past. Our belief is that memories in general are 
trustworthy, that a remembered event probably took place. Imagination, on the other hand, is 
associated with the unreal and fantastic. We are not obligated to verify its realness or truthfulness 
and therefore there is no reason to doubt its epistemological status. Not only does imagination 
not refer to a real past, but also does not necessarily refer to any real existence. Imagination can 
represent anything, at any time. However these descriptions disregard the complexity of these 
cognitive acts. Indeed, imagination contains states that are not and cannot be real. However, 
imagination is not constrained to be fictional but has various manifestations. Imaginings can also 
be actual and compatible with factual reality. It can also coincide with representations of past 
occurrences. Alternatively, imagination can deceive us into believe that imaginative 
representations are true memories rather than products of the imagination. Remembering, on the 
other hand, can be inaccurate, false, or stem from imagination. We often mistakenly designate 
memories as products of the imagination and vice versa. Thus, if memory and imagination can 
represent the same experience, coincide or overlap, how can we distinguish between 
representations of memory from those of imagination? 
 
The complex association of imagination and memory has led philosophers to try to provide 
criteria to distinguish between them. The British empiricists, for example, distinguish memory 
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and imagination in terms of the characteristics of the mental representation. In their view, 
memory is described with greater vivacity, intensity, stability, and steadiness, in contrast to the 
protean, volatility, and the voluntarily characteristics of imagination. While the empiricists 
investigate the quality of the object’s content, Husserl, by contrast, investigates acts of 
consciousness and their relation to their content, what he calls their objects. Since imagination 
and memory can coincide and represent the same content, memory and imagination are, 
according to Husserl, distinguished not by their content but instead by the intention and attitude 
associated with them. Intention determines the way objects appear in consciousness. Memory 
intends what actually has been, while imagination what might have been, since the content of 
imagination is not actual. William James maintained that what differentiates memory from 
imagination is an additional consciousness that constitutes a representation as a memory. 
Memory images are attended with a feeling of “warmth and intimacy,”1 and are accompanied 
with feeling of belief that attributes it to the past, while imagination lacks this feeling. Russell 
also distinguishes between these two cognitive by the relation that the thinker bears toward the 
representation. For him, memories are images that are accompanied with feeling of familiarity 
and are followed by “belief-feeling,” a sense that the representation refers to an existing past 
experience. Other criteria such as how contextual linkages organize one memory in relation to 
other memories—a function seemingly not present in imagination.2 Alternatively, Bartlett 
maintains that remembering is based on one schema, while, in imagination, we construct several 
different schemas. Another criterion which is used to distinguish memory from imagination is 
commitment to truth and existence versus the absence of such commitment in imagination. 
                                                
1 Williams James, The Principles of Psychology, vol 1, (Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1981), 649. 
2 Brian Smith, Memory, Smith, Brian, Memory, (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1966), 142-143. 
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However, findings in neuroscience of memory challenge these criteria and, in fact, undermine all 
existing ways to distinguish between these two cognitive acts. Neuroscience emphasizes the 
dynamic process of memory adjustment. Memory is not a literal reproduction of the past, but 
instead an ongoing constructive process. Memories are modified and reconstructed repeatedly. 
Cognitive psychologists, who deal with memory expression, investigate how memory is formed, 
reconstructed and modified, and in what way it conforms to past experiences.3 These 
psychologists postulate that memory is a mechanism whose function it is to adapt and adjust to 
new circumstances and, as a byproduct, memory tends to fail in reproducing reality. For these 
reasons, memory exhibits forgetfulness, errors, inaccuracy, and distortions. 
Following the cognitive psychologists’ postulation that memory is a constructive process, 
neurobiological memory formation theories that examine the underlying neural mechanisms of 
memory support the dynamic and flexible nature of memory construction at the neurobiological 
level. Two central theories explain the constructive nature of memory, the Multiple Trace Theory 
and the Reconsolidation Theory. 
Multiple-trace-theory assumes that no single location contains the entire representation of a 
specific memory. Instead, the features of a memory are spread out and distributed over many 
locations. Retrieval of a past experience involves a process of assembling scattered memory 
features from different neuronal locations.4 However, this assembling is not a simple process in 
which all the pertained features obey at the time of retrieval and join to form an exact 
representation of past occurrence. Rather, retrieval is a process in which features from the 
                                                
3Asher Koriat, “Remembering: Metacognitive Monitoring and Control Processes,” in Science of Memory: Concepts, 
ed. Henry L. Roediger III, Yadin Dudai and Susan M. Fitzpatrick, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 243. 
4 Morris, Moscovitch, “Memory: Why the Engram is Elusive,” in Science of Memory: Concepts, ed. Henry L. 
Roediger III, Yadin Dudai and Susan M. Fitzpatrick, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 19. 
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original memory are omitted or lost, and features from other, associated memories are attached to 
the retrieved memory. Thus, retrieval of information does not just mean finding a stored object 
or pulling a past experience out from storage in a particular place,5 but an active reformation and 
reconstruction of it. 
The revision that neuroscientists have made to consolidation theory also emphasizes the elastic 
and constructive formation of memory. In the past, researchers claimed that memory 
consolidation (the process of memory stabilization) takes place only once. According to such 
accounts, a new memory is initially labile and becomes stabilized over time through the process 
of consolidation. This process converts an unstable short-term memory into a stable long-term 
memory. These researchers believed that after consolidation, memories are stable and resilient to 
disruption.6 Currently, however, neuroscientists, who study neural processes and mechanisms of 
memory persistence (e.g. synaptic strength and plasticity), show that consolidation takes place 
not only after new learning (encoding), but also after every recall (memory retrieval). During 
retrieval, consolidated memories enter a transient state where they become labile once again, and 
require another phase of consolidation (known as “reconsolidation”) to persist.7 The current 
hypothesis infers that the labile phase of reconsolidation allows new information to be associated 
with established and reactivated memories.8 Memory traces are modified and reconstructed to 
update and adjust them to new circumstances.9 Every time we recall, new perceptions, 
                                                
5 Endel Tulving, Element of Episodic Memory, (New York: Oxford University press, 1983), 5. 
6 Alberini CM, “Mechanisms of Memory Stabilization: Are Consolidation and Reconsolidation Similar or Distinct 
Processes?” Trends Neurosci 28, (2005): 51. 
7 Yadin Dudai, “The Neurobiology of Consolidations, Or, How stable is the Engram?” Ann. Rev. Psychol., 55, 
(2004): 51-86. See also Alberini CM, “Mechanisms of Memory Stabilization: Are Consolidation and 
Reconsolidation Similar or Distinct Processes?” 51. 
8 Tronel S, Milekic MH, and Alberine CM, ”Linking New information to a Reactivated Memory Requires 
Consolidation but not Reconsolidation Mechanism”, PloS Biol., 3(2005): 1630. 
9 Yadin Dudai, “Reconsolidation: The Advantage of Being Refocused”, Curr Opin Neurobiol 16(2), (2006): 175. 
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expectations, attitudes, perspectives are fused into the original memory trace, thereby 
constructing a new memory, a new meaning.10 Reconsolidation is a natural process where the 
memory trace of an event undergoes various modifications. These modifications cannot 
necessarily be considered errors or fabrication, but rather, are normal brain activity. In other 
words, memory distortion is characteristic of normal rather than pathological or abnormal 
remembering. Thus, multiple trace theory and reconsolidation theory bear out the idea that a 
memory is not a literal reproduction of the past, but instead a constant constructive process. This 
neurobiological characterization of memory provides a new framework for rethinking memory. 
If it is true that stored memories are continually being revived and revised through normal brain 
activity, this finding changes traditional concepts of memory representation. It might challenge 
the notion that memory is a source of factual truth and, as a result, transform the way we 
understand memory and remembering.  
Thus, neuroscience of memory poses new problems and raises several questions. What is the 
exact epistemological status of memories? How do neuroscientific models of memory impact the 
way in which we conceive of and relate to our past and to reality? Can we still speak about 
truthful memories even if they are in a perpetual state of modification? If our memories are 
perpetually modified, does this not imply that they are essentially memories of memories and re-
remembering of remembering rather than memories of the original perceived experience? Why 
are memories constantly being revised in the first place? Do these neurobiological insights 
indicate that memory’s function is not confined to represent the past?  
                                                
10 Yadin Dudai, “The Neurobiology of Consolidations, Or, How stable is the Engram?” 51-86. See also Steven, 
Rose, The Making of memory, From Molecules to Mind, (London: Vintage, 2003), 2. 
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Describing memory as a generative reconstructive process is not different from the way we 
define imagination. Not only do the description of how memory functions resembles how we 
characterize the functions of imagination, but neuroscience also shows that memory and 
imagination share similar functions, and, in addition, that memory and imagination depend on 
each other—that imagination is involved in remembering the past and remembering the past 
involves and enables imagining. Their mutual involvement is present in almost every cognitive 
act. Thus, the intuitive distinction between memory as a true representation of the past and 
imagination as independent from the real does not reflect the real, complex functions of each 
cognitive process and the interaction of both on each other. Both imagination and memory are 
cognitive capacities which alter, compound, dissociate, and reconstruct content. They are not 
separate cognitive acts responsible for disengaged processes, but, rather, are fused in various 
types of representation, reflection, simulation, and introspection. This constructive process of 
remembering integrates additional information and eliminates other elements without our 
awareness. We are not aware of the processes of association, reconstruction, and adjustment. 
Thus, the current neuroscientific accounts of memory not only cast doubt on the authority of 
memory, but in fact undermine the very distinction between memory and imagination. Our 
memories are accompanied by a misleading belief that they represent the past as it was. Indeed, 
imagination is not accompanied by this attitude of belief, regardless of whether it is deceptive or 
not. This, then, raises the question whether we can distinguish imagination and memory if, as 
neuroscience shows, our belief in the validity of memory is unaware of the process of 
construction and adjustment and therefore is oft unwarranted. Does this insight mean that we 
must conceive of memory and imagination as a hybrid, synergic function that blends fact and 
fiction? Does the process of revision and adjustment transform memory into imagination? 
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Questions remain about whether there is an effective criterion to identify instances of memory as 
distinguished from imagination, whether we can exercise memory without imagination.  
This research examines these issues. Indeed, some questions might remain unsettled until more 
research in neuroscience is done. Yet, a comprehensive understanding of the implications that 
derive from the current neuroscientific paradigms of memory requires a philosophical analysis 
which has yet not been done. In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the 
concept of memory and how memory relates to imagination, this research approaches memory 
from an interdisciplinary perspective. It integrates different levels, theories, and paradigms 
ranging from subfields in neuroscience (such as cognitive neuroscience and neurobiology) to 
philosophy. In short, the aim of my research is to examine whether the current neuroscientific 
account of memory casts doubt on the authority of memories, and undermines the distinction 
between memory and imagination. 
Not all kinds of memory are relevant to the following discussion. Certainly, all types of memory 
share common processes such as encoding, storing, and retrieval, but memory forms are 
distinguished by their function, features, and content. Some memory types deal with knowledge 
that is not relevant to the truthfulness-falseness dichotomy. Thus, I will mainly refer to episodic 
memory and especially autobiographical memory—the memories of personal experiences. 
Episodic and autobiographical memories hold implications for our understandings of truthfulness 
and falsity in memory more than any other form. Understanding the epistemology of episodic 
and autobiographical memory is, as a result, crucial for several applied domains such as in 
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psychotherapy (in which victims or witnesses may report events that did not happen11), or in 
legal cases and criminal investigations (in which memory reliability is highly important when 
eyewitness memory is required).12 In addition to these practical concerns, understanding the way 
our memory works is also important for how we view ourselves and our reality. We rely on the 
truth of our memories to form authentic personal identity, and to create trustworthy personal 
takes on historical events. Thus, the aim of this research is to examine whether neuroscience 
challenges the epistemological status of memories, and whether it undermines our belief in the 
reliability of memories and the truthfulness of the remembered.  
The research is divided to two sections. The first section deals with various accounts of memory 
and imagination. It is divided to two chapters. The first chapter discusses the British Empiricists’ 
accounts of memory and imagination—the ways Hobbes, Berkeley and Hume relate to memory 
and imagination and how they distinguish between these cognitive acts. The second chapter deals 
with how Husserl distinguishes between imagination and memory. The second section deals with 
neuroscience of memory and imagination. It is divided into three chapters. The first chapter 
examines cognitive and neuro-psychological approaches that consider the behavioral expressions 
and cognitive functions of memory and divide memory into a set of taxonomic systems. The 
chapter then maps the varieties, forms, and conditions of forgetting, misremembering, and 
memory distortions. Since I deal here only with memory as a normal state, I do not deal with 
memory disorders—the states where memory goes wrong due to age related memory loss, 
Alzheimer disease, or brain injuries. This part also reviews how neuroscientific theories describe 
                                                
11 Elizabeth Loftus, “Changing Beliefs About Implausible Events,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 
Vol. 7, No. 1, (2001): 51-59. Elizabeth Loftus, Memory Faults and Fixes,” Issues in Science & Technology, (2002): 
41-50. See also, J., Brainerd, and V. F. Reyna, The Science of False Memory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 219 -422. 
12 Elizabeth Loftus, “Our Changeable Memories: Legal and Practical implications,” Nature Reviews: Neuroscience 
(2003): 231. 
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memory formation and maintenance, noting the functions, operations, and processes that underlie 
memory. The second chapter of this section examines the philosophical conceptualizations, 
current neuroscientific accounts, and multiple cognitive manifestations of imagination. In the 
third chapter, I examine the intersections and possible overlap of memory and imagination. In it, 
I ask whether adjustment mechanisms and brain plasticity force us to consider imagination and 
memory as elements of one mental process, or whether we can still distinguish between these 
two cognitive processes and concepts. In this chapter, I examine whether neuroscientific theories 
of memory formation challenge the prevailing concepts of memory and whether a new, more 
correct concept been established. In this chapter, I also deal with the functions attributed to 
memory, challenge the veridicality of memory, and consider the epistemology of adaption.  
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Empiricist theories of memory and imagination: an epistemological perspective on the 
differences and similarities between memory and imagination 
  
From the classical Greek to Roman periods, through the Middle Ages, and to the Renaissance of 
the 17th Century, the approach to memory was essentially practical.13 Inquiry regarding memory 
was mainly in search of methods and techniques to improve learning and memorizing. The long 
tradition of mnemonic techniques14 reached its peak in the renaissance. 
Indeed, the British Empiricists were not the first ones to provide philosophical studies on 
memory. Plato, Aristotle, Augustine and other philosophers preceded them and offered models 
of memory. However, the British empiricists were the first to give modern epistemological 
accounts for memory. They dealt with memory as a part of their general concern with the nature 
of knowledge. They examined the phenomena and mechanism of memory and their relationship 
to other psychological faculties. One central relationship that the empiricists dealt with is the 
similarity between memory and imagination. The resemblance is considerable, given that both 
concepts share the same attributes and functions, and are involved in the formation of ideas from 
perceptions.  
                                                
13In their introduction to the anthology Memory in Historical Perspective, The Literature before Ebbinghaus, the 
editors Douglas J. Harmann and Roger Chaffin classified memory theorists into four approaches: pragmatic 
approach, the practical approach, the pre-theoretical and theoretical approaches and  see in  Harmann J. Douglas and 
Roger Chaffin (ed), Introduction Memory in Historical Perspective, The Literature before Ebbinghaus, (New York; 
Springer Verlag, 1988),1-7. 
14 See Art of Memory outlined in Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory, (Chicago: The University of Chicago press, 
1996). 
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Following the Cartesian Skepticism, the British empiricists strived to create a systematic theory 
that would establish validity for the “true knowledge of things.”15 For the empiricists, knowledge 
and experience are derived from perceptions. The mental operations of perceiving objects and 
forming images are ascribed to the imagination faculty. Since perceptions are then converted to 
images, it was natural for the empiricists to suppose that imagination was also equipped with the 
ability to retain and rearrange perceptions. In their view, imagination is a very broad concept. For 
Hobbes, for example, imagination is equivalent to other mental phenomena such as 
representation, conception and thinking. Imagination contains the capacity to form and retain 
representations or ideas. It also holds a constructive ability which constitutes thinking, and is 
involved in the process of generating knowledge and experience. That is, imagination manifests 
itself not only in the formation of images from sensory experiences, but also in the combination 
and association of several images into a new composite image. Thereby, imagination holds the 
ability to invent and fancy. However, fancy was only one aspect among many others and not the 
dominant one which was assigned to imagination. Most empiricists, in a similar fashion, assign 
multiple capacities to memory. Hobbes, for example, ascribes to memory the ability to compare, 
distinguish, and combine sensations to images. Berkeley links imagination and memory to 
volition and passion, while Hume accredits memory with the cause of belief, casual inference, 
and the constitution of personal identity.16 
Both memory and imagination originate from perception and are ranked in a subordinate status 
to perception in the hierarchical epistemology. The affinity between the two is so great that they 
                                                
15 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Epistle to the Reader. 
16 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, book I, part IV, Sect. VI. Of Personal Identity. 
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are presented as two conjunct forms of knowledge, and are regarded as two psychical partners.17 
They possess many identical features, intermingle in their operations, and borrow their objects 
from one another. There is a constant parallel between them. Each can connect, combine, and 
dissociate the knowledge that comes from perceptions. Both memory and imagination refer, 
represent, and are involved in retaining the past. Indeed, the empiricists form close connections 
between memory and imagination. However, in spite of assigning them multiple common 
capacities, a tendency to distinguish between them does still exist. Since both images of memory 
and imagination represent the past, what, then, distinguishes a representation of an image of 
memory from being an imaginary representation? 
According to Hobbes, memory and imagination overlap. They have identical attributes 
and functions with a very slight difference. They “are but one thing, which for divers 
consideration hath divers names”. The difference, in his view, depends on whether a sense of 
time passing is attached to an image, or if the image itself is stressed. Memory, then, implies a 
time elapsed, while imagination implies the thing itself. Berkeley does not distinguish between 
memory and imagination, since they produce and carry the same operations. For Berkeley, the 
crucial distinction exists instead between perception, on the one hand, and imagination and 
memory on the other. This distinction was defined by realness. Senses are real things, because 
their existence depends on God, and they are involuntarily. Memory and imagination, on the 
other hand, are less real because they depend on a human mind’s volition. According to Hume, 
imagination and memory differ in terms of degree. Hume does not deny that imagination carries 
a reference to the past. However, he does ascribe more validity and reliability to memory than to 
                                                
17 Edward S. Casey, ”Imagination, Fantasy, hallucination, and Memory”, in Imagination and Its Pathologies, ed. 
James Phillips and James Morley, (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2003), 65. 
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imagination. He conceptualizes validity and reliability in terms of degree of vivacity. Memory is 
more vivid and it keeps the form and order of the past. However, Hume himself indicates 
qualifications for both these criteria. He is aware that neither relative vivacity nor keeping the 
form and order of the past are adequate criteria for distinguishing between memory and 
imagination. There is no way of verifying whether memory keeps the form and order of the no 
longer exiting past. More than that, an idea belonging to memory, can degenerate so much, in 
losing its vividness, that it could be mistaken for an idea belonging to imagination. Conversely, 
an idea belonging to imagination can acquire such vividness that it would be mistaken for an idea 
belonging to memory. It seems that a gradual distinction cannot be grounds for an essential 
distinction between the two. 
In the following chapters I will deal with the distinctions and the similarities that are ascribed to 
memory and imagination by the philosophers Thomas Hobbes, George Berkeley, and David 
Hume.18 However, the examination of these three philosophers will also include, when it is 
needed, more than a narrow examination of the conceptions memory and imagination since 
sometimes these conceptions can only be understood by relating to them to the philosopher’s 
whole theory.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
18 John Locke is not included since he discarded the distinctions and mutual operation of imagination and memory. 
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The scope and function of imagination and memory in Hobbes’ natural philosophy   
In Hobbes’ natural philosophy, imagination is a broad and comprehensive concept that exhibits 
different abilities and that relates to various cognitive and psychological capacities, such as 
thinking, knowing and conceiving among others.19 The overlap between these various capacities 
abolishes the distinction between them, on the one hand, and leads to inconsistency and 
contradictions on the other. One central overlap and resulting inconsistency in Hobbes’ natural 
philosophy exists between the concepts imagination and memory. Hobbes ascribes to both 
concepts identical attributes and similar functions with a very slight difference. While at the 
beginning of these issues’ consideration, it seems that imagination is a broader and more 
important concept, later these two conceptions are merged together and at some point memory 
becomes central. This reversal did not occur because memory was perceived as more reliable 
than imagination. It also did not occur because imagination was viewed as deceiving and as a 
threat to reason. Hobbes is not interested in hierarchical theory, a theory in which imagination is 
believed to be a lower activity of the mind. He has no disdain for imagination. Just the opposite, 
he eliminates the former distrust attributed to imagination. Imagination is part of his scientific 
investigation of natural law, “as organic function of the mind.”20 For Hobbes, imagination 
originates with the senses, and then embodies understanding and knowledge in the mind.  
                                                
19 Hobbes uses the terms imagination, fancy, and phantasm sometimes as identical and sometimes for different uses. 
He does not make any clear distinction between them. In the following text, I will not deal with the coincidences and 
differences of these terms so when terms are mentioned either as imagination, fancy or phantasm, I relate to them as 
synonyms. For Hobbes's uses of the concept imagination see: Juhana Lametti, “The Most Natural and The most 
Artificial: Hobbes on Imagination”, Hobbes Studies, Vol. 17, Issue: 1, (January 1, 2005): 48-50; Juhana Lametti, 
Imagination and Diversity in the Philosophy of Hobbes, (PhD diss., Helsinki University Press, Helsinki, 2006), 47- 
53. Clarence DeWitt Thorpe, The Aesthetic Theory of Thomas Hobbes, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan press, 
1940), 79– 85. F.S. McNeilly, The Anatomy of Leviathan, (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 30-31. A. p. Martinich, 
Hobbes, (New York, Routledge, 2005), 35-37.  
20 Thorpe, The Aesthetic Theory of Thomas Hobbes, 24. 
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The different modes of imagination  
Hobbes divides the capacities of human beings into two kinds: capacities of the body and 
capacities of the mind.21 The mind has two powers: 1) cognitive (also known as imaginative or 
conceptual);22 and 2) motive (deliberation and action). By cognitive, Hobbes encompasses 
capacities such as imagination, knowledge, cognition, conception, etc. 
 “This imagery, and these representations of the qualities of things outside us, is 
what we call our ‘cognition’, ‘imagination’, ‘ideas’, ‘notion’, ‘conception’, or 
‘knowledge’ of them.”23 
As equivalent to cognitive capacities such as knowledge, ideas, and thinking,24 
imagination embraces a variety of other mental capacities such as sensations, perception, 
understanding, memory, dreams,25 vision, apparition, and beliefs.26 Imagination is endowed with 
the ability to divide, distinguish, unite, and associate the images which establish these mental 
capacities. Because imagination involves such a broad variety of conceptions, and relates to 
many other mental capacities, the term is not always consistent. In different works of his, it 
applies to different notions. However, imagination, in its different manifestations, refers to two 
main modes: one which is responsible for storing and retaining, and the second which is 
responsible, for constructing and forming capacities. In the first mode, imagination is a capacity 
                                                
21 Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law, part I, chapter 1:5.  
22The Elements Of law, Part I, Chapter I: 7. 
23The Element of Law, Part I, Chapter 1:8. 
24See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed with an introduction: J.C.A. Gaskin (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), part I, chapter VIII. 
25Thomas Hobbes, “Concerning Body” in English Works, collected and edited by Sir William Molesworth, Bart, 
(London, J. Bohn, 1839-1845), Vol. I, IV, 25:7, 396. 
26For other attributes of imagination such as invention, wit and poetry see: Thorpe, The Aesthetic Theory of Thomas 
Hobbes, 96 – 112. 
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of the mind, and acts as a mental state equivalent to representation. Imagination is, in that mode, 
the appearance in the mind of the external object’s effect, upon which we rely for knowledge.  
In the second mode, imagination is in itself a constructive ability that constitutes thinking and 
takes part in the process of generating knowledge and experience. Imagination, in this second 
mode, is the power that enables the encounter of motion from objects with our senses.  
In this state there is an overlap between imagination and senses. 
Imagination derives from the senses  
The scientific method of Hobbes begins with his consideration of the constitutive and structuring 
elements of our knowledge and cognitive capacities. Though understanding and knowledge are 
common to men and animals, the knowledge which is peculiar to men consists of conceptions 
and thoughts. Hobbes distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge: (1) the knowledge of 
particular facts, and (2) the knowledge of consequences, conception27 and reasoning. These two 
kinds of knowledge both stem from the imagination. A thought is a representation or appearance 
in our imagination of an external object which affects our senses. Imagination is composed of 
successive images, which are derived from our senses.28 We conceive and imagine only what we 
perceive by our senses, and therefore the whole of human knowledge is derived from our 
senses.29  Hobbes writes, 
“For there is no conception in a man's mind which hath not at first, totally or by 
parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense.” 30 
 
                                                
27For imagination as equivalent to conception, See: Hobbes, The Elements of Law, part I, chapter II. 
28Hobbes did not say much about the way our senses operate. 
29Hobbes, Concerning Body, vol I, IV, I, p. 389. 
30Hobbes, Leviathan, part I, chapter I. See also The Elements of Law, part I, chapter II. 
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We cannot have any thought or knowledge that does not rely on the different senses and their 
qualities.31 By senses, Hobbes means five kinds of senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste, and 
touch.32 The sensible qualities (such as colors, sounds, and odors) that we ascribe to objects are 
not inherent qualities of these objects but apparitions that we receive from the motion or the 
agitation which the objects stimulate in our brain. Hobbes writes: 
 
“For if those colours and sounds were in the bodies or objects that cause them, 
they could not be severed from them, as by glasses and in echoes by reflection we 
see they are: where we know the thing we see is in one place; the appearance, in 
another. And though at some certain distance the real and very object seem 
invested with the fancy it begets in us; yet still the object is one thing, the image 
or fancy is another. So that sense in all cases is nothing else but original fancy 
caused (as I have said) by the pressure that is, by the motion of external things 
upon our eyes, ears, and other organs, thereunto ordained.”33 
 
A bell, for example, does not produce sound, but produces motions. These motions pass through 
the air, then press on our ears, pass to our brain, and then become an image.34 Our senses make 
us think that these qualities, such as sound, are in the world, while in fact they exist only in the 
                                                
31Hobbes, Leviathan, part I, chapter III. 
32“By our several organs we have several conceptions of several qualities in the objects; for by sight we have a 
conception or image composed of colour or figure, which is all the notice and knowledge the object imparteth to us 
of its nature by the eye. By hearing we have a conception called sound, which is all the knowledge we have of the 
quality of the object from the ear. And so the rest of the senses also are conceptions of several qualities, or natures of 
their objects.” The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, part I, chapter II: 3. 
33Leviathan, part I, chapter I. 
34Elements of Law, part I chapter II: 8. 
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human mind. The cause of the sensation is the motion of the object. Hobbes makes the 
distinction between the external object of perceptions and perceptual images in the mind: 
“And from thence also it followeth, that whatsoever accidents or qualities our 
senses make us think there be in the world, they are not there, but are seemings 
and apparitions only. The things that really are in the world without us, are those 
motions by which these seemings are caused. And this is the great deception of 
sense, which also is by sense to be corrected. For as sense telleth me, when I see 
directly, that the colour seemeth to be in the object; so also sense telleth me, when 
I see by reflection, that colour is not in the object.”35 
Imagination- a decaying sense 
In contrast to Descartes’ doubt, Hobbes does not discard external reality, but he does rule out that 
qualities are parts of the objects, instead describing the objects as consisting of motion. He also 
dismisses Descartes’ dualism by establishing the principles of his natural philosophy on 
materialism, the idea that the whole universe is corporeal. Hobbes regards the mental activities 
such as sensations, perceptions, and imagination in terms of matter as well.36 In his view, we are 
material objects, as are all the other objects. Through our sense organs, we perceive these other 
objects that surround us.37 Since materialism applies to all cognitive capacities, the stimulation in 
                                                
35The Elements of Law, part I, chapter II: 10. 
36For a short review of the theories of motion and change from the Greeks to Hobbes see: Thomas A., Spragens, Jr., 
The politics of Motions: The world of Thomas Hobbes, (Kentucky:The University Press of Kentucky, 1973), 53-76. 
37 MacNeilly, The Anatomy of Leviathan, 31. 
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our sense organs is therefore produced by motions from the external bodies.38 The reaction of the 
senses to objects is of 
 “resistance or reaction against the motion which is propagated from the object to 
the innermost part of the organ [...] then from the reaction, how little soever the 
duration of it be, a phantasm or idea hath its being.”39  
 
This is the same with all the senses, such as sight, taste, smell, hearing and feeling.40 The 
motions of the bodies are transformed to images, to representation, that eventually become our 
awareness, our imagination, and conceptions of the world (all of them described alternately as 
the same). In other words, imagination is the ability of the appearance of the external objects. 41 
Hobbes maintains that all bodies are either in motion or lie still. Their state cannot be changed 
unless something external either stirs up the motionless things or inhibits the moving things. 
“Nothing can change itself.”42 That is, if an object is inanimate only something external can 
change its state by stirring it up and alternatively, “it will eternally be in motion unless somewhat 
else stay it.”43 The inhibition of the movement will not take place immediately but occurs 
gradually:  
 “As we see in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over 
rolling for a long time after; so also it happeneth in that motion which is made 
in the internal parts of a man, then, when he sees, dreams, etc. For after the 
                                                
38On Hobbes's theory of motion regarding senses see Richard Peters, Hobbes, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1956), 
103- 115.  See also Bernard Gert, “Hobbes's Psychology”, in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, ed. Tom 
Sorell, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 157- 160. 
39Concerning Body, vol 1, IV, 25: 2, p. 391. 
40Concerning Body, vol 1, IV, 25: 9. 
41Leviathan, part I, chapter I. 
42Leviathan, part I, chapter II. 
43Leviathan, part I, chapter II. 
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object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, 
though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it the Latins call 
imagination, from the image made in seeing, and apply the same, though 
improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it fancy, which signifies 
appearance, and is as proper to one sense as to another. Imagination, therefore, 
is nothing but decaying sense.”44  
 
 Images or conceptions of external objects remain in our imagination after the external objects 
cease to appear to us. After the movement has ceased to exist or was inhibited, the effect lingers 
on but more vaguely than it was at the moment we first encountered it. There is a difference in 
clarity between the time the object impinges upon our senses and the time the object ceases to 
appear to us. The distinction between senses and imagination depends on whether the external 
objects are present. So long as the objects are present, they are in the realm of the senses but the 
moment the objects cease to appear to the senses, they are established in imagination, which is a 
“decaying sense.” 45 However, it is not clear what exactly the relationship between sense and 
imagination is, nor when sense becomes imagination. Also, it is not clear where imagination and 
sense overlap, or how this overlap is limited. 46 
Simple and compound imaginations  
Imagination is divided to two kinds; simple and compound. Simple imaginations are those which 
are perceived all at once, like an image of man or horse, while compound imaginations are 
simple ones which were perceived as separate images in different occasions and have been 
                                                
44Leviathan, part I, chapter II. 
45Leviathan, part I, chapter II. 
46 On this concern see Juhana Lametti, Imagination and Diversity in the Philosophy of Hobbes, 52. 
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combined to form one image. For example, the image of a man which was perceived at one time 
and the image of a horse which was perceived at another time form a compound imagination of a 
centaur.47 The image of mountain when combined with an image of the color of gold forms a 
new image of Golden Mountain.48 Another compound imagination is, for example, when we 
have an image of ourselves combined with an action of another person, like when a person 
imagines himself as Hercules. Compound imaginations are fictive imaginations of the mind and 
do not belong to the real world, “and this composition is what we usually call a fiction of the 
mind.”49 Thereby Hobbes distinguishes imagination from fiction.50 While imagination derives 
from the senses and refers to a real reality, fiction is composed of delusive combinations that we 
form from two or more separate images. Compounded imaginations are productive but bring 
about fictitious associations.51 These images relied on the senses, but their combination brings 
about unreal and delusive imaginations such as satyrs, fauns, nymphs, fairies, ghosts and goblins. 
Fiction is attributed to the sphere of illusion, apparition, and of the unreal. Hobbes also describes 
fictions as a resulting in confusing dreams, with apparitions such as “ghosts and incorporeal 
substances,”52 or superstitious and false prophecies which derived from fears and false belief.  
 While Hobbes distinguishes between true imagination and delusive imagination, he does not 
deal with the reliability of knowledge, that is, the reliability of simple imaginations that are 
                                                
47Leviathan part I, chapter II. 
48Elements of Laws, part I, chapter II: 4. 
49Leviathan part I, chapter II. 
50Leviathan part I, chapter II.  
51Hobbes also describes a form of compounded imagination which occurs simultaneously with the process of 
perception. While Hobbes claims that compound imagination is formed from two imaginations from different times, 
in Concerning Body, he maintains that the senses work just like the compounded imagination does. Since we cannot 
perceive more than one object at the same time, that is, since our sense organs can be moved by only one object at a 
given time, our imagination merges several actions into one imagination. And this action is not perceived as fiction: 
“And therefore two several phantasms will not be made by two objects working together, but only one phantasm 
compounded from the action of both.” vol I, IV, 25:6. p. 394. 
52Concerning Body, vol I, IV 25: 9, p. 402. 
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produced from sensations. He does not deal with the compatibility between sensations and the 
external objects,53 though he does argue against deceiving and illusory common sense which 
misleads us in believing that the qualities we sense are inherent in the objects themselves:54 
“From this it also follows that, whatever accidents or qualities our senses make 
us think there are in the world, they are not out there, but are only seemings 
and appearances. The things which really exist in the world outside us are the 
motions by which these seemings are caused. And this is the great sensory 
illusion; but one which is also to be corrected by sensation. For just as it is 
sensation which tells me, when I look directly at an object, that the colour 
seems to be in the object; so also it is sensation which tells me, when I look at 
a reflected object, that colour is not in the object.”55 
This sensory deception is corrected by sensations themselves, by understanding that the 
existence of objects is equal to reflected objects, distorted objects which are optical errors and do 
not contain their qualities in themselves. However, this view does not lead Hobbes to indicate a 
correlation between images and the motions from the external objects. Neither does he deal with 
whether nor how we know that the internal motions of our brain correspond correctly to the 
motions of the bodies external to us. He also does not discuss the need to verify the objective  
imagination of external objects. 
 
                                                
53Richard Peters, Hobbes, (Baltimore: Penguin Books,1956), 109 - 110. See also F.S. McNeilly, p.31. 
54On the subjectivity of sensible qualities see Cees Leijenhorst, The Mechanism of Aristotelianism, (Boston: Brill, 
2002), 84- 85. 
55Elements of Law, part I, chapter II:10. See also Elements of Law part I, chapter II:IV. 
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Memory – decaying of the senses 
 Hobbes describes the senses as going through process of decay: “Imagination, therefore, is 
nothing but decaying sense.”56 However, according to Hobbes, there is no real process of decay 
in our imagination but instead an obscuring by other dominant objects. Like the stars that are 
invisible for us during the day because the light of the sun obscures them, our old imaginations 
become obscure because of impressions of new senses from external objects. The predominant 
affects obscure the less dominant. The influence of the less dominant objects that is, the objects 
that we do not sense or experience any more are not removed from our imagination but still have 
their lingering effect on us. 
“Any object being removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us 
remain, yet other objects more present succeeding, and working on us, the 
imagination of the past is obscured and made weak, as the voice of a man is in 
the noise of the day.” 57 
The strength of the image depends on the time from the original sense impression. Distance of 
the time has an effect on our imagination.58 The longer the time that passes the weaker is our 
imagination. Distance brings about the fading of a perceived object’s small parts, which seem 
weak and inarticulate. Until this point Hobbes does not draw any distinction between memory 
and imagination. Quite the opposite, he connects imagination and the past in that imagination 
                                                
56Leviathan, part I, chapter II. 
57Leviathan, part I, chapter II. 
58Hobbes maintains that time and space are imaginary concepts since we do not have any direct experience of them. 
These two conceptions are deducted from other experience. We experience moving objects but their moving in time 
or in space is our deduction. On Hobbes’s notions of space and time, see Cees Leijenhorst, The Mechanisation of 
Aristotelianism: the Late Aristotelian setting of Thomas Hobbes’ Natural Philosophy, (Boston: Brill, 2002), 101-
137. 
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carries a sense of time and as a result, the distinction between imagination and memory is 
abolished: 
“So also after great distance of time our imagination of the past is weak; and 
we lose, for example, of cities we have seen, many particular streets; and of 
actions, many particular circumstances.” 59 
 However the distinction between memory and imagination comes shortly after that. Imagination, 
according to Hobbes, is the image of the thing itself, in other words the thing which impinges on 
the senses. Alternatively, memory is the image coupled with a notion of elapsed time, in other 
words the sense of decaying which attached to the image. Memory retains an image of sensible 
things after the objects themselves have ceased to appear to us, “[f]or he that perceives that he 
hath perceived, remembers.”60 The feeling of elapsed time and therefore the decaying of the 
senses is what distinguishes imagination from memory. Hobbes actually sees memory and 
imagination as the same thing but which serve different purposes: imagination describes the 
image itself, while memory describes the image in its weak and decayed existence:  
“This decaying sense, when we would express the thing itself (I mean fancy 
itself), we call imagination, as I said before. But when we would express the 
decay, and signify that the sense is fading, old, and past, it is called memory. 
So that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for diverse 
considerations hath diverse names.” 61 
Or as he expresses it in Concerning Body: 
                                                
59Leviathan, part I, chapter II. 
60Concerning Body, vol I, IV, I, p. 389. 
61Leviathan, part I, chapter II. 
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“Fancy and memory, differs only in this, that memory supposeth the time past, 
which fancy doth not. In memory, the phantasms we consider as if they were 
worn out with time, but in our fancy we consider them as they are; which 
distinction is not of the things themselves, but of the considerations of the 
sentient. For there is in memory something like that which happens in looking 
upon things at a great distance; in which as the small parts of the object are not 
discerned, by reason of their remoteness; so in memory, many accidents and 
places and parts of things, which were formerly perceived by sense, are by 
length of time decayed and lost.”62  
Memory and imagination are almost the same thing (in contrast to fiction) and to some extent 
coincide.63 The difference between them is sensible. When we express the process of decay and 
signify the change in the original sense impression, we refer to memory. When we refer to the 
thing itself without its decay, it is the imagination. The only criterion for distinguishing memory 
from imagination is the growing of decay and vagueness of the image. However, this was the 
same criterion that Hobbes uses to distinguish imagination from senses (see few pages back). 
The decaying of the senses is what turns senses to imagination. Nevertheless, this same criterion 
also becomes the distinguishing criterion between imagination and memory. As a result, it seems 
that in some places in the text, imagination is identical with sense and in some other places, with 
memory. 
                                                
62Concerning Body, vol I, IV, 25:8. p.399. 
63Tom Sorell, “Hobbes's Psychology”, in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, ed. Tom Sorell, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 83 -85. 
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            The decay of senses is not due to any inherent tendency to languish but to the competitive 
interference of later impressions which leave the prior ones in a concealed state: 
“From hence it is manifest, that every endeauvour of the organ outwards, is not 
to be called sense, but that only, which at several times is by vehemence made 
stronger and more predominant than the rest; which deprives us of the sense of 
other phantasms, no otherwise than the sun deprives the rest of the stars of 
light, not by hindering their action, but by obscuring and hiding them with his 
excess of brightness.”64    
In the Elements of Law Hobbes attributes another feature to memory- recognition, the awareness 
of having experienced a similar thing previously. We experience external objects through our 
senses, but when an imagination reappears, and we are aware of a conception originating from 
the past, this is “classed as a sixth sense, but an internal one, not an external one like the others; 
and it is usually called ‘memory’.”65 The two above distinctions of memory from imagination are 
similar and connected. The first distinction expresses how memory relates to fading and 
weakening sense, while the second distinction includes an awareness of already having received 
an imagination in the past and having it again now. This second attribution leads to a third one, 
which Hobbes ascribed to memory – Judgment. While in other places Hobbes merges sense and 
imagination here he combines memory and sense:  
“For by sense, we commonly understand the judgment we make of objects by 
their phantasm; namely by comparing and distinguishing those phantasms; 
                                                
64Concerning Body, vol I, IV, 25:6, p 396. 
65The Elements of Law, part I, chapter III: 6. 
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which we could never do, if the motion in the organ, by which the phantasm is 
made did not remain there for some time, and make the same phantasm return. 
Wherefore sense, as I here understand it, and which is commonly so called, 
hath necessarily some memory adhering to it, by which former and later 
phantasms may be compared together and distinguished from one another”66 
 The abilities to compare and to distinguish, which were previously attributed to imagination, 
here are attributed to memory.67 It is memory which is infused in our senses and which enables 
us to perceive through our senses. Without comparing and distinguishing imaginations from each 
other, there is no way to make conceptions. Memory is the tool which provides an awareness of 
the past, but it also enables us to make conceptions by comparing and distinguishing. 
“For he that thinketh, compareth the phantasms that pass, that is, taketh notice 
of their likeness or unlikeness to one another. And as he that observes readily 
the likenesses of things of different natures, or that are very remote from one 
another, is said to have a good fancy; so he is said to have a good judgment, 
that finds out the unlikenesses or differences of things that are like one another. 
Now this observation of differences is not perception made by a common 
organ of sense, distinct from sense or perception properly so called, but it is 
memory of the differences of particular phantasms remaining for some time; as 
                                                
66 In Concerning Body Hobbes attributes judgment to phantasm, see: vol 1, IV, 25: 5 p. 393.  
67 See for example “Judgment [...] is gotten by experience; and experience is store of phantasm, arising of the sense 
of very many things.”Concerning Body, vol I, part IV, 25:8, p.398. Or “For he that thinketh, compareth the 
phantasms that pass, that is taketh notice of their likeness or unlikeness to one another. And as he that observes 
readily the likeness of things different natures, or that are very remote from one another, is said to have a good 
fancy; so he is said to have a good judgment, that finds out the likeness or differences of things that are like one 
another. Now this observation of differences [....] is memory of the differences of particular phantasms remaining 
for some time.” Concerning Body, vol I, part IV, 25;8, p. 399. 
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the distinction between hot and lucid, is nothing else but the memory both of 
heating, and of enlightening object.”68 
Hobbes also adds the ability to conjecture to memory. Old people have the ability to conjecture 
better since they remember more and have more experience.69  
“Nevertheless, it is obvious that the people who have had most experience will 
make the best conjectures, because they have the most signs to conjecture by. 
This is why, other things being equal, old people are more foresightful, that is, 
conjecture better, than young people. For, being older, they remember more; 
and experience is nothing other than remembering. And people who have a 
quick imagination, other things being equal, are more foresightful than people 
with slow imaginations, since they observe more in less time. And 
foresightfulness is nothing other than conjecture from experience, or cautiously 
taking signs from experience — that is, so that all the individual experiences 
from which the signs are taken are remembered, otherwise events which seem 
alike might not really be alike.”70 
The ability to make good judgments and to have foresight also leads to the ability to make 
conceptions of the future out of conceptions of the past. The consequences of the past enable us 
to deduce possible consequences of the future: 
                                                
68Concerning Body, vol 1, IV, 25:8, p. 399. 
69“Much memory, or memory of many things, is called experience”. Leviathan, part I, chapter II. 
70The Elements of Law, part I, chapter 4:10. 
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“And in this way, we turn remembering into foreseeing, or conjecturing what 
will happen, or an expectation, or an assumption about the future.”71  
Finally, the collaboration between sense and memory forms our knowledge: 
 “There are two kinds of knowledge. One is nothing other than sensation, or 
original knowledge (as I said at the beginning of Chapter 2), and the memory 
of it. The other is called ‘scientific knowledge’, or knowledge of the truth of 
propositions and of what things are called; and it is derived from 
understanding. Both kinds of knowledge are nothing other than experience: 
sensation is the experience of the effects of things which influence us 
externally; and scientific knowledge is the experience people have of the 
proper use of names in language. And since, as I have said, all experience is 
nothing but remembering, it follows that all knowledge is remembering. When 
we record the former in books, it is called ‘history’; and when we record the 
latter, it is called the ‘sciences’.”72  
Conclusion 
Hobbes's accounts of memory and imagination overlap and are even identical. Therefore, they 
are contradictory. He assigns the same scope and function to imagination as he does to memory. 
Since their attributes are identical, differences between them become blurred. While at the 
beginning of his account on the way senses and imagination operate, Hobbes connects 
imagination and the senses very closely. It even seems that imagination and the senses coincide 
                                                
71The Elements of Law, part I, chapter 5.   
72The Elements of Law, part I, chapter 6. 
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since it is not quite clear in what point they are distinguished. However he tries to distinguish 
between imagination and the senses by defining imagination as a decaying sense: “Imagination 
therefore is nothing else but sense decaying, or weakened, by the absence of the object.”73 Here, 
imagination is conceived as a very broad term which includes memory and senses together with 
others capacities such as dream and fiction. In some other texts, Hobbes elaborates his 
psychological philosophy, where a very similar view regarding imagination also applies to 
memory. He ascribes the same functions to memory which were also ascribed to imagination. 
Examples include constructing, understanding, retaining images and knowledge, responsibility 
for experience, and the ability of comparing and distinguishing (i.e. judgment). Even Hobbes’ 
apparently consistent distinction regarding memory and imagination (where he attaches a sense 
of the past to memory) is not consistent because Hobbes distinguishes imagination from sense by 
the same definition in that “imagination is decaying sense.” 
How can one solve these contradicting statements regarding memory and imagination? What are 
the limits, functions, and relations of senses, memory, and imagination?74 Do memory and 
imagination possess the same features? Do they have the same function?    
It seems that even with a very prudent and careful reading of Hobbes's texts, this contradiction 
will not be solved unless we understand them as indeed the same thing and to assert that the only 
difference between them is that imagination indicates itself while memory indicates the decaying 
                                                
73Concerning Body, IV, 25, 8, p. 396. 
74Thorpe, 1940, p. 113. 
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that “supposeth the time past.”75 “So that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for 
diverse considerations hath diverse names.” 76 That is, they are two aspects of the same thing. 
 
Berkeley’s two mental events: Ideas of senses and ideas of imagination and memory 
          At first, Berkeley’s philosophy may not seem an obvious choice for dealing with the 
relation between memory and imagination. It is, indeed, true that Berkeley does not distinguish 
between these two faculties. He either treats them as the same or just ignores their differences. 
However, Berkeley’ philosophy is very pertinent and relevant to this deliberation. He describes 
sense, imagination, and memory as having the same ontological status, on the one hand, but 
distinguishes their epistemological status on the other. Senses, imagination, and memory are all 
ideas but they are different in their realness.  
Idealism – the denial of matter 
Berkeley’s primary motivation is to refute the principles which lead to skepticism. In response to 
this concern, he denies metaphysical dualism — the existence of two different kinds of 
substances, spirit and matter.77 Dualism assumes a difference between real physical entities 
(which have external and independent existence) and ideas that represent these physical 
entities.78 The existence of two different kinds of substance leads to a contradiction, 
inconsistency, and epistemological skepticism, since these external entities are impenetrable. Our 
senses cannot inform us of things that exist externally to the mind. There is no way to insure that 
                                                
75Concerning Body, part I, chapter IV, 25: 8, p. 398. 
76Leviathan, part I, chapter II. 
77George, Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge,1710, part I, section 86. In the next 
footnotes it will be cited in abbreviation PHK and by section number. 
78 PHK, sec. 86. 
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the things that are perceived in our mind are compatible with those that exist outside the mind. 
We see only appearances, not the real qualities of things. In this state, the knowledge that we 
have is inferred from our perceptions. One cannot be certain of having any real knowledge of 
external reality at all. This stand, which led him to his theory, is manifested repeatedly.  
“THE EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL BODIES AFFORDS NO 
EXPLICATION OF THE MANNER IN WHICH OUR IDEAS ARE 
PRODUCED.”79   
There is no way to know how ideas can be produced from external objects. There is no way to 
know:   
“[i]n what manner BODY CAN ACT UPON SPIRIT, or how it is possible it 
should imprint any idea in the mind.”80              
             Berkeley responds to the problem that dualism implies. He tries to provide a metaphysics 
which is free of skepticism. In order to overcome skepticism, he denies the existence of matter 
and reduces all things to immaterial substances. He constructs an ontology which denies any 
external corporal materials and acknowledges only ideas. The existence of ideas depends on 
minds with which to perceive them. Similar to Hobbes, Berkeley opposes the position that 
maintains sensible qualities are part of the material objects. However, his solution was the 
extreme opposite of Hobbes’ solution. While Hobbes posits materialism, Berkeley posits 
Idealism. Hobbes, who dismisses Descartes’ skepticism and dualism, rules out that properties 
and qualities are inherent in external bodies themselves, however he does not discard the 
                                                
79 PHK sec. 19. 
80 PHK, sec. 19. 
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existence of external substance. On the contrary, he applies materialism to all bodies in the 
external world as well as to mental activities. Hobbes reduces everything to motion.81 Berkeley 
also rejects the distinctive ontology which Locke ascribes to primary and secondary qualities.82 
Locke distinguishes between primary (size, shape, solidity, motion, etc.) and secondary qualities 
(colors, sounds, tastes, etc.). While primary qualities are qualities which exist in the material 
objects themselves, secondary qualities are those object’s ability to produce senses in us. These 
secondary qualities exist not in the objects themselves but are produced by human imagination.83 
Locke assigns an external existence to primary qualities. He does not deny material existence, 
but he maintains that secondary qualities are sensations or ideas existing only in the mind. 
Berkeley denies that primary and secondary qualities have a different ontology and confers the 
same status to both of them because both of them exist at the moment that the mind perceives 
them. He denies either primary qualities or secondary qualities as having external existence 
outside the mind.  Thus, the project of denying dualism in order to overcome skepticism leads 
Berkeley to the exact opposite position as Hobbes. It also leads Berkeley to reject Locke’s 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities. He dismisses dualism and the existence of 
material substance84 and posits immaterialism. 85 Berkeley writes,  
                                                
81 See the part which deals with Hobbes. 
82 PHK, sec. 9. See also Jackson Reginald, “Locke’s Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities in Locke 
and Boyle” in Locke and Berkeley, A collection of Critical essays, ed. C. B. Martin and D. M. Armstrong, (London: 
University of Notre Dame press, 1968), 53-77. 
83 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, sec, VIII.  
84 The existence of material substance is for Berkeley “WORDS WITHOUT A MEANING.” It is an empty 
expression. PHK, 24. 
85 Berkeley’s immaterialism indeed belongs to the idealist tradition yet he is considered as empiricist since all the 
knowledge is received from the senses. See discussion on that in Michael  R., Ayers, Berkeley, “Ideas and 
Idealism,” in  Reexamining Berkeley’s Philosophy, ed. Stephen H. Daniel, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2007) 12-13. See also Lisa J. Downing, “Berkeley,” in A Companion to the Philosophers, ed. Robert L. Arrington, 
(MA: Blackwell: Malden, 1999), 169. 
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 “To explain the phenomena, is all one as to shew why, upon such and such 
occasions, we are affected with such and such ideas. But how Matter should 
operate on a Spirit, or produce any idea in it, is what no philosopher will 
pretend to explain; it is therefore evident there can be no use of Matter in 
natural philosophy. Besides, they who attempt to account for things do it not 
by corporeal substance, but by figure, motion, and other qualities, which are in 
truth no more than mere ideas, and, therefore, cannot be the cause of anything, 
as hath been already shewn”.86  
         Berkeley rules out two level of existence: he dismisses materialism, the corporeal substance 
of the sensible objects, and he dismisses the existence of sensible qualities separated from a 
perceiver. There are no outward objects. These qualities “are ONLY IDEAS EXISTING IN THE 
MIND.”87 All qualities like size, motion, and velocity exist in the mind. Therefore, we should not 
assume that ideas are formed from material bodies but rather from other ideas. In this way, 
Berkeley resolves the problem of epistemological validity by dismissing the problem of 
matching internal ideas to external material objects.  
The real existence and the cause of ideas 
 The denial of matter does not imply the denial of real existence. By ruling out the material or 
corporal existence, Berkeley does not deny the real existence of things. 
“I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend 
either by sense or reflexion. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with 
                                                
86 PHK, 25. 
87 PHK, 9. 
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my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing 
whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal 
substance”88  
 He eliminates the opposition of idea to matter and designates an objective existence to ideas of 
senses. However, the reality does not exist in ideas themselves but instead depends on a state of 
perceiving. The reality of sensible things consists in their being perceived. All sensible objects 
such as tables, chairs, houses, mountains, rivers, for example, do not have existence distinct from 
the mind perceiving them. Reality lies in ideas themselves as directly perceived by us.  
“For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without 
any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their 
ESSE is PERCIPI,89 nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the 
minds or thinking things which perceive them.” 90 
  Objects exist only by the epistemic activities of our mind and therefore have no substance 
distinct from their being perceived. Perceiving takes place through a variety of capacities such as 
willing, imagining, and remembering. The perceiver, in whom ideas exist, has several synonyms 
such as mind, spirit, soul and the self. 91   
                                                
88 PHK, sec. 35. 
89 To be is to be perceived. 
90 PHK 3. “In a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence 
without a mind, that their BEING (ESSE) is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not 
actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other CREATED SPIRIT, they must either have 
no existence at all, OR ELSE SUBSIST IN THE MIND OF SOME ETERNAL SPIRIT --it being perfectly 
unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an existence 
independent of a spirit.” PHK, 6. See also PHK, 90. 
91 PHK, 2. 
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               Berkeley’s idealism is opposed to solipsism. He does not maintain that only his own 
mind exists. Rather, he recognizes that there are many other minds that exist and perceive92 and 
besides all these distinct human minds, there is the mind of God. However, the dependence of 
ideas upon perceiving leads to the conception that ideas are subjective because each mind 
perceives ideas in an individual way. However, Berkeley maintains that our ideas are objective. 
They do not depend on our own will or volition but instead on Gods’ will. According to 
Berkeley, the objective reality of ideas is guaranteed by the immediate cause which is God. The 
things which we perceive do not exist except in our mind, but they also exist independently of 
our mind.93 That is, God produces sensible ideas and the combinations between them.  
“That sensible things can’t exist except in a mind or spirit. From this I 
conclude not that they have no real existence but that - seeing they don’t 
depend on my thought, and have an existence distinct from being perceived by 
me - there must be some other mind in which they exist. As sure as the sensible 
world really exists, therefore, so sure is there an infinite, omnipresent Spirit 
who contains and supports it.”94 
                                                
92“For, though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived; yet 
we may not hence conclude they have no existence except only while they are perceived by us, since there may be 
some other spirit that perceives them though we do not. Wherever bodies are said to have no existence without the 
mind, I would not be understood to mean this or that particular mind, but all minds whatsoever. It does not therefore 
follow from the foregoing principles that bodies are annihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all during 
the intervals between our perception of them.” PHK, 48. 
93George Berkeley, “Three Dialogue Between Hylas and Philonous”, in The Works of George Berkeley, D.D., Late 
Bishop of Cloyne in Irland, (London, 1820) Vol 1, 164. The following abbreviation for this book will be DHP. 
94DHP, 160. See also “CAUSE OF IDEAS.--We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are anew excited, 
others are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and 
which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas [...] It must 
therefore be a substance; but it has been shown that there is no corporeal or material substance: it remains therefore 
that the CAUSE OF IDEAS is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit.” PHK, sec. 26. 
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Distinction between two mental events: ideas of senses and ideas of imagination and 
memory  
           There are two kinds of entities according Berkeley: minds (also called spirits and selves) 
and ideas. The mind is not idea but stands for a mental substance which is different from ideas. It 
supports ideas but is entirely distinct from them.95 By ideas, Berkeley refers to the immediate 
perception of sensible things (in contrast to inference). Examples of ideas include a variety of 
sensations such as sounds, sight, taste, touch and the like. Ideas are both sensory and mental 
occurrences. Ideas and minds excite two different modes: ideas are constructed as a passive state 
and minds as an active state. Ideas are sensible things, objects of thought, and objects of 
perception. In this sense ideas are sensations and therefore they are passive. Minds, on the other 
hand, produce active modes like acts of thought, and acts of operation (such as understanding, 
willing, imagining, remembering and the like.)96 Although Berkeley distinguishes between ideas 
as objects and acts of thought/perceiving, he characterizes ideas as objects of thought at the time 
of perceiving. That is, since ideas are real entities which exist only at the time of perceiving, they 
can be seen as both objects and also acts of perceiving.97 The constitution of ideas’ objects is an 
epistemic activity of perceiving and combining sensible qualities. While it seems that the 
distinction between objects and acts of thought is not clear and that there is superimposition of 
objects on acts of thought, Berkeley distinguishes between perceiving vs. imagination/memory. 
He makes a distinction between two different kinds of ideas: ideas of senses and ideas of 
                                                
95“But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or 
perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them. This perceiving, 
active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a 
thing entirely distinct from them, wherein, they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived- for 
the existence of an idea consists in being perceived.” PHK, sec. 2. 
96 See Kenneth P. Winkler, Berkeley An Interpretation, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 4. 
97 Winkler claims for ideas as objects and not as act of thought, see p. 3-6. 
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imagination and memory. His idealism leads him designate all types of ideas as having the same 
ontology but different epistemological status. Ideas of senses and ideas of imagination and 
memory are assigned with different attributes and different levels of realness. Ideas of senses 
constitute real things.98 They are stronger and more vivid. They exhibit steadiness and vivacity 
and are excited according to order and coherency, while ideas of imagination and memory are 
either representations of the corresponding ideas of senses or are inventions of our mind. These 
ideas of imagination and memory are faint, excited at random, and have less reality in them than 
ideas of senses. 
“The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called REAL 
THINGS; and those excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and 
constant, are more properly termed IDEAS, or IMAGES OF THINGS, which 
they copy and represent.”99 
Berkeley addresses the difference between ideas of senses and ideas of imagination in terms of 
their reality, by appealing to the source of ideas, and their voluntarily or involuntarily nature.           
Ideas of senses are excited by God’s will and are forced upon the passive human mind.  
“IDEAS OF SENSATION DIFFER FROM THOSE OF REFLECTION OR 
MEMORY.--But, whatever power I may have over MY OWN thoughts, I find 
the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. 
When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose 
whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present 
                                                
98 DHP, 163-164. 
99 PHK, sec. 33. 
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themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the 
ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is THEREFORE 
SOME OTHER WILL OR SPIRIT that PRODUCES THEM.”100  
Ideas of senses, which are excited by God’s will in accordance to the laws of nature, form our 
experience: 
 “LAWS OF NATURE.--The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and 
DISTINCT than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, 
order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the 
effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series, the admirable 
connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its 
Author. Now THE SET RULES OR ESTABLISHED METHODS WHEREIN 
THE MIND WE DEPEND ON EXCITES IN US THE IDEAS OF SENSE, 
ARE CALLED THE LAWS OF NATURE; and these we learn by experience, 
which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such 
other ideas, in the ordinary course of things.” 101 
         Ideas of sense depend upon two different things. First, they are produced by God. 
However, since sensible qualities cannot subsist in themselves or in external material, they 
depend upon being perceived immediately and involuntarily by human minds. Perceived 
sensations (which are excited systematically) form our experience, and indicate to us the laws of 
nature. These ideas of sense are the source for ideas of imagination and memory. After being 
                                                
100 PHK, sec. 29. 
101 PHK, sec. 30. 
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perceived by the mind, perceptions become objects of volition and passion. Ideas of senses 
involve volition and are excited at will102 become ideas of imagination.  
 “I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene 
as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea 
arises in my fancy; and by the same power it is obliterates and makes way for 
another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate 
the mind active.”103  
It seems that what differentiates between ideas of senses and ideas of imagination is the state of 
the mind: voluntarily connected with the mind being active and involuntarily with the mind 
being passive. While the mind is passive, it cannot control the perceiving of sensible ideas 
because it perceives sensations as they are, though while the mind is active, it creates and forms 
ideas of imagination and memory. Imagination and memory are free to shift, to eliminate, or to 
distort ideas of sense according to their own will. Berkeley ascribes the ability to combine ideas 
of senses to all sorts of ideas to imagination and memory.  
“It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human 
knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else 
such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; 
or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination- either 
                                                
102“Phil: The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct;  they have, besides an entire 
dependence on the will. But the ideas perceived by sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and 
clear, and being imprinted on the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have not the like dependence on our will. There is 
therefore no danger of confounding these with the foregoing: and there is as little of confounding them with the 
visions of a dream, which are dim, irregular, and confused. And though they should  happen to be never  so lively 
and natural, yet by their not being connected, and of a piece with the preceding and subsequent  transactions of our 
lives they might be easily distinguished from reality.” DHP, 189. 
103PHK, sec. 28. 
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compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the 
aforesaid ways.”104 
Memory and imagination combine105 the different senses to make complex ideas which can last 
longer than ideas of senses. Berkeley attributes two kinds of combination to ideas of imagination 
and memory: first, the combination of ideas of sense, which leads to copy and representation, 
and second, invention and fancy. According to our experience, combination and association lead 
to correlation between the senses and imagination and memory. In this case, ideas of imagination 
and memory are copies and representations of ideas of senses.106 The second kind of 
compounding diverges from reality in free association, which lacks any strict correlation to ideas 
of sense. Berkeley does not provide any distinctive features which will enable us to distinguish 
between these two different kinds of compounding. Whether a correlation exists between the two 
kinds of ideas, or whether ideas of imagination and memory exceed the representation of their 
corresponding ideas of senses and thereby become fiction, ideas of imagination and memory 
always correspond and rely on sensation.  
“But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the 
possibility of real existence or perception. Hence, as it is impossible for me to 
see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so is it 
impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object 
distinct from the sensation or perception of it.”107 
                                                
104PHK, sec. 1. 
105See also Richard Glauser, “The problem of Unity of a Physical Objects in Berkeley”, in Reexamining Berkeley’s 
Philosophy, ed. Stephan H. Daniel, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 66-69. 
106 Glauser, “The problem of Unity of a Physical Objects in Berkeley”,  56. 
107 PHK, sec. 5. 
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On the other hand, even when ideas of imagination and memory correlate to ideas of senses, 
there is no adequate representation. This leads to the distinction in regards to the degree of reality 
and subjectivity inherent in ideas of senses and ideas of imagination and memory. While people 
perceive the same things, they imagine differently as can be seen from the following exchange: 
Hyl: ... Pray are not the objects perceived by the senses of one, likewise 
 perceivable to others present? If there were a hundred more here, they would 
all see the garden, the trees, and flowers as I see them. But they are not in the 
same manner affected with the ideas I frame in my imagination. Doesn’t this 
make a difference between the former sort of objects and the latter? 
Phil: I agree it does; and I have never denied that the objects of sense are 
different from those of imagination.108 
 
While ideas of senses do not depend on the human mind’s will — and therefore are objective and 
can be perceived by all human minds — ideas of imagination are composed from our own ideas 
in a subjective way.  
Because ideas of senses are perceived immediately and simultaneously, they exist only at the 
moment of perceiving, and therefore do not last long. They are not inherent in the human mind. 
Ideas of sense leave traces in our mind, and these traces are ideas of imagination and memory.   
The distinction is in degree of realness and dependence on different source (i.e. whether from 
God’s mind or a human mind). Ideas of senses which are imprinted from external source that is 
God, their validity is not questionable. These ideas are ideal but also real things. Conversely, 
                                                
108 DHP, 203-204. 
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ideas of imagination and memory are of questionable or even doubtful validity because they are 
reconstructed by human mind. In other words, being involuntary is a necessary condition for 
being a real thing. The real is what comes to us without our volition. Excited by God’s will, ideas 
of sense are delivered according to the laws of nature. They are thus regular and constitute the 
coherent and real world. Ideas of imagination and memory, which are excited by the human 
mind according to its own will, can indeed compound their ideas in a variety of ways. However, 
these ideas are either copies or representations of ideas of senses or else chimeras — that is, 
fancy and invention. They are less real than ideas of senses which are imposed on us from God. 
Even with all the different attributes mentioned above, the question of what exactly are ideas of 
sense or imagination is not resolved. There is an inability to distinguish between images from 
ideas of senses and images from ideas of imagination and memory since all ideas have the same 
ontological status. They are all composed of the same kinds of substance, in that all of them are 
mental constitutions, mental ideas.109 The question is whether ideas which are accorded the same 
ontological status can be different entities. Ideas of sense, according Berkeley, are the things 
themselves. They are not representations. However, it is impossible to distinguish between the 
two kinds of ideas in terms of their reality. While there are some difficulties in the distinguishing 
between sensations and imaginations, Berkeley does not distinguish between imagination and 
memory (in other words, between ideas of imagination and ideas of memory) but instead fuses 
them. While Berkeley describes sense and imagination as having different epistemological 
status, he assigns imagination and memory the same epistemological standing. Both are either 
copies and representations, or invention and fancy, and thereby are less real than ideas of senses. 
                                                
109All ideas are particular, and Berkeley denies the existence of general or abstract ideas. 
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Hume’s criteria for memory and imagination 
 
Hume bases the epistemological foundations of knowledge on the basic element of 
consciousness and thought, that is, perception. Perceptions are divided into impressions and 
ideas. Impressions and ideas compose both memory and imagination. We think either through 
memory or through imagination. Both of them originate from the same source and are related to 
other epistemological capacities. Memory has a central role in providing the starting point for 
belief, casual inference, and also in constituting a sense of personal identity by creating a bond 
between various experiences.110 Imagination, which is represented throughout the treatise as an 
equivalent to the ability of thinking, also operates as a crucial component in our personal 
identity. Imagination produces unity of ideas through three principles — resemblance, contiguity 
and causation111 — which constitute our personal identity.112 Through these principles, 
imagination separates, combines, connects,113 associates, and reunites different ideas in our 
                                                
110Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, book I, part IV, Sect. VI. Of Personal Identity. 
111“The imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of thinking, and run along the parts of space and 
time in conceiving its objects.” Book I part I section IV. Or “First, We have observed, that whatever objects are 
different are distinguishable, and that whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the thought and 
imagination.” Book I, part I, section VII. Of Abstract Ideas. 
112 Identity is “merely a quality, which we attribute to them [perceptions], because of the union of their ideas in the 
imagination, when we reflect upon them [perceptions]. Now the only qualities, which can give ideas an union in the 
imagination, are these three relations above-mentioned. There are the uniting principles in the ideal world, and 
without them every distinct object is separable by the mind, and may be separately considered, and appears not to 
have any more connexion with any other object, than if disjoined by the greatest difference and remoteness. It is, 
therefore, on some of these three relations of resemblance, contiguity and causation, that identity depends; and as the 
very essence of these relations consists in their producing an easy transition of ideas; it follows, that our notions of 
personal identity, proceed entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of 
connected ideas, according to the principles above-explained.” Book I, part IV, sect. VI. Of Personal Identity. 
113“By which two ideas are connected together in the imagination.” Book I, part I, Sect. V. Of Relations. 
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consciousness. Imagination forms a transition from one idea to another. It also separates simple 
ideas114 and then reunites them in a different ways to make complex ones. 115  
Both memory and imagination involve the operations of cause and effect and inference 
and both also play central role in constructing personal identity. However, the above statements 
regarding imagination and memory were part of cross-examination of other issues such as 
personal identity, cause and effect etc. To discern when we really are remembering a past event 
or else are imagining that we remember it, we must distinguish memory from imagination. This 
is especially the case in those sections in the treatise where this issue is addressed most directly 
and explicitly.116  
Impressions and Ideas 
 
As was mentioned above, Hume distinguishes between two mental events that are generated by 
our perceptions: impressions and ideas,117 that is, sensations and images respectively. There is a 
great resemblance between them, but they are distinguished in reference to their degree of 
force.118 While impressions are perceptions with a high degree of vividness and liveliness,119 
                                                
114“The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a collection of Simple ideas, that are united by 
the imagination.” Book I, part I, sect VI. Of Modes and Substances. 
115Book I, part I section IV. See also “A particular idea becomes general by being annexed to a general term; that is, 
to a term, which from a customary conjunction has a relation to many other particular ideas, and readily recalls them 
in the imagination.” Book I, part I, section VII. Of Abstract Ideas. 
116Book I, part I, section III. Of the Ideas of the Memory and Imagination and Book I, Part III, section V, Of the 
Impressions of the Senses and Memory. 
117There is inconsistency in Hume’s presentation of impressions and ideas: “It is even unclear whether impressions 
and ideas are not simply diverse aspect of perceptions, so that a perception counts as an impression if it is regarded 
as a present content of consciousness and an idea if deemed as representation of something distinct from it.” 
Waxman, Wayne, pp.28 -31. 
118 In the beginning of the section “Of the Origin of our Ideas” Hume claims that impressions and images are so 
different that one can not confuse them except in few instances such as “In a sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any 
very violent emotions of soul.” However, this claim is followed by another one which states that impressions and 
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ideas are ascribed with low-vividness and weakness.120 By impressions, Hume encompasses 
sensations, feelings, passions, and emotions “as they make their first appearance in the soul.”121 
There are two kinds of impressions: original impressions and secondary impressions. Original 
impressions are impressions of sensation which depend on natural or physical causes122 while 
secondary impressions are impressions of reflection. Hume ascribes all the senses and bodily 
pains and pleasures to impressions of sensation, while he ascribes passions and emotions to 
impressions of reflection. Impressions of reflection are derived either from impressions of 
sensation or from ideas. First we feel an original impression. Then, from that impression, we 
form an idea that gives rise to a reflective impression.123 For example, we eat a rotten apple, then 
we have an idea of the disgusting taste. From that idea, a reflective impression of aversion to 
apples is derived. 
 By ideas, Hume refers to images that are representations and reflections of impressions in 
our thought and consciousness, or in other words, in memory and imagination.124 Memory and 
imagination are two kinds of ideas and each of them is a copy of an antecedent impression. Ideas 
can be derived by coping impressions, or from other ideas which are themselves copies of 
impressions. Sensation that retains a high degree of its first vivacity becomes a memory but 
sensation that loses its original vivacity becomes imagination.  
                                                                                                                                                       
images resemble each other in all the aspects except in their degree of force. Book I, part I, section I. Of the origin of 
our Ideas. 
119 For Hume’s notion of force and vivacity see, Trudy Govier, “Variation on Force and Vivacity in Hume,” 
Philosophical Quarterly 86, (1972): 44-52. 
120 See also An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section II. Of the Origin of Ideas. 
121 A Treatise of human Nature, Book I, part I, sect I.  
122 There is no explanation how impressions of sensation are aroused by the external objects.  
123 Book II, part I, sect. I. Of pride and Humility. 
124 Ideas are mental representations which mediate between the objects and the mind. 
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Two criteria for distinguishing memory from imagination 
 
In the first book of the A treatise of the Human nature,125 Hume raises two criteria for 
distinguishing ideas of memory from ideas of imagination. The first criterion deals with the 
difference in the degree of vividness regarding ideas of memory in comparison with those of 
imagination. Ideas of memory have more force and vividness than ideas of imagination, although 
not as much force and vividness as impressions.  
  
“The faculty, by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the 
MEMORY, and the other the IMAGINATION. It is evident at first sight, that the 
ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the 
imagination, and that the former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours, 
than any which are employed by the latter. When we remember any past event, 
the idea of it flows in upon the mind in a forcible manner; 126 whereas in the 
imagination the perception is faint and languid, and cannot without difficulty be 
preserved by the mind steady and uniform for any considerable time.”127  
 
Both memory and imagination rely on perceptions. The difference is that memory maintains the 
impression vividly and firmly, while a perception in the imagination is retained very faintly or 
even fails to retain (as Hume terms it) “a perfect Idea.” An Idea appears in 
                                                
125 Book I, part I, sect. III. 
126In his critic on Hume’s account of memory, Pears raises the question whether Hume by strength and vivacity of 
the memory image refers to a pictorial property, that is, having a very clear and plain image, or does he intend a 
behavioural property, that is, the way in which an image enters the mind. See David Pears, Hume’s System; An 
Examination of the First Book of his Treatise, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 44. 
127A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, part I, sect. III.  
  
54 
 
“Two different ways: either when in its new appearance it retains a considerable 
degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression 
and an idea: or when it entirely loses that vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The 
faculty, by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the 
MEMORY, and the other the IMAGINATION.”128 
 
Ideas of memory have more specificity than ideas of imagination and are preserved 
steady and uniform over time, while ideas of the imagination are continually changing. These 
two features — the specificity and persistence over time—keep memory distinct from 
imagination.   
While the first distinction between ideas of memory and ideas of imagination relates to 
degree of vividness, the second distinction relates to whether the original form and order of the 
experience is preserved. Both memories and imagination may correlate with their preceding 
impressions, though memory preserves the original form in which its objects were presented.129 
Imagination, in contrast, is not constrained to the same form and order of the original 
impressions, and has the liberty to confound, transpose, and change its ideas.  
“yet the imagination is not restrained to the same order and form with the original 
impressions; while the memory is in a manner tied down in that respect, without 
any power of variation.”130 
                                                
128Book I, part I, sect III. 
129“The chief exercise of the memory is to preserve the order and the position of events and objects were presented 
to it.” Book I, part I, sect. III. 
130 Ibid 
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Hume claims that imagination is not constrained by the original order and form of the 
impressions, though his wording does not state that imagination must change the order and form 
of impressions. That is, one can assume that imagination can either follow the form and order of 
the original impressions or change it. 131 If memory and imagination meet the same criterion and 
both can have the same form and order, does this undermine the difference between them? 
 
The interrelation between memory and imagination 
  Imagination generates an idea of memory 
These two initial criteria are used to distinguish between memory and imagination, but the 
operation of the impressions and ideas and also their division to simple and complex creates 
more qualifications regarding the differences between them. 
Even though impressions and ideas resemble each, with the only difference between them being 
the relative degree of vividness, Hume limits this generalization as well. Imagination and 
memory are also distinguished by the subdivision of perceptions. The perceptions appearing in 
impressions and ideas are divided into two groups: simple and complex. By simple perceptions, 
Hume means basic perceptions that are not composed from varied qualities (such as color, taste 
and smell) but from one quality which cannot be divided or separated. By simple idea, he refers 
to the color of the apple. By complex impressions or ideas, Hume means those perceptions which 
are composed from several qualities and can be divided into different parts. For instance, an 
apple can be divided to different qualities such as taste, color, and smell.  
                                                
131 Oliver, A., Johnson, The Mind of David Hume: A Companion to Book I Of A Treatise of Human Nature, 
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 57. 
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The relation between simple impressions and their corresponding simple ideas is expressed by 
the dependence of the ideas on impressions. Hume maintains that simple ideas always follow 
impressions and resemble them. There is an exact correlation between them. No possibility to 
form an idea exists without having first the impression (e.g. perception) of the object. Those who 
did not experience a simple impression cannot have a simple idea of that phenomenon. One 
cannot hold an idea of the taste of pine-apple without having tasted it before. However, Hume 
recognizes that there are some exceptions. In some cases, simple ideas are not always derived 
from correspondent impressions.  
In these exceptions to the basic rule for simple ideas, impressions are not always derived from 
correspondent impressions. Instead, they can be inferred from general or other related or 
contiguous ideas. One might form a simple idea without experiencing a corresponding simple 
impression. Hume gives an example of someone who is familiar with all the different shades of 
the color blue except for one shade. It is possible that this person will be able to deduce the 
missing color shade without perceiving it before with his senses. He will be able to do that by 
deducing the missing shade from comparing the graduation of all the other shades of the color 
blue. That is, by relying on the knowledge we have, we can deduce from other knowledge and 
complete a missing impression without encountering it first, all with the help of our imagination. 
Imagination seems to have the ability to produce simple ideas without relying on simple 
impressions, and we will take these simple impressions as corresponding to perceptions exactly 
as ideas correspond to the antecedent impressions. In this point, Hume actually exhibits the 
interrelation between memory and imagination. In simple knowledge, our imagination can 
provide some replacement to a deficiency i.e., imagination can create an image of something that 
was not experienced before and brings it as an idea of memory.   
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Complex ideas  
 For Hume, the idea that imagination can create an impression never previously perceived is 
indeed an exception. This exception, however, might enable us to go further and examine 
whether some other relations exist which rely on the reversed relationship between impressions 
and ideas, a reversal which in the process entwines memory and imagination. While as a rule, 
simple ideas are derived from simple impressions, complex ideas do not necessarily rely directly 
on impressions and can be produced from other ideas. That is, many complex impressions are 
neither copied nor retained exactly in corresponding ideas, and never had preceding impressions 
that corresponded to them. In other words, we can imagine a complex idea without relying on 
perception but which is instead derived from our imagination. For an example, he gives an 
imagination of a New Jerusalem "whose pavement is gold and walls are rubies,” even though no 
any impressions precede this imagination. Using this example, Hume illustrates how we form 
from simple ideas which we combine to a complex idea of the imagination. Imagination is the 
faculty which joins simple ideas together to form complex ideas in free arrangement of order and 
form.  Although memory is distinguished from imagination in that the former follows the form 
and order of the original impressions, there are some qualifications for this statement as well. 
Impressions are not retained fully in complex ideas. This means that there is either doubt 
regarding the way our memories preserve the original impressions, or that very few of our 
complex ideas can be counted as memories.132 It seems that we cannot form complex idea that 
will match precisely complex impressions. An example of this is the city of Paris. Hume cannot 
                                                
132 Saul Traiger, “Hume on Memory and Imagination”, in A Companion to Hume, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
2008), 63. 
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form an idea of the city with all its houses and streets in the original proportion and formation as 
he has experienced it.133 In other words, many details are lost when we form the corresponding 
ideas. The impressions are not reflected exactly in the mind. This example has a particular 
significance for the relation between memory and imagination since in the case of complex 
details, we cannot represent an exact reflection of our perceptions.  
 
Reservations regarding the distinction between memory and imagination 
This contiguity of imagination and memory shows that there is no a real ability to distinguish 
between the two. Imagination is not constrained to the form and order of the presented 
perceptions, nevertheless memory fails to retain their complex detail. Not only is the causal 
dependence between impressions and ideas not maintained, thereby undermining the distinction 
between memory and imagination, but even the second criterion is insufficient to distinguish 
between ideas of memory and ideas of imagination. Hume is aware that we cannot provide 
evidence that an idea is an idea of memory. It is impossible to compare an idea of memory with 
the form and order of the past and to see whether its arrangement is indeed the same. 
“When we search for the characteristic, which distinguishes the memory from the 
imagination, we must immediately perceive, that it cannot lie in the simple ideas 
it presents to us; since both these faculties borrow their simple ideas from the 
impressions, and can never go beyond these original perceptions. These faculties 
are as little distinguished from each other by the arrangement of their complex 
ideas. For though it be a peculiar property of the memory to preserve the original 
                                                
133Book I, part I, sect, I. Of the Origin of our Ideas. 
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order and position of its ideas, while the imagination transposes and changes 
them, as it pleases; yet this difference is not sufficient to distinguish them in their 
operation, or make us know the one from the other; it being impossible to recall 
the past impressions, in order to compare them with our present ideas, and see 
whether their arrangement be exactly similar. Since therefore the memory, is 
known, neither by the order of its complex ideas, nor the nature of its simple ones; 
it follows, that the difference betwixt it and the imagination lies in its superior 
force and vivacity. A man may indulge his fancy in feigning any past scene of 
adventures; nor would there be any possibility of distinguishing this from a 
remembrance of a like kind, were not the ideas of the imagination fainter and 
more obscure.”134 
As a result of these reservations, Hume renounces his second criterion of maintaining form and 
temporal order and sticks to the first criterion, that is, the superior force and vivacity of memory 
over imagination.135 However, relying solely on relative vivacity poses some problems. Vivacity 
as a criterion leads to a variety of epistemic errors as a result of the constant conjunction of 
memory and imagination. We can fail to recognize some ideas as memories or inversely some 
ideas as imaginations. We cannot really distinguish between real memories, merely apparent 
memories, and ideas of the imagination.136 One can claim to be certain that he remembers 
something with a very high degree of vividness which is in fact an invention of the imagination. 
                                                
134Book I, part III, sect V. 
135Starting with a seemingly minor claim, Johnson posits that Hume has two theories of memory: the original theory 
in Book I, Part I, Sect 3 and a revised theory in Book I, Part III, Sect. 5. Oliver A. Johnson, The Mind of David 
Hume, 62. See also Francis W. Dauer, Hume Studies, Volume XXIV, Number 2 (1998): 375-384. 
136Traiger in his Article claims that “Hume thinks that we cannot always distinguish memories from other 
perceptions "in their operation." It is not clear that he thinks that there must be a sharp distinction at all, since the 
traditional epistemo- logical purpose for such a distinction, to partition the veridical from the non-veridical, is not 
obviously Hume's purpose.” Traiger, Saul, “Flage on Hume’s Account of Memory”, Hume Studies 12 (1985): 167. 
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Hume cannot distinguish between low vivacity memories from ideas of the imagination.137 
Therefore the following questions are raised: would a highly vivid complex idea without the 
form and order of the original impression be considered a memory? Alternatively, would a low-
vivacity complex idea with the form and order of original impression be counted as memory?  
When a memory’s vivacity fades, does it thereby become imagination? Is an imagination a 
fainted memory?  
Hume was aware of the possibility that we might confuse memories and imagination and that an 
idea of memory could mistakenly be taken as imagination, and alternatively imagination with 
vividness could be mistakenly taken as memory: 
 
“And as an idea of the memory, by losing its force and vivacity, may degenerate 
to such a degree, as to be taken for an idea of the imagination; so on the other 
hand an idea of the imagination may acquire such a force and vivacity, as to pass 
for an idea of the memory, and counterfeit its effects on the belief and 
judgment.”138  
By his argument in Book I part I section III which is given few pages back, Hume claims that 
imagination and memory rely on the same impressions but that an idea of imagination is an idea 
that lost its vivacity and, as a result, became an imagination. There he does not relate to the 
degenerated idea as a fake, but instead as the way imagination operates. 
 “And as an idea of the memory, by losing its force and vivacity, may degenerate 
to such a degree, as to be taken for an idea of the imagination.”139 
                                                
137Johnson, Oliver, “Lively Memory and Past memory”, Hume studies 13 (1987): 343-359. 
138Book I, part III, sect. V. 
139Book I, part III, sect. V. 
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Relative vividness was a criterion which was related to memory. If Hume discarded the second 
criterion and was left with the first one (the relative force and vividness), memory and 
imagination have to be clearly distinguished. However, from the former quotation it is assumed 
that a transformation between memory and imagination cannot take place. Memory cannot 
degenerate to become idea of imagination and imagination cannot be revived to the degree of 
being memory. If we would mistake a memory for an idea of imagination or vice versa, our 
belief and judgment would be false. It is also thought that memory can have several degrees of 
force. When memory loses its vividness, it can only mislead us towards thinking that it is 
imagination when it is still memory with low vividness. From this quotation it seems that Hume 
refutes his own criterion which claims that as long as an idea has high vividness it is memory and 
when it loses its vividness it becomes imagination. We cannot apply the second criterion nor can 
we apply the first one since it is impossible to distinguish ideas of memories from ideas of 
imaginations because both of them either have high or low vividness. Therefore, vividness must 
be discarded as distinguishing feature as well. 
 Nonetheless, Hume continues this quotation immediately with a reservation which enables him 
to stick to his first criterion by ascribing the confusion between memory and imagination to liars: 
  
“This is  noted in the case of liars; who by the frequent repetition of their lies, 
come at last to believe and remember them, as realities; custom and habit having 
in this case, as in many others, the same influence on the mind as nature, and 
infixing the idea with equal force and vigour.”140 
                                                
140Book I, Part III, Sect V. 
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Liars consolidate their imagination into memories by frequent repetition of their lies. By this 
repetition their lies become reality. If so, what is the state of liars’ reality if they believe and 
remember their lies as memories? Hume is not willing to accept that this state is a frequent 
occurrence which happens as a natural interrelation between imagination and memory. However, 
while he ascribes false memoires to liars, he does not refute or try to solve the confusion in the 
case where memories lose their vivacity and are mistakenly taken as imaginations. Since the 
epistemological evidence for distinguishing memories from imagination is misleading, Hume 
attaches this difference of force and vividness to belief and feeling. 
“Thus it appears, that the belief or assent, which always attends the memory and 
senses, is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present; and that this 
alone distinguishes them from the imagination. To believe is in this case to feel an 
immediate impression of the senses, or a repetition of that impression in the 
memory.”141 
 Or: 
“Since, therefore, the imagination can represent all the same objects that the 
memory can offer to us, and since those faculties are only distinguished by the 
different feeling of the ideas they present, it may be proper to consider what is the 
nature of that feeling. And here I believe every one will readily agree with me, 
that the ideas of the memory are more strong and lively than those of the 
fancy.”142 
                                                
141Ibid 
142Ibid 
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Is the connection of a certain belief to our memory sufficient to distinguish memory from 
imagination? As we saw, Hume also ascribes belief to the liars “who by the frequent repetition of 
their lies, come at last to believe and remember them, as realities.” Can we claim that the liar is 
not liar anymore and that his lies are true memories since he believes in them? The distinction 
between what someone really remembers, and what he only seems to remember — in other 
words, the distinction between memory and imagination — would collapses. 
 In order to overcome the difficulty in distinguishing memory and imagination, Oliver 
suggests renouncing our ordinary concept of memory and breaking the tie between memory and 
the real past. An idea of memory should be regarded as an idea of the present since we cannot 
verify that it replicates the past.143 However, in this solution, we can distinguish memory and 
imagination only from our belief. It does not really matter if a memory was indeed the real past 
or not; what does matter is whether we believe it to be part of the real past. We do not speak 
about the past, but only about what we believe.144 Indeed, even if most of the time our feelings 
and beliefs are correct, they do not provide us an epistemological device to verify them. One 
cannot apply feeling as epistemological device to distinguish memory from imagination. 
 
 
                                                
143“It follows that, because a necessary condition for our having knowledge of the past cannot be fulfilled within 
Hume's epistemology, we can have no such knowledge. Therefore, we must drop the concept of the past, as it is 
ordinarily understood as something that once existed, from our account of memory. 'Past' memory must be 
abandoned in favor of 'present' memory, which in Hume's theory is equivalent to 'lively' memory…… The only 
reason it appears to be a problem lies in our assumption that, to remember the event, the individual's memory-idea 
must replicate what actually occurred. i.e., 'the past.' Once this assumption is dropped we no longer face a dilemma. 
If the person has a lively idea of the event as being of a certain nature, then he remembers it in that way; if, later, he 
has a lively idea of its having been of a different nature, then he remembers it in that at way. Both are equally cases 
of remembering, and that is the end of the matter.” Oliver, Johnson, “‘Lively’ Memory and ‘Past’ Memory,” in 
Hume Studies Volume 13, Number 2, (1987): 353. 
144 Oliver, Johnson, “‘Lively’ Memory and ‘Past’ Memory,” 354 – 355. 
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 The Husserlian phenomenological epistemology of time-consciousness, perception, 
memory and imagination 
Introduction  
 In the following chapter I will discuss memory and phantasy in Husserl’s phenomenology. 
These issues were primarily investigated in two books which contain lectures course he gave in 
the winter semester of 1904-05. The first book, Zur Phänomenologie des inneren 
Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917)145 deals with the phenomenology of our consciousness of internal 
time and mainly addresses the phenomena of perception and memory in relation to time.  The 
second book Phantasie, Bildbewußtsein, Erinnerung: Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen 
Vergegenwärtigungen, Texte aus dem Nachlaß (1898-1925)146 mainly deals with the 
phenomenology of phantasy. These acts of apprehension are all related to and constitute the main 
division of consciousness into two types: presentation and re-presentation. In order to understand 
the interrelation and distinction between these modes of apprehension, I will refer first to 
Husserl’s general phenomenological approach which determines his investigation of these modes 
of consciousness, then I proceed into the way memory and phantasy are constituted. 
Negating descriptive attributes 
British Empiricists describe the differences between perception, memory, and imagination with 
reference to their differing origins. These differences entail further distinctions of perception and 
memory (such as greater vivacity, intensity, stability, steadiness, etc.), in contrast to the protean, 
                                                
145 Edmund Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), ed Rudolf Bernet, 
Volume IV, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1991). [ PITC/ Hu X]( here and after PITC)]. All references in 
this chapter cite the pagination of the English translations. 
146 Edmund Husserl, Phantasy, Image Consciousness and Memory (1898- 1925),Trans: John B. Brough, (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2005). [PBE/ Hu XXIII].  
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volatility and the voluntarily characteristics of imagination.147 However, these descriptive 
distinctions between perception, memory, and imagination are relative and not essential. Husserl 
maintains that distinctions between modes of consciousness cannot be made with reference to 
descriptive attributes of their content because this would lead to a gradual distinction that cannot 
be ground for an essential characteristic.148 Defining a mode of consciousness with descriptive 
attributes cannot clearly distinguish between modes in cases when features of one act of 
consciousness approaches and resembles a different mode. For example, when the vivacity of 
imagination is strong or even stronger than that of memory, the descriptive distinction between 
the two is ambiguous. The resemblance of phantasy presentation to its corresponding perception 
requires more essential distinctions, rather than relative ones such as vivacity. In fact, Husserl 
does not rule out completely the significance of these descriptive features described by the 
empiricists and even considers some of them as having phenomenological significance (such as 
stability vs. instability, fullness vs. vagueness or continuity vs. discontinuity). Nevertheless, he 
claims that these relative qualities cannot be the ground for an essential distinction and that the 
phenomenological approach has a different reference point. For Husserl, the reference point for 
establishing the distinction between memory and imagination is the act of presenting the object 
in consciousness, and its relation to its object. While the empiricists, as Husserl claims, 
investigate the quality of the object’s content, he investigates apprehensional modes, the acts of 
consciousness and their relation to the content (the object).  
                                                
147 See the chapters that deal with the British empiricists. 
148 PBE, 12-15. 
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 Rejection of the psychologism and the natural science 
Husserl’s rejection of the empiricists’ descriptive distinctions is part of his general rejection of 
psychology.149 For the empiricists, it is psychology that provides the foundation for knowledge 
and epistemology. Indeed, in his early stage, Husserl shared this viewpoint. He claimed that the 
essential theoretical foundations of logic lie in psychology. He saw logic as either a branch or 
constituent that derived from psychology. However, his investigation leads him to refute the idea 
that psychology150 can provide the theoretical basis for logic and cognition, a foundation for 
knowledge,151 but instead to believe in non-empirical validity. Husserl maintains that the real 
psychical acts of knowing cannot provide us with a priori knowledge. Validity cannot depend on 
the act of knowing but is a priori.  It is logic which leads to certainty by investigating ideal 
structures and the laws of consciousness. Pure logical laws are established “by apodeitic inner 
evidence”152 and provide a priori validity. 
In contrast, psychology, as Husserl defines it, is “a science of experience,”153 a science of facts 
and real events. He writes:  
“….psychology is a factual and therefore an empirical science….psychology 
has so far lacked genuine and therefore exact laws and that the propositions in 
                                                
149 On the refutation of Psychologism see, Marvin, Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology, (Frankfurt: Ontos 
Verlag, 2006), 99-136. See also J. N. Mohanty, The philosophy of Edmund Husserl: A Historical Development, 
(New Haven; Yale University Press), 2008, 62-72.  Joseph, J. Kockelmans, A first introduction to Husserl’s 
Phenomenology, (Louvain: Duquesene, 1967), 9-20. 
150 Husserl’s phenomenology went through some shifts. After being criticized by Frege, who claimed that pure logic 
cannot based on psychological acts, Husserl internalized this critic and abandon psychology. See Marvin, Farber, 
The Foundation of Phenomenology, 98.  See also Dermot Moran, Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology, 
(Cambridge: Polite Press, 2005), 80-86.  J. N.  Mohanty, “Husserl and Frege: A New Look at Their Relationship”, in 
Husserl Intentionality and Cognitive Science, Ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus, (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1982), 43- 56. 
151 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigation, Vol 1, Trans: J.N. Findlay, (London: Routledged & Kegan Paul,1976), 
98. Logische Untersuchungen, Erste Band, Prolegomena zur reiner Logik, Ed. Elmar Holenstein, (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1975). Here inafter the abbreviation will be used is LI. 
152 LI, I, 98 -99. 
153 Edmund Husserl, Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, Trans: W. R Boyce Gibson, (London: 
George Allen, 1952), 43. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomemologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie.  [Id/Hu III] 
Here inafter the abbreviation will be Id. 
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it which are dignified with the name of laws are merely vague, even if 
valuable, generalization from experience.”154  
Because psychology investigates the factual nature of consciousness and not its a priori laws, it 
cannot establish a correlation between cognition and its object and overcome skepticism. Neither 
can natural science, which is established by induction from singular facts of experience, establish 
or validate laws, but only probability.155 Husserl’s primary concern was to create a foundation 
for pure logic and epistemology which would be independent of psychical activities. He wants to 
constitute the objective conditions and principles for the a priori foundation of knowledge and 
the ideal structures of consciousness in their different modes. Yet, although Husserl resists 
empiricism and natural science, he still has a common ground with them. Both empiricism and 
phenomenology take their theory of knowledge from lived experiences; however, the 
epistemological goals of phenomenology are pursued differently than those of the empiricists. 
Phenomenology investigates primordial forms of experience, the ideal structures of 
consciousness. It is the constitution of acts of consciousness, a system which establishes the 
structure of a priori categories of meaning,156 conscious acts, and their relation to objects. 
Husserl looks at the a priori structures of all conscious experiences. In contrast to empiricists 
who validate a phenomenon by leaning on factual reality, Husserl is interested in the essence of 
the phenomenon. This is an epistemological shift from investigating the world of realities to 
exploring its ultimate presuppositions, a turn from the factual experience to experience in 
ideality, independent from any possible factual reference.157  
                                                
154 LI, I, 98. 
155 LI, I, 98 -99. 
156 On the constitution of meaning, see Robert Sokolowski, The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of constitution, (the 
Hugue: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 53-54. 
157 Sokolowski, The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of constitution, 116- 120. 
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Phenomenological reduction: suspension of reality 
This shift from psychology and natural science to phenomenology entails a change of attitude 
toward reality, a different ontological assumption. Phenomenology is concerned with reality as it 
appears in consciousness. Husserl maintains that phenomenology should not deal “with real but 
with transcendentally reduced phenomena.”158 He is not interested in examining the existence of 
real world. Instead, he defines reality in terms of appearances. He distinguishes between reality 
and the way we grasp it, maintaining that we cannot grasp reality as it is since actual things and 
events are beyond our reach and knowledge. The thing-in-itself does not belong to experience or 
to apprehension and therefore consciousness cannot know the thing-in-itself. Instead, the thing-
in-itself belongs to metaphysical reflection. Phenomenological analysis cannot lead to the 
objective world of actual things and events but relates to reality from a different perspective, that 
of reality intended, intuited, represented, and phantasied in our consciousness. Husserl does not 
deny the existence of physical objects or an external reality. He does not commit himself to 
Berkley’s idealism, but he does suspend any presumptions regarding actual reality (Epoché).159 
He brackets empirical- real existence as a transcendental,160 metaphysical question and excludes 
it from his epistemological investigation. The phenomenological reduction is the bracketing that 
which concerns the real world in its empirical reality. 161 
                                                
158 Ideas, I, 44. 
159 On Epoché see, Dan Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 43- 46.  See 
also Charles, W., Harvey, Husserl’s Phenomenology and the Foundation of Natural Science, (Ohio: Ohio University 
Press,1989), 97-145. 
160 PITC, 4. 
161 Rodulf Bernet, Iso Kern, Eduard Marbach, An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology, (Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1993), 58-87. 
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Essence  
Husserl initiates a shift from psychology which deals with the existence of the real world to the 
essence which he calls the eidetic reduction. By eidetic reduction, Husserl means the essential 
properties that are to be distinguished from the accidental properties of an object. In other words, 
the eidetic reduction focuses on the invariant structure that makes up an object’s essence. 
Essence discloses itself in phenomenon, in the appearance. The shift from the empirical 
perspective to the phenomenological perspective takes place by the transformation from 
empirical intuition to essential intuition,162 by relating to the essence of the object instead of the 
quality of the object.163 In other words, pure essence is not enclosed by empirical examination, 
but rather by an investigation of the a priori ideality, a priori structure of consciousness which is 
to be known intuitively. Phenomenology is the investigation of primordial forms of experience, 
the ideal structures of consciousness. Husserl strives to establish a priori principles of each 
structural component of consciousness. He is interested in the condition of knowing, that is the 
fundamental principles that constitute knowledge, modes of appearance, “the pure 
phenomenology of the experiences of thinking and knowing.”164 Phenomenology concerns the 
way in which we are conscious of the world through meaning, essence, eidetic, idealization 
rather than empirical investigation of particular existence. He looks to analyze various kinds of 
thinking, modes of intuitive consciousness, such as perceiving, remembering, imagining, etc. 
Phenomenology seeks the essence of the givenness, of what appears to our consciousness when 
we perceive, think, imagine, or recall.  
                                                
162 Ideas 1, Section 3, 54. 
163 David, Wood, The Deconstruction of Time, (Humanities Press International, Inc. Atlantic Highlights, 1989), 43. 
164 LI, vol 1, 249. 
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Act and object 
 
The phenomenological attempt to clarify the essential structures of consciousness takes place in 
the analysis of the correlation between the acts of consciousness and objects. In this analysis, 
Husserl also looks at the a priori structures of these acts. The a priori structures of conscious acts 
are experienced from the first-person point of view, the way the subject experiences objects. 
Husserl claims that one of the mistakes that psychology makes is not to distinguish between an 
act of consciousness and the object, an act of knowing and the object of knowledge. 
Psychologists pay attention only to the content of the object and overlook the act itself. Ignoring 
the act is overlooking the difference between the object as experienced and the object as it 
appears. Husserl maintains that almost all the features that we ascribed to an object of perception 
can also be applied to the object of phantasy as well. An object can be perceived and imagined in 
the same way, from the same perspective, illumination, etc. Therefore, the apprehensional 
characteristics are responsible for determination of the object as it appears in consciousness. 
What distinguishes the giveness of one object from another are the modes of apprehension and 
their characteristic of meaning.165 The content of apprehension is determined by the way the act 
intends the object.   
Intentionality  
The intrinsic feature of consciousness that distinguishes the act from the object is intentionality. 
By intentionality, Husserl means that consciousness is intentionally directed toward an object. 
Husserl writes:  
                                                
165 PBE, 17. 
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“essential intuition is the consciousness of something, of an object, a something 
towards which its glance is directed.”166  
Husserl was interested in the essence of intentionality in order to define the relation between the 
act of knowing and the object. There are different types of consciousness and every conscious act 
posses an intentional content, from the constitution of actual presentation to non-existent 
presentation. Apprehensions such as perception, phantasm, and memory are all kinds of 
intuitions and each has a distinct eidetic characteristic. While perception intends an existing 
object, imagination intends an un-existing object. Intentional acts take place regardless of 
whether the objects exist or not. The essence resides in the intentional act of consciousness, an 
act of apprehension as a mode of objectivation. 167 By objectivation, Husserl means the 
directness of the act, be it perception, phantasy or memory, toward an object and the 
determination of the object, by that directedness. The difference, for example, between memory 
and imagination lies in the different kind of objectivation; each act exerts different objectivation. 
The act of objectivation is the act of creating meaning, apprehending the object in a certain way. 
Husserl specifies two aspects of intentionality: quality and matter. Quality signifies the way an 
act is intended, be it perceiving, imagining, recalling and so on. Intentional matter signifies the 
intentional object, be it a table or a chair.168  In a case where the same object is intended by 
different conscious act, the intentionality of that object is not changed, but only its mode of 
givenness, that is, the way it is intended, its mode of apprehension. The modification of the 
object is by its mode of givenness, the mode of consciousness, be it memory, imagination or 
perception. 
                                                
166 Ideas, I, 55. 
167 PBE, 7. 
168 LI, vol 4, 586 -590. 
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Presentation and representation: the constitution of the flow of internal time-consciousness 
In accordance with his whole theory, Husserl’s analysis of time-consciousness excludes all the 
assumptions with respect to objective and actual time. In order to investigate the structure of 
time-consciousness and to constitute the validity of time, it is necessary to suspend naïve beliefs 
regarding the nature of objective time. Husserl writes,  
“Inherent in this, as in any phenomenological analysis, is the complete exclusion 
of every assumption, stipulation, and conviction with respect to objective time 
(the complete exclusion of all transcending presuppositions concerning what 
exists).”169   
Or  
“what we accept, however, is not the existence of a world time, the existence of 
physical duration, and the like, but appearing time, appearing duration, as 
appearing. ….To be sure, we do assume an existing time in this case, but the time 
we assume is the immanent time of the flow of consciousness, not the time of the 
experienced world.” 170  
Husserl suspends all assumptions about objective time and describes time as it is experienced 
immanently in consciousness. His “analysis of time-consciousness, of the temporal character of 
the objects of perception, memory and expectation”171 is not a study of the actual time of the 
experienced world rather “the immanent time of the flow of consciousness.”172 The internal time-
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consciousness is constituted by two different modes: 1) immediate presentation 
(Gegenwärtigung); and 2) reproduction or representation (Vergegenwärtigung). In the first mode, 
Husserl binds the immediate past (retention or primary memory) and the immediate future 
(protention) to perception;173 the second mode is representation (reproduction). Within 
representation, Husserl includes recollection (secondary memory), 174 phantasy and expectation. 
Husserl maintains that every constituted experience is either presentation or representation 
(reproduction). These two modes of appearance constitute temporality. In both cases, the object 
is immanently present.175 The phenomenological difference between presentation and 
representation generates an alliance between retention, perception and protention on the one 
hand and between recollection, imagination and expectation on the other hand. While retention 
and perception are affiliated and are originary modes of consciousness (in both, a lived 
experience is involved), imagination, recollection and expectation are kinds of representation, 
reproductive modifications which share some of their features but are not tied to each other as 
the modes of presentation, The modification of consciousness from primary impressions and 
retention into secondary memory and phantasy is the transition from originary to what is 
reproduced. The acts differentiate in their intentional essence. Each act yields different content. 
Acts of presentation constitute the immanent content and acts of representation are those that 
represent or reproduce this immanent content. In what follows, I will try to demonstrate how the 
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expectation, see Wood, The Deconstruction of Time, 85-91. 
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constitutions of different types of apprehensions like perception, memory and phantasy take 
place. 
Temporal determination of the immediate presentation: perception and primary memory  
 
Husserl distinguishes between the various modes of giveness, the different ways to intend an 
object. These varieties of ways to intend an object are related to each other and they are 
hierarchically ordered. The type of giveness and the directness or originality of the intended 
object determines the hierarchy. This ranking also establishes the level of epistemology of the 
intentional essence. Perception is ranked highest in the epistemological level, since its objects are 
given in their most directness. Like the British empiricists, who designate perception as the 
beginning point of all other states, Husserl maintains “a priori necessity of precedence of a 
perception or a prima impression.”176 The now-phase of the object is called by Husserl primary 
impressions. Primal impressions constitute the immanent content and are the source of all other 
kinds of consciousness such as recalling, imagining, believing, doubting, desiring, and so forth. 
The primal impression is consciousness of what now exists as present ‘in person’. We have a 
direct acquaintance with the object. Its form is unmodified and always new with each present 
moment. Husserl characterizes perception  
“as an act in which something objective appears to us in its own person, as it 
were, as present itself.”177  
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However, the now is in perpetual movement. Every actually-present now of consciousness is 
subject to modification, of continuously sinking into the past. There is a continuous flux, 
continual passing over of the content from impression into retention. A primal impression passes 
over into retention as new impressions arise. By retention, Husserl means the immediate 
perceptions which have been pushed back, phases of duration which are still adjacent to the 
present moment. The intuition in retention is intended as what has just been. Retention is not 
reproductive and does not involve images or signs. Rather, like perception it is a mode of direct 
awareness of the self-given. The preceding perceptions are not erased from consciousness but are 
fused in the apprehension of the present perception. Retention is not temporally removed with 
respect to primal impressions; it is united with the primal sensations and has the mode of what 
has just elapsed, of the immediate past. The mode of the now is attached to the mode of the 
immediately past. The attachment between perception and retention is to such extend that 
retention always clings to present sensations. In each perceptual moment, there is the now that 
endures, the just-elapsed moment that sinks to the past, and the new moment which follows the 
now. This process has a sense of a running-off mode that is a state in which perpetual change 
takes place continuously. This continuity forms an inseparable unity whose parts cannot exist by 
themselves; the parts can only exist in the whole process of running–off. That is, retention is not 
separated from perception and perception is not separated from protention.178 Retention is bound 
to perception however its mode is of a continuity of running-off.  It is in a perpetual process of 
sinking further and further.  
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“The impressional consciousness, constantly flowing, passes over into ever 
new retentional consciousness… thus a continuity of retentional modification 
attaches itself to each of these retentions.”179  
Retention changes into retention of retention and so on. The primal impressions shift into 
retention, and this retention of the primal impressions shifts again into retention of retention.  
“Each later retention is not only continual modification that has arisen from 
primal impression; each is also continuous modification of all earlier continuous 
modification of that same initial point.”180  
Retention attaches itself to impressions, to the actual now “as a comet’s tail that attaches itself to 
the perception of the moment”.181 In receding into the past, the impressions in retention undergo 
a weakening in intensity and become obscure and empty.182  
In the continuous transition of primal impression into primary memory, the proximity between 
these two modes is somewhat relative. Since past, present and future are constituted in 
continuity, how can we distinguish between perceptual and retentional consciousness?                                                                                                  
Husserl maintains that perception can be defined in two different ways: either as extended or as 
condensed.183 In its extended form, perception grasps the whole process of the temporal act, the 
continuum of unity.184 Perception, in this case, encompasses the elapsed retention, the now point, 
and protention (the immediate coming future). For example, in the case of a melody, the whole 
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melody is defined as now in the extended form of perception. In its narrow sense, perception is 
the now-point without the retentional and protentional phases that attached to it. In that case, the 
melody is not the now-point. Rather the now-point would be the perceptual consciousness of a 
single tone (though it still resonates the preceding ones). The preceding tones are attached to the 
current tone. The current single tone is the now and the tones that have passed away are 
retention. Whether the scope of perception is extended and includes retention and protention, or 
whether retention and protention are distinguished from primal impression, they are all 
immediate and original modes of consciousness. The distinction between primal impressions and 
retentions depends upon the kind of the intentionality generated through the act of meaning. If 
the intentional act is directed toward the whole temporal process then perception includes 
retention and pretention. However, if the intentional act of meaning is directed toward a single 
phase of this process, then perception is a single now-point. The difference, then, between primal 
impression and retention is the difference between what we immediately see now and what we 
have just been seen. While impressional consciousness is a now directed toward the now, 
retentional consciousness is a now that is directed toward what has just been sensed. The essence 
of perception is to bring the now to intuition and the essence of primary memory is to bring the 
just past to intuition, it is a direct intuition to the past. When primal impression recedes toward 
retention, it does not lose its intention. Its objectivity is not changed, but its givenenss and 
relation to time has changed.  
Reproductive representational consciousness  
Representation as opposed to perception 
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The fundamental distinction is between presentation and representation. This distinction depends 
upon the characterization of consciousness. In perception not only do we encounter the object 
standing before us as present and existing but also ‘in person.’ In contrast, the object in re-
presentation is given as presently existing but absent from the perceptual field, the object is not 
bodily present.185 Reproductive re-presentations characterize memory, expectation, phantasy, and 
image consciousness (the image object).186 All these reproductive conscious apprehensions have 
an essentially common aspect. They are re-presentational modifications of original impressions 
obtained through perceiving objects. Representation presupposes a consciousness that was 
intended impressionally but yet stands in opposition to perception.187 In the following, I will 
refer only to two forms of representation: memory and phantasy. Though expectation has a role 
in memory and it is quite interesting to see the way expectation and memory are interwoven,188 
my analysis here excludes expectation. There are two reasons for this exclusion. First, Husserl 
himself does not elaborate his ideas on expectation, and second, the subject of this chapter 
concentrates on memory and phantasy and their interrelation. Image consciousness will be dealt, 
however, only as long as it relates to phantasy.  
        Neither recollection nor phantasy presents their object as actually there in person. Both of 
them do not carry the consciousness of being present.189 Rather, they deal with what is absent. 
                                                
185 Image consciousness is exceptional since it is embedded in a physical object. 
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The act of representation is characterized by a double intentionality; it represents not only the 
remembered or phantasied object but also the remembered and phantasied act. An act is 
reproduced and an object is represented. Both memory and phantasy possess two objects: (1) the 
image that appears; and (2) the subject of the image which does not appear.190 Representation is 
directed toward the represented subject in the image and not toward the image itself.191 In other 
words, the act of meaning, the objectivating intention aims at the image subject.  
Husserl’s fluctuation image theory192 
       While Husserl challenges the image theory regarding presentation since perceptions, 
retention, and protention present themselves directly and are present in person, for the 
constitution of re-presentation such as secondary memory, and phantasy, he shifts from accepting 
the image theory to denying it. Husserl in an early phase did embrace the image theory.193 He 
initially tried to define memory and phantasy-consciousness in terms of image theory, as forms 
of pictorial consciousness. The need for image is the supposition that there is a need of 
something present to fill in for something that is absent in the mode of as-it-were or as-if. Later, 
however, Husserl rejects his initial reduction of phantasy and memory to forms of image-
consciousness. He instead claims that phantasy and memory are direct experiences of their 
objects. The content of the absent object, which features memory and phantasy, does not depend 
on mediation of an image. By ruling out image mediation, Husserl posits instead the direct 
reproduction of the acts that intend those objects. Husserl defines memory and phantasy as forms 
of reproduction in a sense of modified consciousness in which there is a direct awareness of their 
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objects. The object hovers before me in representation not through an image but through 
identity,194 the object endures through the changes and transformations in subjectivity.  
 Differences between recollection and phantasy  
        Recollection and phantasy are both representational modifications that stand in opposition 
to perception and retention. Husserl distinguishes representational modification from the original 
consciousness of the present and past. However, even though he defines both recollection and 
phantasy in terms of representational modification, he differentiates between them. The 
questions to be asked are: what are the particular characteristics that distinguish these different 
types of reproduction?  How can one distinguish the modified character of phantasy-
consciousness from the modified consciousness of the past in the form of recollection? What 
kinds of modification apply to phantasy-consciousness or to recollection?  
Husserl distinguishes between the mere phantasy of the ‘temporal extended object” and 
recollection. Memory deals with what has been, while phantasy with what might have been. 
When applied to phantasy, modification means not actual or not related to what is actual. In mere 
phantasy, there is no reproduction of a now, nor a coincidence of the now with a past that was 
once given. We have an awareness that what we see in phantasy we do not posit as actual. 
However, in recollection, we have a reproduction of an earlier perception; a consciousness of 
having been perceived. Recollection aims toward a past which has actually been and therefore 
endows the object with an awareness of this past. Memory is the representation of something of 
the past. It is not simply the consciousness of a past object but consciousness of the object as it 
has been perceived. Perception presents an object from a specific way, for example, from one 
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side, in a certain illumination. Memory follows the specific way in which the object originally 
appeared in perception. In phantasy, the reproduction of a possible perception is the crucial 
determinant, it is the act of as-if, while in memory, the defining feature is the act of the 
reproducing the once experienced object. Memory and phantasy are both representational 
modifications that are opposed to perception. However, in one aspect, memory and perception 
are allied and stand in opposition to phantasy. All apprehensional modes intend a transcendent 
object, yet the referent in perception and memory is distinguished from the referent in phantasy. 
Whereas in perception and memory, a referent exists, in imagination the referent does not exist. 
Imagination intends a transcendent object which does not externally exist, yet the act of 
imagination still contains a reference toward a transcendent object, but toward a non-existing 
object. The differences and resemblances between memory and phantasy have not yet been 
exhausted and I will elaborate them in the following pages. 
Secondary memory – recollection of the present  
Memory and time determination: retention and recollection, “the not now in the now” 
The analysis of memory and its constitution is related to time determination.195 Time and 
memory are interrelated concepts; their existence is interwoven. The constitution of time 
depends on the particular kind of intentionality of memory (be it retention or recollection), and in 
its relation to perception. Memory and perception are distinguished and defined in terms of 
distance from the original perceived object. Without the distance inherent in the distinction 
between memory and perception, there would be no difference between the past and the present. 
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Through this temporal distance, the act of the present is distinguished from the object as it stands 
in perception. Husserl asks,   
“Now what determines the difference between the original consciousness of 
time, in which the past is experienced in relation to the now, and the 
reproductive consciousness of time? In other words, what distinguishes time-
consciousness in the ‘perception’ of an event or duration from the time-
consciousness in a memory of something further past?”196  
Husserl maintains that a strong phenomenological opposition exists between re-presenting 
recollection and retention. Recollection and retention are distinguished by the different 
extension, temporal position and by different dimensions of consciousness extension. Retention 
belongs to the absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness, while recollection is constituted 
by this absolute time-constituting flow.197 Time-constituting consciousness is the flow of 
successive moments from the actual present, to what has elapsed, and to those future moments 
that have not happened yet. Retention is linked to present perceptions, either during the 
perceptual flow, or after it elapses in a continuous union. It depends on primary impressions and 
holds in consciousness what has just past. It is an extension of the now-consciousness, and 
intends the immediate past. It is a part of a process that is constantly and continuously coming 
into being.  In contrast to retention, recollections “reach into the distant horizon of retention,”198 
and intend the whole elapsed event or object. It is an intentional act that is directed towards a 
completed past occurrence when retention of that occurrence is over. Recollection is an 
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independent phase that repeats the temporal horizon of the experienced object and its succession. 
It reconstructs the whole flux of what has been experienced: the phases of retention, primal 
impressions and protention. The process of recollection is  
“re-presentational modification of the perceptual process with all of the latter’s 
phases and stages right down to and including the retentions: but everything has 
the index of reproductive modification.”199  
It is responsible for the successive flow of experience following the determinate order of 
retention. The object is modified in representation in the sense that it does not appear as present 
but as having once been present, the “representation of something that presently exists but 
absent.” 200  
There is also a difference between retention and recollection in terms of evidence. While in 
retention everything is “absolutely certain”201 and understood as it was experienced (there are no 
mistakes), in recollection the reproduced past is liable to deviation from the original experience 
and consequently errors are possible. Recollection can deviate from the original past both in its 
elements and in its actual order of succession. 202 
Interaction between past and present: time determinations between the act and object of 
the memory 
In recollection the now appears to us but in entirely different sense than it appears in perception. 
While in perception the now stands before me as the now, memory constitutes what is not now in 
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the now. Recalling takes place between two spheres: the actual now and the sphere of the 
original temporal field.203 Memory as time-constituting consciousness does not only bring back 
time past but it also constitutes the realm where the past and present interact. Recollection is the 
consciousness of the past in the present. It defines that which now exists but is not present to 
me.204 Recollection represents a now that is not given. It is a representational consciousness 
which apprehends an existing object which is not in my perceptual field at the time. The object 
of memory appears as past, as something perceived at an earlier time, however its appearance 
comes about in relation to the actually present now. The act of memory is itself not past but 
rather exists in the now and occurs simultaneously with actual perceiving. Recollection is the 
consciousness of the past which occurs in the present; it is carried out in the now. In recollection, 
the interaction between these two temporal spheres constitutes the temporal difference between 
the act of memory and the remembered object.205 The act of remembering belongs to the now 
while the object itself belongs to the past. Memory is a present act but the object of memory is 
situated in the past with relation to the actual present. When both the act and the object appear as 
present and have the same time determination, then we have an act of perceiving and not of 
remembering because the time determination of the act of perceiving and the object perceived is 
the same. Alternatively, if we lose the temporal difference between a memory and a perception 
and the distinction between the act and the object disappears, “this would no longer be memory 
but a (hallucinary) perception of the past, yet not as past!”206   
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Double intentionality 
Memory, for Husserl, implies not only remembering the perceived object itself, but also 
remembering the act of originally perceiving the object. Recalling thus has two components. It 
comprises not only the past perception of an object but also the memory of the earlier act of 
perceiving that led to the perception in the first place. Recalling an object or event is possible 
only by recalling the original perceiving act that intended the object or event. I recall the past 
event or object by remembering the past act that correlated to the object. 207    
At will 
Recollection constitutes the consciousness of duration and succession at will. It reproduces and 
modifies perception and therein lies the domain of freedom. Recollection is the ability to return 
to a perception over and over again at will. Everything that we have perceived can be recalled 
freely any time. Every memory can be repeated in memory endlessly, while this memory may 
shift to a memory of memory, and so on in unrestricted numbers.   
Phantasy208  
 Refuting Brentano’s concept of imagination 
The British empiricists perceive imagination as a broad concept. For them, imagination 
encompasses a variety of capacities such as the ability to conceive, rearrange perceptions, and is 
involved in retaining the past, etc.209 Kant perceives imagination as a mediation between the 
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empirical and the conceptual,210 while Brentano, who influenced Husserl most,211 maintains that 
the origin of time’s representation derives from phantasy. It is phantasy which creates the 
temporal character, the representation of the time series such as duration and succession. 
According to Husserl, Brentano believes that this productive representation performed by 
phantasy “is the sole instance in which phantasy creates a truly new moment of representation, 
namely, the temporal moment.”212 Since phantasy enables us to experience duration and 
succession, it makes us conscious of the past. It generates the temporal representation of 
sensations shifting into the past, “With the shift into phantasy, the sensation receives the 
continuously changing temporal character; thus from moment to moment the content appears as 
pushed further and further back.”213 Not only does phantasy generate temporal representations of 
the past, phantasy is also the realm that constitutes future, that is, expectation, “Phantasy forms – 
in expectation - the representation of the future out of the past.”214  
Husserl, in his lectures course from 1905, is opposed to the positions of Brentano, the Empiricist 
and Kant.215 For Husserl, phantasy is an operation which neither forms original objectivity or 
capacities nor temporal acts. Indeed, in phantasy duration and succession still produce different 
temporalities of the imagined event or object. As Husserl writes, “Even in mere phantasy, every 
individual is extended in time in some way, having its now, its before, and its after; but the now, 
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before, and after are merely imagined, as is the whole object.”216 In contrast to Brentano’s 
concept of time, for Husserl, phantasy does not constitute time. Rather, Husserl maintains that 
while we can use expressions which say that what we remember hovers before us in phantasy, 
“we do not call memory itself a phantasy.”217 Instead, Husserl ascribes to perception, the two 
types of memory (retention and recollection), and to expectation the role of organizing time 
while imagination is excluded from this schematic role.218 Husserl deprives phantasy from 
having any role in the constitution original capacity and among them forming time. It neither 
enables time nor other capacities: “Even the concept of Phantasy does not arise from 
Phantasy.”219 Husserl writes: “Now there certainly is re-presented time; but it necessarily points 
back to a time that is given originally; no presentation [Vorstellung] can ‘spring’ from it. That is, 
Phantasy is not a consciousness that can set forth, as given itself, some objectivity or other, or an 
essential and possible trait of objectivity.”220 Husserl maintains that phantasy cannot generate 
objectivity. By this, he means that phantasy is a mode of reproduction which is the opposite of 
original mode of consciousness (presentation), and which comes only after presentation is fully 
formed. Only presentation can yield an object’s original appearance, objectivity, and therefore 
phantasy cannot create the temporal representation of perceptions which would constitute 
original objectivity. The phantasy world is distinguished from perceptual reality and is not 
involved in its constitution or in any other original constitution. “The phantasy is not mixed into 
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what is actual but forms a realm of its own, the realm of shadows.”221 By that, Husserl actually 
negates both the British Empiricists’ and Kant’s concept of imagination. Neither the Kantian 
transcendental mediation act between the empirical and the conceptual, nor the empiricists’ 
conception of imagination applies to Husserl’s notion of imagination.  If that is the case, what 
then is the essence or givenness of phantasy? 
Some restriction 
Before I move to the analysis of phantasy apprehension, I would like to mention some 
restrictions regarding the interpretation of phantasy in Husserl’s phenomenology. Though 
Husserl eliminates the roles that the Empiricists, Kant, and Brentano ascribe to phantasy, some 
reservations must be mentioned. Husserl argues explicitly that phantasy belongs to the realm of 
reproductive modification, which stands in direct opposition to original objectivity. Thus, 
phantasy cannot be involved in any constitution of original objectivity itself.222 However, 
phantasy is far from being an unambiguous notion in Husserl’s phenomenology. It is an evasive 
concept which relates to and subsumes a variety of forms of apprehensions. Husserl does not 
argue for this indefinite character of phantasy explicitly but he does use expressions which can 
indicate that his concept of phantasy as representation is stretched and, indeed, intermingles with 
a variety of other apprehensions such as perception and memory. Moreover, while Husserl 
investigates the status of phantasy, he doubts “whether there is such a thing as a completely pure 
phantasy”223 in which phantasy can be separated from all the acts of actual experience. In the 
realm of actual experience, experiences are bound into the flow of consciousness (retention-
perception-protention and recollection-phantasy-expectation). Though phantasy does not have a 
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role in the time flow, Husserl inserts it into the flow of consciousness. What does this act of 
insertion of phantasy to the flow of consciousness bring about for phantasy’s relation to reality 
and to actual experience?  Furthermore, our role as observers in our phantasies is not naturalized 
since we are already involved in actual existence and our phantasies are immersed in our 
experienced reality. Phantasy is bound up with non-phantasy acts. It can be bound up with 
perceptual fields in either the present or the past. Yet, this does not mean that phantasies achieve 
a total blend of present and past. Husserl indicates several ways in which phantasy, perception, 
and memory can be blended. However, this synthesis will never be indistinguishable (such as in 
the case of physical image). One example which can imply that his concept of phantasy does 
involve in original objectivity is when phantasy fills in the unseen parts of the object in our 
perceptual field. Objects appear perceptively, they are never given in their totality, but always in 
a limited way, yet, experience itself intends the whole object and appears immediately. We 
perceive physical object from a specific perspective. We can perceive only a part of an object 
and never all of it from all vantage points at the same time. Only part of the intended object is 
given from any one specific perspective, (the front surface or the back surface, etc.). For 
example, when we perceive a chair, we cannot see the back side if we stand in front of the chair, 
but only the front side of the chair. However, when I perceive an object like a chair, I intend not 
only one surface of it but the whole chair. Consequently, some gap between the intended object 
and the given object exists. Or as Dan Zahavi puts it: “Our intentional directedness toward 
spatio-temporal objects are consequently characterized by the fact that we persistently transcend 
the given in order to grasp the object itself. Although perception is defined as the intentional act 
that aims at giving a full presentation of the intended object, that is, to let the object show itself 
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fully as it is, this remains as ideas when it comes to physical objects.”224 We know intuitively 
that an object is constituted from the sides or parts that we do not see, as well as from those that 
we do see. This supplement is provided by phantasy.225 In that sense, phantasy is involved in 
original perceptual sphere. Furthermore, in some other places of Husserl’s texts, it is possible 
that Husserl sees imagination as a broad concept similar to the way that Hume and Kant view 
imagination.226 In these places, Husserl refers to memory in terms of phantasy presentation. 
Phantasy here refers to the ability to encompass memory. Still, these mentions are not consistent 
and are contradicted by other ones which state quite the opposite. For example, elsewhere, 
Husserl argues that “presentations belonging to memory and expectation, in which non-present 
objects are determined in the mode of realities as having existed earlier or as expected with 
certainty, are not designated as phantasies… but what is here taken to be phantasy is not a matter 
of determinate expectations, but of things merely imagined.”227 In other places Husserl, refers to 
phantasy as the general ability to represent other acts of knowing such as judgment, volition, 
desire, etc. Phantasy in that sense is opposed to these original acts such as judgment, volition, 
etc. The difference between phantasy and these acts of knowing is that phantasy does not lead to 
deeds as judgment or volition do, though phantasy’s status is not quite completely imaginary.  
Husserl also refers to phantasy as involved in the casual process, stating that “phantasy activity 
considered as a casual process taking place in psychic action; and naturally the same is true of 
the result of the action, of the work of phantasy considered as the result of a casual process.”228 
Overall, Husserl does not refer to these modes of phantasy explicitly. These allusions are 
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scattered throughout his texts, and their implications are not explicitly described. Therefore, I 
will deal only with those characteristic and arguments that are explicitly addressed by Husserl. 
 
The Distinction between phantasy and perception 
Husserl contrasts the appearance of an object in phantasy-consciousness with what appears in 
perception. Phantasy, the experience of internal seeing, is not only opposed “to the external 
seeing that belongs to perception,”229 but also “to the intuitive positing of past and future as true; 
in short to all acts that posit something concrete as existing.”230 Husserl claims that Brentano 
overlooks the fundamental difference between sensations and phantasms. Brentano holds that the 
differences between phantasy and perception are in terms of intensity, steadiness and mutability. 
Phantasms are less intense, steady but more inconstant than sensations. Indeed, Husserl himself 
points to the inconsistent character of phantasy.231 The image in phantasy presentation is 
“fluctuating, unsteady changing, now growing in fullness and force now diminishing, hence 
something continually changing immanently in the scale of perfection.”232 Nevertheless, despite 
the fact that phantasied objects are modified perceptions and characterized by perpetual 
fluctuation, discontinuity, and instability of appearance, Husserl maintains that phantasy and 
perception are both two simple intuitive modes. An identical appearance can emerge in both 
modes. The same content can appear at different times to different apprehensions, it can belong 
at one point to perception and at another point to phantasy. The potential coincidence of 
imagination and perception proves for Husserl that the distinction between the two has to depend 
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on the mode of apprehension and not on the content.233 If this is the case, new questions arise. 
What are the different features of phantasy-apprehension and perceptual-apprehension? What 
characterizes phantasy-consciousness as distinct from perception? How do we know when 
perception-apprehension or phantasy-apprehension is taking place? 
Lack of reality and the mode of “as if” 
What distinguishes phantasy from perception is mode of consciousness involved. The distinction 
“lies in the characterization that constitutes the difference between present and re-presented.”234 
The mode of perception is characterized as presentation, while the mode of phantasy as re-
presentation and reproduction. Re-presentations in the sense of phantasy “lack the consciousness 
of reality in relation to what is phantasied.”235 For phantasy, the type of consciousness involved 
is not believed to be actual;236 it does not posit the characteristic of actual existence but instead 
imaginative characteristics. While in perception, we are conscious of objects or events that now 
existing, in memory we are conscious of objects which having existed in the past. Conversely, in 
phantasy the reproduced object does not have any mode of existence.237 Phantasy is the 
presentation of what is not present, “the object itself appears… but it does not appear as present. 
It is only represented; it is as though it were there, but only as though.” 238 Modes of belief such 
as “as-if,”239 “as it were,” 240 and “quasi” express the character of phantasy. Memory is also the 
consciousness of “as-if” but it refers to actual past and being, while the “as-if” of phantasy is 
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directed against actual existence. In contrast to illusion or hallucination, which enforce 
themselves into the perceptual field and therefore blur the distinction between the unreal and real 
perceptions  and hold the perceived as genuine perceptual appearance, phantasy distinguishes 
itself clearly from the actual real with its mode of “as if”. 
 
Two apprehensions 
Phantasy apprehension is a more complicated phenomenon than perceptual apprehension. While 
in perceptual presentation there is only one object and this object is the object that meant, in 
phantasy presentation there are two intermingling apprehensions which constitute two objects: 1) 
apprehension of the image, and 2) apprehension of the represented object that is the depicted 
subject. The act of meaning is directed not toward the representation, but toward the subject 
itself. The object that appears in phantasy is not independent but is taken for another, non-
appearing objectivity represented in image. Phantasy represents an object by generating another 
object resembling it. Even if the object that appears in phantasy perfectly resembles the 
perceptual object, there is still a conflict of consciousness resulting from different intentional 
contexts.  
Free supposition 
While in perception, there is “a small sphere of freedom,”241 experiences are determined by the 
nature of the perceptual situation and the relation of the subject to it. In contrast, phantasy is the 
realm of freedom.242 It is characterized by “its optional character.”243 Everything which was 
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existed can be replaced in phantasy and imagined otherwise. The phantasy world has an open 
horizon; all the restrictions stemming from belief are excluded. It is the realm of possibilities. 
The fulfillment of the horizon of phantasy is a voluntary. It is the integration of two acts: 1) the 
first act, which Husserl calls free supposition, is fundamental since it determines the object. This 
initial act actualizes phantasy. Free supposition enables the second component of phantasy: 2) 
the directness of phantasy towards an object which was first determined by the free 
supposition.244 Every act is directed toward something, and since phantasy is not capable of 
constituting objects, the act of free supposition determines the content or object of phantasy. Free 
supposition enables intentionality to be aimed to its essence. Both memory and imagination 
involve free act of setting out. However they are different in the sense that the intention in both 
these acts is actualized in a different way. In memory, the intention is aimed at objectivity is 
involved with the belief of an “objectivity that presents itself as intrinsically real.”245 In memory, 
the supposition has the characteristic of a belief. In phantasy, this belief is neutralized. Phantasy 
frees itself from belief and replaces belief with “as if.” “The being actual turns into being-as-if 
(as if it were reality).”246 However, phantasy is subject to some constraints as well. Some of the 
natural laws and eidetic necessities that bind perception constrain phantasy as well. For example, 
in phantasy, every object is extended in time and has its now, past, and after, though these 
constraints are merely imagined. The difference between the phantasy, recollection, and 
perception is that phantasy represents the now but its object is not now, it does not represent the 
actual now, while perception and primary memory do intend the now. 
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Two phantasy forms: ordinary phantasy and perceptive phantasy 
Husserl distinguishes between two conscious apprehensions belonging to phantasy: reproductive 
phantasy and perceptive phantasy. Reproductive phantasy represents objects that stand in 
opposition to perception. As was mentioned above, its objects do not appear to us in their own 
person and they lack a sense of real existence. Rather, it appears in the mode of the “as though”, 
“as-if.” However, the second characteristic of phantasy apprehension bears relation to the 
perceptual field. Here, phantasy presentation appears by means of physical image. These two 
phantasy presentations are further distinguished by two types of imaginative apprehension: 
external and internal images. 1) An ordinary phantasy has no image object247 which is given 
perceptually and functions as a representant for something beyond it. The ordinary phantasy 
represents an intended object which is not present. In ordinary phantasy, the phantasy 
consciousness is purely internal. In contrast, 2) the Image Object248 is an imaginative 
consciousness that derives from external, perceptual consciousness. It appears in the mode of 
perception as a physical image. In that sense imagination is mediated by external physical 
objects, such as photograph, painting, engraving, theatre show, and film, and represents another 
object by means of resemblance. The function of physical object is to awaken a mental image. It 
substitutes for another object which is absent from the perceptual field. Imagination, on the basis 
of perception, constitutes an image object in the present. Although the physical object appears in 
the perceptual field as present, it nevertheless points to and is taken for something else. The 
image object points beyond itself, toward the image subject. An example of an image object is 
the image of a child in photograph. The image of the child points to the child who is the subject 
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of the apprehension,249 or for example, a painting of a landscape points to the landscape itself 
that is represented in the painting. The image object refers to a subject that is not present. In 
image consciousness, sensations are the content of apprehension: lines, colors, shapes, and so on. 
However the apprehension here is not of perception, but of presentation by means of 
resemblance.250 The image object is aimed at representing another object by means of 
resemblance. This image object is present, but it refers to and represents an object which is not 
present.251 The portrait of a child is taken as a representation of the image subject, for the non-
appearing child who is represented in the photograph. The physical object is based on perception, 
however the apprehension exceeds beyond the perceptual apprehension and performs an 
imaginary apprehension. It has double status: on the one hand it is a perceptual existing object, 
on the other hand it functions as an imaginative representation of something not present. Image 
objects appear as actual perceptual object, but they produce a conflict with the actual present. An 
image object appears in the perceptual field in the sense that a picture, for example, hangs on the 
wall. It is indeed part of a room but at the same time conflicts with it. “The conflict that comes 
from being placed into the surroundings of ‘reality.’”252 While in an image object, the 
apprehension is based on perception in that the image establishes itself as a part of the perceptual 
field, in the actual reality of the present, the image is not merely perceptual apprehension and 
does not function as actual. In contrast to perception, the image object bears the characteristic of 
unreality. The image object is figment that fluctuates between its two roles in the perceptual field 
and in the phantasy field of “as if”. It is not real in a sense that the represented object (the child 
in the picture) does not presently exist as real. Thus, image objects appear in reality without 
                                                
249 PBE, 20. 
250 PBE, 28. 
251 PBE, 89. 
252 PBE, 175. 
  
97 
having the character of reality. Imaging apprehension is grounded in an image object, and 
therefore it is part of the perceptual field. However, its characteristic act—not its perceptual 
appearance—distinguishes imaging from perceiving. Since both the physical object that belongs 
to image consciousness and the perceptual object appear in the perceptual field, the difference 
depends on the apprehensional act. In order to form an image phantasy, an objectivating 
consciousness is required; apprehension that interprets the image’s content and produces an act 
of meaning.253 The act of objectivation constitutes the presenting image intentionally. In image 
presentation, Husserl distinguishes between the subject and the image. The subject is the object 
meant by presentation. The image object presents the subject, but it at no point is the subject. As 
for ordinary phantasy, not only does it not appear at all in the perceptual field, it is totally 
separated from the world of the actual present. In an ordinary phantasy, in contrast to physical 
imagining, the conflict with the perceptual field does not exist because they function on two 
completely separate levels. Husserl claims that the apprehension belonging to physical image 
presentation is more complicated than the apprehensions belonging to phantasy presentation. 
While in perceptual presentation, there is one apprehended object and in an ordinary phantasy 
image, there are two apprehensions, in physical image presentation actually three objectivities 
are interwoven: 1) the physical object, the material, be it paper, canvas, wood and so on; 2) the 
representing object or image object; and 3) the represented object, or the image subject. 254 The 
image subject is intended through the image object by means of the material, physical object.  
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General differences 
Image consciousness and ordinary phantasy both imply a consciousness of something absent. 
However, in image-consciousness, I intend an object that is represented by another perceptual 
object such as picture, photo, etc. Phantasy intends an absent object that is neither embedded in a 
physical object nor confined to represent an object by means of resemblance. The image objects, 
in contrast, do represent an absent object but by means of resemblance. The person in the picture 
for example, represents a real person.  Furthermore, while in ordinary phantasy, the perceptual 
field disappears, in image consciousness, the perceptual field not only does not disappear but 
serves as the surrounding of the image object, such as the wall forms the background of a 
picture. It is also important to see the distinctive intentionality of an image consciousness (image 
object) in contrast to perception. Image consciousness partially functions as a form of perceptual 
consciousness since it appears as present directly in itself. However, it is not a perceptual object 
in the same way that a simple perceptual object is, since it represents the image of an object that 
is not actual in the physical object itself. The subject of the picture, for example, does not appear 
but is meant and implied. In perception, what appears is also what is meant, while in image 
consciousness the image object that appears is present but not meant. This object representation 
entails discrepancy between what appears and what is meant. There are different levels of 
correspondence between the image object and the image subject (such as intensity, size). Yet, the 
physical object stabilizes the image object. It appears in the same sensuous force and intensity as 
perceptual object while ordinary phantasies are prone to fluctuation and variance.255 The 
difference between perceptual apprehension and apprehension of an image object depends on the 
characteristic of the apprehensional act. 
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Image object as a basis for various forms 
Phantasy in the form of image object serves as a basis for various forms of presentations such as 
aesthetic, symbolic, and signative presentation. Although all these apprehensions have in 
common the fact that they point beyond themselves, they differ in some respects. While the 
imaging apprehension points to a similar object, the image objects of symbolic and signitive 
apprehensions do not resemble the aimed object but instead points to a different object. “In 
symbolic presentation, the meaning regard is pointed away from the symbol; in pictorial 
presentation, it is pointed toward the image.”256 In the act of symbolization, the symbol appears 
for itself but also bears relation to something else. The symbolizing image’s mediation is 
equivalent to reading a word. “The word itself is seen but not meant.”257 The meaning of the 
word is meant. The word is taken as a sign. After the first apprehension of the appearance of the 
word, a second apprehension occurs where the word’s meaning is manifest. The meaning is 
directed toward the referent of the word and not toward the word itself.258 Image consciousness 
does not only involve the perceptual and phantasy apprehension but can also employ memory. 
The image object can function to reproduce an object by means of memory.259 In that sense, 
image object can be, for example, a small reproduction of a well known painting which evokes 
memory of the original painting. 260 In the case of aesthetic consciousness,261 the image object 
itself is intended and does not point toward a different object.262 In aesthetic contemplation, the 
phantasy apprehension is directed towards the image itself and the subject is not external to the 
                                                
256 PBE, 37. 
257 PBE, 26. 
258 PBE, 26. 
259 PBE, 38. 
260 PBE, 38. 
261 PBE, 37- 41.  
262 The aesthetic object has a bit different status but it bears similar attitude; the aesthetic object appears as present 
but is not taken as actual. 
  
100 
image.  In this case, we immerse ourselves in the image. The aim is in the way the art embodies 
its form, and it does not necessarily awaken the memory of another non-appearing object. In 
contrast to phantasy presentation (where the focus is directed toward the image subject), here we 
are interested in the manner of appearance. The physical image is not separated from the image 
subject. The aesthetic image is set apart from reality and is grounded in conscious imagining. 
Each of these acts constitutes different meaning but all of them involve in imaginative 
constitution. All of these integrations of phantasy apprehension with other types of 
apprehensions stand in opposition to pure and ordinary phantasy. Here again, Husserl does not 
indicate it directly, however, it seems that he ascribes the role of relating the image object to the 
image subject to phantasy apprehension. Whether the image subject coincides with the image 
object or is separated from it and the image object functions as awaking a presentation of 
something which is external to the image, the function of phantasy is to immerse us into the 
image subject.  
Summary 
In his phenomenology, Husserl initiates a change of attitude toward reality. His motivation was 
to validate the correlation between modes of apprehension and their correlated objects. 
Therefore, he suspends all assumptions regarding actual external reality and instead deals with 
the phenomena, with appearances. He approaches these phenomena by investigating acts of 
consciousness and the way they intend, intuit, represent, recollect, and phantasy the world. 
Husserl investigates the primordial, a priori structures of apprehension and seeks to establish the 
essential structure of each act of consciousness. The essential structure of acts of consciousness 
is intentionality; its directness toward the object, characteristics of meaning, objectivation, and 
the relation that it constitutes with its content. The conscious acts are distinguished not by their 
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content of the object, but through their intentionality. Husserl divides conscious acts into two 
different modes of time-constitution: immediate and reproduction. This distinction brings about 
division between primal impressions, retention, and protention on the one hand, and recollection, 
phantasy, and expectation as forms of representation on the other hand. Both memory and 
phantasy are forms of reproduction and they represent in the now that is absent. Secondary 
memory and phantasy are characterized in the same way. The only thing that distinguishes 
between them is whether their object is actual or not. Memory represents an actual object or 
event, whereas phantasy represents a nonexistent object. While memory is affixed with the belief 
that its object refers to an real past, in phantasy this belief is neutralized and replaced with free 
supposition characterized by the apprehension of the “as-if”. Phantasy is not such a simple 
concept, and indeed Husserl deprives it from the constitutive characteristics that the empiricists, 
Kant and Brentano ascribed to it. Yet, Husserl’s concept of phantasy is a concept that engaged 
with varieties of modes and through them is involved in various forms of representation such as 
perceptual, aesthetic, signitive, symbolic and memory apprehension.                          
 The particular mode of apprehension and its relation to the object constitutes both the 
ontological and epistemological status of the object. Each mode of apprehension ascribes either 
actuality, present, or past existence to the events or objects or refers to the object as fictions. 
Husserl explains the different characteristics of each act and distinguishes between their modes 
of apprehension with reference to their relation to the object and their constitution in relation to 
internal time consciousness. However unexplained aspects are still present. We know different 
ways in which an object is identified or categorized, however, we do not know how it is 
constituted in that way. Husserl does not explain how each act forms its particular mode of 
apprehension. Yes, primal impressions are original, belief is attached to memory, and phantasy is 
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free supposition which represents objects that are not actual. However, how each act is 
constituted in each specific way is not explained in Husserl’s Phenomenology. Indeed, Husserl 
explains the difference between memory and phantasy, but he does not explain how the memory 
constitutes the object as a memory and phantasy constitutes the object as a non-actual phantasy. 
He indicates the different qualities each mode of apprehension has, but not the unique way in 
which they constitute their object. Furthermore the phenomenological method does not provide 
us completely escape from doubts, errors, or confusion.  The approach does not explain how the 
apprehensional correlation with the object takes place in the first place. It is unclear how the 
intentionality of each act of apprehension necessarily establishes a correlation with the object. Is 
it possible that an intentional act generates a false objectivation? How can we know that we are 
really establishing the correct correlation between our mental intention and the object when we 
deal with perception, memory, or phantasy? How do we know that appearance does not mislead 
our consciousness or that our consciousness itself does not misinterpret the phenomena? Husserl 
describes states of misapprehension such as illusion and hallucination, and distinguishes between 
them and phantasy. Illusions and hallucination force themselves on our perceptual apprehension 
thereby blending the real and unreal without our ability to discern between them, while in 
phantasy this epistemologically defective synthesis does not take place. 
  However, what about confusion between memory and phantasy? If these two modes both 
represent the absent, how can we ensure confusion between the two is excluded? Is the belief 
attached to memory sufficient enough to ensure that there is no confusion with other modes of 
apprehension? Husserl himself distinguishes between retention and recollection in terms of 
evidence: while retention is evident, recollection is liable to errors. Indeed, Husserl’s 
phenomenology establishes the ideal constitution of different apprehensional modes and their 
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relation to objects, but still does not provide us with validity regarding the way conscious acts 
intend the appearance of objects. 
 
 
Neuroscience and the epistemology of memory and imagination 
Neuroscience of memory 
Introduction 
Neuroscience postulates memory as a mechanism that is composed of multiple systems, forms, 
functions and processes. Traditionally, philosophers characterized the ontology of memory 
through various spatial metaphors,263 such as Plato’s wax tablet metaphor or the birds in an 
aviary model,264 “the treasure house of ideas” by roman rhetoricians,265 the metaphor of library 
in the middle ages,266 Locke’s repository metaphor which describes memory as the storehouse of 
ideas,267 and William James’ metaphor of painting our past on a canvas.268 Memory was 
imagined as a storage place and assessed in terms of quantity, how much information can be 
retained and stored. 269 Most of these spatial conceptions implied a passive notion of memory. A 
memory was arranged in a physical place, like an item in a storehouse, complete and available 
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for the owner to draw on at any time. Thus, spatial analogies presuppose that the person doing 
the remembering simply needs to pull a memory out from a storage location. As for the 
epistemology of memory, as was discussed above, a prevalent criterion was the strength of 
memory, which manifested itself in its vividness and distinctiveness. Memory was understood to 
vary in force and accessibility compared to other mental processes such as perception and 
imagination.270 Other criteria for attributing mental images to memory were Williams James’ 
feeling of belief and “warmth and intimacy”271 or according to Bertrand Russell, a sense of 
familiarity that invokes a belief in the accuracy of the memory.272  
Over time, the study of memory has shifted from philosophy to psychology, to experimental 
research,273 behaviorism, to cognitive revolution,274 and, finally, to the paradigms of 
neuroscience (which includes cognitive psychology, neurobiology, and physiology). 
Consequently, the concept of memory has changed, spreading over range of domains and 
disciplines. Current views of memory no longer conceptualize it with reference to the amount of 
space or through criteria such as vividness or familiarity, which in current view are no longer 
inductive of its reliability. Neuroscientists approach memory from different perspectives that 
focus on different levels of its ontology. For example, some neuroscientists tackle the whole 
process of memory, while others concentrate on a specific part of the process, approaching 
memory at the time of stabilization or at the retrieval phase. Still other neuroscientists focus on 
the physical trace of memory in the brain (engram) as some deal with the function of memory 
systems and others with its underlying neural mechanisms. In contrast to past philosophers who 
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viewed memory as one faculty, neuroscientists share the view that memory is composed of 
multiple systems, forms, functions and processes. Nonetheless, the science of memory has not 
abandoned spatial analogies: memory is still localized but at a level beyond metaphor. Indeed, 
neuroscientists investigate the physical basis of memory in the brain, how memory is embedded 
in different brain areas, and how neural circuitry supports both plasticity and memory 
expression. Yadin Dudai, for example, defines memories as “experience-dependent internal 
representations […] acquired models of the world, encoded in the spatiotemporal activity of 
brain circuits.” 275  However, while neuroscientists localize memory, they reject the passive view 
of memory in favor of viewing memory as a dynamic and generative process. 276 The process of 
memory formation depends on flexible and elastic mechanism. This mechanism involves the 
reorganization and dissipation of memories across different neuronal sites. Subsequently, 
retrieval of information does not just mean finding a stored object or pulling a past experience 
out from storage in a particular place,277 but the active reformation and reconstruction of it. Both 
cognitive psychologists and neuroscientist postulate that memory is a constructive process and 
emphasize the labile characteristics of memory.  
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The neuroscientific ontology of memory  
Multiple memory systems (episodic, semantic, procedural) 
Memory is not a single faculty but is composed of multiple separate systems. Endel Tulving 
states “that there is no such thing as ‘the memory’ rather we have to distinguish between 
different forms of memory.”278 In a similar way, Schacter also states that “Memory is not a 
single or unitary faculty of the mind, as was long assumed. Instead, it is composed of a variety of 
distinct and dissociable processes and systems.”279 The reason that cognitivists divide memory to 
subsystems derives from the inability to state generalizations that explain all the variety memory 
types and expressions.280 Psychologists categorize and classify forms of memory according to 
types of knowledge they represent, and also by their underlying mechanism, process, method of 
acquisition and functions they might serve. In short, different kinds of memory depend on 
different brain systems and correlate with different neural expression.281 By identifying multiple 
memory systems, researchers assume that different brain areas support different memory systems 
and, as a result, a memory with one feature, such as consciousness, necessarily correlates to 
specific brain region such as the hippocampus whereas a memory not associated with awareness 
relies on another area, the basal ganglia and related brain structures. 282 
Evidence for multiple systems has its origins in several sources, but mainly from studies of 
amnesic patients with brain lesions. This brain lesion research leads psychologists and 
cognitivists to identify correlations between behavior and cognitive expression in brain areas 
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responsible for a given function since lesions can affect one type of function but not necessarily 
the other. Thus, studies of human amnesia and brain damage lead psychologists to dissociate 
various kinds of memory, such as declarative (explicit memory) from procedural memory 
(implicit memory). 
The most famous case, which is widely mentioned in the literature, is of a patient named H.M, 
who suffered from severe epileptic seizures. Treating the seizure, the neurosurgeon, William 
Beecher Scoville, removed part of his inner medial temporal lobe on both sides of the brain. The 
surgery, while giving H.M. relief from his seizures, it left him severely amnesic.283 After the 
surgery, H. M. was not able to learn new information, although his short term memory was not 
impaired and he could only retain information for few minutes. This case cast light on several 
important issues. Until then, researchers associated the hippocampus with other mental 
phenomena such as emotions, autonomic regulation, sleep and respiration, and sexual 
behavior.284 Due to this case, it was conjectured that the hippocampus plays a critical role in 
memory.285 Behavioral experiments with H. M. showed that he could acquire new skills, but that 
he had no memory of learning them. This finding suggested that memory for skills is different 
long term memory and is disassociated from other memory types.  
Another notable case study was the patient K.C., who became amnesic as a result of head injury. 
K.C. lost all his episodic memories but could retain factual knowledge (semantic memory), 
including information on himself. Although he knew the information such as his date of birth and 
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educational record, he did not remember experiencing this information.286 After the injury, he 
could learn new semantic information and skills but could not remember episodic experiences. 
Thus, researchers concluded that impairment of episodic memory could take place without the 
impairment with other memory systems, illustrating the disassociation between the systems. 
These studies of H.M., K.C. and other amnesic patients have shown that formation of new 
declarative memories relies on the hippocampus while permanent long term storage for those 
memories lies in other areas in the brain.287 In other cases described by Michale D. Kopelman 
and Narinder Kapur, the patients display severe impairments of semantic memory, while their 
autobiographical memory remains intact.288 Thus, it is important to taxonomically distinguish the 
varied forms, activities, and operations, identifying different ways each memory system behaves 
and what functions they serve. These classifications are not merely convenient for theoretical 
purposes, but are based on the way our memories are constructed and how we remember since 
different brain structures process different types of memory. 
However, while scientists agree that there are multiple definitions and types of memory, there is 
no complete agreement about how to categorize memory systems.289 For example, the debate on 
the multiple systems and distinguishing features of long term memory has not yet reached a 
resolution.290 On the other hand, researchers agree that memory varies by duration, and length of 
storing (working memory, short-term versus long-term memory). They also agree that memory 
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varies by the kind of the stored information, such as whether memory expresses itself as mental 
representation (propositional memory) or mental process (skills, habits), or whether there is or is 
not awareness of the memory (conscious or non-conscious). Each of these memory types has 
different features and fulfills specific goals. Autobiographical memory, for example, functions to 
form personal identity and a concept of a self; prospective memory enables us to carry out plans 
and intentions;291 semantic memory handles factual and general knowledge; procedural memory 
enables us to acquire and perform skills automatically. 
Although memory systems each have distinctive goals, they are interrelated and share 
components; the operation of one memory system may overlap with the operation of another 
memory system.292 For example, Tulving maintains that memory is evolutionary mechanism and 
is arranged hierarchically. The three memory systems (procedural, semantic and episodic) 
emerged at different stages of the species evolution and develop at different stages in the growth 
of the individual organisms. These systems constitute mono-hierarchical arrangement, divided 
according to operation, function and characteristics. Each higher system depends on and is 
supported by a lower system, illustrating the interrelatedness of memory systems. Indeed, 
procedural memory contains and supports semantic memory as a subsystem, and semantic 
memory contains and supports episodic memory as a subsystem. However, each system 
nevertheless possesses unique features. Since procedural system is the lowest memory system, it 
is the only system that can operate independently of the other systems. Semantic memory can 
function independently from episodic memory, but not independently from procedural memory 
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and episodic memory depends on both procedural and semantic memory.293 Squire, in contrast to 
Tulving, formalizes the systems a bit differently, claiming that episodic and semantic memory 
are two parallel sub-branches of the hierarchy. 294 
Short term and long term memory 
Dual-trace-theory maintains that experience initiates two memory traces: short term and long 
term memory traces. It is not clear whether these two forms of memory are separate systems, that 
is, whether they are distinguished functionally and structurally or only by their availability.295 
Regardless, different decay and capacity rates distinguish short and long term traces. The rate of 
forgetting in short term memory is rapid and its capacity is limited because short term memory 
traces hold small amount of information for short periods. In psychology, short term memory is 
measured by the number of items that a subject can repeat immediately after their presentation. 
Short term memory can incorporate 7 +2 items and, in terms of time, it lasts no longer than a 
minute. In short term memory, three main phenomenon trigger forgetting: the passage of time, 
spontaneous forgetting, and the interference process (when new information displaces old 
information). Long-term memory, by contrast, is characterized by persistence over time.296 It 
requires time to develop and has a much slower decay rate. Its capacity is unlimited. It is 
mediated by long-term potentiation, which facilitates learning and remembering, and, also long-
term depression, which weakens the synaptic activity that supports a memory. The traces of 
short-term memory and long-term memory are not only distinguished by their duration but also 
but their rate of vulnerability and their state as active or passive. While short-term memory is 
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active and vulnerable, long term memory is inactive and less vulnerable. Short term memory and 
long term memory involve different brain systems and require different molecular 
components.297 Long-term memory is itself divided to two additional systems: non declarative 
(implicit memory)298 and declarative, propositional memory (explicit). 299 
Long term memory: non-declarative and declarative memory systems   
Non-declarative memory- procedural memory 
Non-declarative memory encompasses forms of learning that function without dependence on 
representation but are instead expressed through non-symbolic behavior. While a subject can 
express a declarative memory, one can only demonstrate a non-declarative memory since this 
type of memory does not contain representations but, rather, actions.300 Encoding such non-
declarative memories requires practice and repetition until the subject becomes skilled. It is 
expressed and measured through performance and by capability.301 Because it centers on such 
actions, this memory type is automatically retrieved and resides below the level of conscious 
awareness.302 That is, changes in procedural memory are expressed in behavior, but are not 
necessarily conscious and are based on implicit learning. We do not even have any sense of 
remembering when we activate a non-declarative memory. Indeed, procedural memory starts as 
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conscious process (declarative memory), when an act is done deliberately and exerts cognitive 
efforts. However, with practice, the information is retrieved automatically without any deliberate 
or conscious effort, then becoming a procedural memory.303  
Non-declarative memory contains elementary, non-associative forms of behavioral plasticity 
such as classical conditioning, the priming effect, in addition to the acquisition of motor, 
perceptual, and cognitive skill, procedures, and habits. Classical conditioning is learning that 
occurs when one stimulus elicits another immanent stimulus while priming is unconscious 
memory that refers to a stimulus that is not explicitly remembered, but, after exposure, facilitates 
retrieval in a later situation. Examples of procedures, skills include reading, walking, biking, 
playing piano, swimming, and driving a car. Most of the skills are mundane and can be examined 
in terms of success and accomplishment or failure, but they cannot be judged in terms of truth or 
falsity.304 The circumstances of when, where or how one acquires these skills are not important; 
only their performance is. Non-declarative memory is independent of the medial temporal lobe, 
the location where declarative memory is consolidated, and is intact in amnesic patients. Thus, 
amnesic patients can acquire motor, perceptual, cognitive skills and habits that are based on new 
learning even when they fail or are not able to acquire declarative memory.  
Declarative memory: semantic and episodic memory  
Declarative memory (propositional) provides representations on the external world and internal 
states of the individual and is described in propositional or linguistic terms. This memory type is 
sometimes called explicit memory, since it consists of information that is consciously and 
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explicitly encoded and retrieved as the rememberer is aware that s/he retrieves information when 
s/he does so. Declarative memory can obtain knowledge in a single occasion and is expressed in 
variety of ways. Declarative memory addresses the relation between knowledge and reality. This 
is the type of memory that account for correspondence to accurate or distorted remembering 
since information can be compared with the external world and assessed for its truth value. 
Psychologists divide declarative memory into two subtypes: semantic and episodic memory.305 
These systems can react to the same sensory perceptions and correspond with each other during 
the different phases of encoding, storing, and retrieval. As was mentioned above, according to 
Tulving, semantic memory is embedded in episodic memory but not vice versa. Though both 
semantic and episodic memories are conscious, the kind of awareness varies by type.  
Semantic Memory 
Semantic memory contains factual knowledge about the world—the concepts, ideas, rules, and 
language that form our general knowledge,306 such as the idea that water is composed of one 
oxygen and two hydrogen atoms, or the fact that Oslo is the capital of Norway. Semantic 
memories are impersonal and have no association with a particular occasion of acquisition.307 It 
does not refer to the time of learning, and the original context of acquisition is not important at 
the time of retrieval. In contrast to episodic memory, which is to be remembered, semantic 
memory is, according to Tulving, to be known as it is characterized by noetic awareness and is 
                                                
305 Endel Tulving introduced the distinction between episodic and semantic memory. See Endel Tulving, “Episodic 
and Semantic Memory”, in Organization of Memory, ed.  E. Tulving& W.Donaldson, (New York: Academic press, 
1972), 381-403. See also Endel Tulving, Elements of Episodic Memory, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983),18. 
306 Daniel L. Schacter, “Memory: Delineating the Core,” in Science of Memory: Concepts, ed. Henry L Roediger III, 
Yadin Dudai and Susan M. Fitzpatrick, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 24. 
307 Endel Tulving, Elements of Episodic Memory, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 63. 
  
114 
accompanied by feeling of familiarity.308 Language plays bigger role in semantic memory than in 
episodic memory. 
Episodic memory  
 
Episodic memory enables people to recollect personal past experiences. It is characterized by 
individual, first person experience and, as a result, is accompanied by autonoetic awareness.309 
By autonoetic awareness, Tulving refers to the subjective conscious awareness of 
remembering.310 He aims at William James’ description of memory as a subjective experience 
with the feeling of “warmth and intimacy.”311 Episodic memory is accompanied with an 
awareness that connects one’s subjective past experiences to his personal identity.312 It entails a 
sense of self and characterized by subjective belief in the veridicality of the memories. The 
subjective feeling of conscious awareness is associated with the nature of content and 
distinguishes this form of memory from others. Apparently, this subjective feeling derives from 
the specificity, the time, space and the contextual information. However, it is not clear what 
underlies this belief since there is no way of comparing the memory with the past but, 
nevertheless, this belief is a strong component in episodic memories.  
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Episodic memory’s specificity, temporality, and duration 
Episodic memory is characterized by specificity, by the ability to recall considerable details of 
what occurred a short time ago. It represents summaries of moments of conscious experience and 
is often represented in the form of visual images. Studies on brain damage demonstrate the close 
relationship between visual images and episodic memories. These studies show that inability to 
form visual images causes retrograde amnesia and the lack of specificity in memory.313 Working 
in this vein, Martin Conway revises Tulving’s concept of episodic memory. While Tulving 
categorizes all past personal memories as episodic, Conway limits episodic memory to 
representations of short time slices of experience.314 For Conway, its temporal range does not 
extend beyond the sleep/wake cycle, which follows the consolidation of episodic memories into 
autobiographical ones.315 Episodic memories do not include general or lifetime knowledge. 
Rather, the context of episodic memories is, according to Conway, today or yesterday.316 Most 
episodic memories can be recalled at the end of the day, but do not endure for lengthy periods of 
time. Only a relatively small proportion of these memories remain accessible in long-term, after 
they become autobiographical memories. Episodic memory retains the particular occasion, time, 
and place of the remembered event and preserves the track of the temporal successions. Tulving 
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defines episodic memory as “mental ‘time travel’ through subjective time, from the present to 
the past and to the future—a feat that other memory systems cannot perform.”317  
Because these memories preserve the temporal order, they thus retain a feeling of “beforeness 
and afterness.” Feelings about the order of time include also an anticipatory sense of an 
immediate future. Episodic memory is more susceptible to forgetting, manipulation, or change 
than are other memory forms such as semantic318 or procedural memory. Episodic memories are 
susceptible to these changes because rememberers are prone to forget the original context and 
new information can modify these memories.  
Function 
Episodic memory is the memory system that developed late in human evolution and only exists 
in adult humans; it does not exist in animals and in young children. What function does episodic 
memory serve?  Long-term retention of specific episodic memories plays a key role in learning 
and the acquisition of knowledge. Psychologists such as Tulving and Conway have also 
highlighted how episodic memory support goal-making and planning for the future.319 According 
to Conway, one of the main functions of episodic memories is to maintain and manage 
information relevant to goal processing, plan execution, motivation, and evaluations.320 Episodic 
memory retains knowledge of sensory perceptions related to goals that can be rendered to 
actions. It also provides appropriate information and keeps track of progress on recent goal 
processing so that progress with goals and plans can be assessed. The content of memories 
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adjusts to changes in the goals status. Therefore, it is not necessary to remember in a literal way 
what occurred, but, rather, in a relevant way. Remembering relevant information provides a 
means by which to check on recent progress towards current goals. By recent progress it means 
progress that the individual has made in the preceding minutes, hours, or days. By providing a 
detailed record of progress towards very specific goals, episodic memory forms the basis for 
future goals and for autobiographical memory.321 Thus, goals are organized hierarchically, with 
goals lower on the hierarchy serving goals at higher levels of the hierarchy. Essential activities of 
the everyday are low goals in the hierarchy that serve long term goals.322 For example, studying 
for a test is a short term goal which serves a long term goal such as graduating that, in turn, 
serves another long term goal such as getting a future job. 
The high degree of short term specificity in episodic memories stems from the fact that these 
details help rememberer make plans about the future.323 The ability to preserve and recall the 
temporal order of the day’s events in backward and forward order, including an anticipatory 
sense of the immediate future,324 serves the ability to be connected to our current goals and 
future plans. This constructive function of episodic memory allows individuals to simulate or 
imagine future episodes, or scenarios. Since the future is not an exact repetition of the past, 
simulation of future episodes requires a system that can draw on the past in a flexible manner 
that extracts and recombines elements of previous experiences. Yet rapid forgetting is also an 
important feature of episodic memories and plays a role in adjustment mechanism. Forgetting 
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occurs because certain memories are relevant to longer-term goals and consequently to the 
future, whereas others are not relevant and are forgotten. Fulfilled goals can recede from our 
consciousness as resolved, but unfulfilled goals can motivate action for years.          
From episodic memory to semantic memory 
Episodic and semantic memory systems are closely related and interact with one another. They 
do not derive from different sources but induce different forms of conscious representation 
which also invoke different degree of confidence. In episodic memory, the self is in the center of 
the memory, while in semantic memory, the self is not relevant or does not play an important 
role. Therefore, remembering produces stricter standards, and knowing produces more lenient 
criteria.325 The distinction between semantic-episodic memories is not always clear. The 
transformation hypothesis suggests that semantic memory can be derived from episodic memory 
by a process of generalization.326 General knowledge is gradually abstracted from episodic 
memories in the process of becoming more generic and conceptual.327 Exactly how conceptual 
knowledge is abstracted from episodic memories is not known. But it is assumed that episodic 
elements are combined together to become more general by reducing specificity of the individual 
episodic memories and grouping them together in long-term memory to form a conceptual 
knowledge. Semantic memory incorporates the essential features of the original memories and 
can be accessed independently of episodic memory. This occurs, for example, when personal 
memories decrease in the specificity, lose their temporal and physical context, and become 
general knowledge. The formation of routines and schema not associated with specific or unique 
                                                
325J. M. Gardiner, Episodic Memory and Autonoetic c.Consciousness: A First-Person approach, in Episodic 
Memory: New Directions in Research, ed. Alan Baddeley, John p. Aggleton & martin A. Conway, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 18. 
326Gordon Winocur, and Morris Moscovitch, “Memory Transformation and Systems Consolidation,” Journal of the 
International Neuropsychological Society, 17 (2011): 766–780.  
327 Schacter, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Constructive Memory, 131. 
  
119 
events serve as a good example for abstraction of general knowledge from episodic memory. The 
shift from initial reliance on episodic memories to conceptual knowledge may be a general 
feature of the acquisition of new knowledge. The abstracted semantic memory does not replace 
the initial episodic memory but these two forms of memory co-exist and interact with each other. 
We can also retain concurrently an episodic memory for a specific event and general conceptual 
knowledge of the event. On the other hand, episodic memory can get its meaning or be 
interpreted with reference to prevalent general knowledge that stems from semantic memory.328 
However, although the two memory systems interact, they are thought to be independent 
behaviorally, neurally and phenomenally, having distinct memory retrieval processes.329 
Episodic memory is represented in the hippocampus and semantic memory in extra-hippocampal 
structures. 
From episodic memory to autobiographical memory 
Autobiographical memory is generally viewed as either an equivalent to, or as subsystem of 
episodic memory. Although the terms episodic and autobiographical memory are often used 
interchangeably, psychologists distinguish the two memory forms by duration and function. 
According to Conway, autobiographical memory is composed of episodic memories which were 
integrated in the conceptual knowledge of the self. He thus distinguishes between episodic and 
autobiographical memory with reference to the nature of their retention. While episodic memory 
is limited to recent, specified memories, autobiographical memory refers to the accumulation of 
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personal memories.330 Episodic memory retains highly detailed sensory perceptual knowledge of 
recent experiences for minutes and hours, while autobiographical memory retains information 
over weeks, month, years, decades and life span. Many of the episodic memories are mundane 
experiences and only a relatively small proportion of episodic memories are integrated into the 
long term memory. An even smaller proportion becomes an accessible part of autobiographical 
memory. That is, access to an episodic memory might be maintained over long periods of time 
when this memory is integrated into autobiographical memory. Episodic memories with stronger 
reference to the self are likely to integrate into autobiographical memory and then are involved in 
constituting the conceptual frame of the self, beliefs and attitudes.331 Alternatively, conceptual 
knowledge organizes and integrates episodic memories that accord with the self and its goals, 
constituting autobiographical memories.332  
Autobiographical memory retains knowledge of the self at a higher, more complex level of 
abstraction than episodic memory. It provides a basis for coherent long-term goals and plans that 
extend beyond a few days. Episodic memories become integrated with autobiographical memory 
if they are relevant to longer-term goals, these goal structures suppressing irrelevant knowledge. 
As Singer and Salovey claim, “A memory may lose or gain affective intensity depending upon 
its connections to an individual’s current goals rather than to goals originally served by the 
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remembered behavior.”333 Also, according to Conway, episodic and autobiographical memory 
involve different subjective states of awareness. For him, “episodic memory supports 
recollection and familiarity whereas autobiographical memory supports feeling of knowing.”334    
Different kinds of autobiographical memory 
Autobiographical memory varies in sensory-perceptual and temporal specificity.  On the one 
hand, it is combined from abstract, conceptual, and general knowledge, while on the other, it 
consists of sensory perceptual specific information derived from single events.335 Thus 
autobiographical memories cover periods ranging from minutes and hours to years, decades and 
a lifetime.336 Memories that span long periods such as years and decades are the most abstract 
and conceptual because these memories contain generic knowledge enabling the evaluation of an 
entire time period. Such independent general information can be organized through temporal, 
spatial, or thematic frameworks, indicating, for example, a period of time such as when I was in 
high school or in college, lived in Europe, or worked at a hospital.337 We have generic 
knowledge of a given period in relation to the self, which enables us to evaluate that period as 
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whole. In short, general autobiographical knowledge frames and puts in context specific episodic 
memories,338 and the combination of the two constitute a specific autobiographical memory. 339 
Autobiographical memory also varies in its epistemological status. It is composed of memories 
both from a person’s experiences and also from more abstract, conceptual, autobiographical 
knowledge. Some autobiographical memories lack the sensory perceptual component and they 
become factual and semantic. These memories are composed of information such as the names 
of friends and colleagues, places where one has worked, towns lived in, schools attended, goals 
attained or abandoned, etc. Not all autobiographical memories are first experienced as events, 
since some of them are stem from facts and events that took place in the past without us having 
any memories of them (such as of our own birth). Thus, not all autobiographical memories 
involve recall of previously experienced events, but recall can be invoked by photographs, 
objects, or from stories told by others even though only implicit feeling is associated.340 Thus, 
autobiographical memories engage facts and general knowledge, but this semantic knowledge 
differs from semantic memory since it involves a stronger relation to the self. 
Field vs. observer 
One prevalent distinction that researchers draw between types of visual autobiographical 
memories is the different perspective embedded in them— either a ‘field’ or ‘observer’ 
perspective.341 With a field perspective, a visual autobiographical memory is associated with 
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recent memories and considered to preserve a person’s original perspective. With an observer 
perspective, by contrast, an autobiographical memory appears to the observer from the 
outside.342 The subject sees himself as if from a third-person, spectator’s point-of-view,343 
detached from the experience. We tend to experience older, less specific memories from an 
observer perspective.344 Whether a memory has a field or observer perspective also determines 
the degree of self-awareness that we possess and the types of feelings that we link to the 
remembered experience. When we have broader awareness, the perspective will be that of an 
observer; when we have a specific or definite awareness, the memory will likely have a field 
perspective. 
Another factor distinguishing field from observer memories is our emotions. Field memories are 
generally emotional as we focus on how we felt in them. Alternatively, in observer perspective 
we refer to an experience less emotionally. This factor is essential since the emotion that we 
attribute to past experience determines how we relate to this experience and what we focus on. 
The observer perspective reflects the reconstructive nature of memory, and how autobiographical 
memory integrates general knowledge. Generic autobiographical knowledge and schemes reform 
older autobiographical memories, enabling us to relate to these memories from a greater distance 
and with new interpretative attitudes. Thus, the shift of perspective from first- to a third-person 
perspective demonstrates how autobiographical memories are dynamic and reconstructive.345 
Perspective determines the way a memory is constructed, and as Schacter writes, “this means 
that an important part of your recollective experience- whether or not you see yourself as a 
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participant in a remembered event –is, to a large extent, constructed or invented at the time of 
attempted recall. The way you remember an event depends on your purposes and goals at the 
time that you attempt to recall it.”346 The relationship between the self and memory come to 
include new interpretive attitudes, leading to the constructive characteristic of autobiographical 
memories.  
Self, narrative and construction 
Autobiographical memory is shaped and formed by our past experiences and functions to ground 
the self in these memories; the retrieved information is recollected with a reference to oneself. 
This reference to oneself is combined from the present self and the self that was present in the 
past experience. In order to make sense out of experiences and make them compatible with self 
definition and personal identity, autobiographical memory (re)constructs narratives. Making 
these narratives derives from a variety of motivations and functions, such as constructing a 
narrative that accords with to one’s purposes and goals or, alternatively, constructing a narrative 
to compensate for unfulfilled or unsatisfied desires and goals.347 The need for congruency348 and 
accord between the self and memories might induce changes to both. For the self, it might lead to 
changes in the attitudes and beliefs, while for memories, it might lead to an inhibition of 
memories, misremembering, and revision. Thus, autobiographical memories, composed of a 
combination of past experiences and fictive narratives, underlie the continuity and stability of the 
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self. The experience of remembering is accompanied with the belief that a memory is a more or 
less true replica of the original event, as well as the belief that the event is part of one’s own 
past.349 Thus, autobiographical memories are molded and invented to form a life story schema 
which is integrated in the formation of the self. This constructed nature of autobiographical 
memories means that they are intrinsically prone to error and in extreme cases may be wholly 
false, despite our spontaneous belief to the contrary. 
Neuroanatomy 
The differences between non-declarative and declarative memory systems are also a matter of 
location and degree. Non-declarative memory relies on the cerebellum and basal ganglia, while 
declarative (explicit) memory depends on structures in the medial temporal lobe and within the 
temporal lobes. The important structures are the hippocampal formation, together with the 
adjacent parahippocampal and perrihimal cortices.350 This memory form is damaged in amnesic 
patients.351 The same chemical and cellular processes underlie both non-declarative and 
declarative memories.352  
Indeed, it seems that the differences between non-declarative and declarative memory systems 
are minor at the neural level and these differences stem mainly from the number of synaptic 
connections. As was mentioned above, episodic memory evolved more recently than other 
systems, is probably unique to humans, and developed late in childhood. Its operations depend 
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on semantic and other forms of memory. As a result, episodic memory shares neural mechanisms 
and cognitive processes with other systems, but in addition, originates from unique mechanisms 
and processes. 353 
There is overlap between the sites involved in representing facts and episodes. Hippocampus 
plays a critical role in encoding both memory types.354 However, episodic memories are likely to 
contain more sensory information, more spatiotemporal and contextual references, and more 
reference to the self and its emotions.355 Researchers also suggest that episodic memory depends 
on the frontal lobes in a way that declarative and other forms of memory do not. The localization 
of retrieval of semantic and episodic memories is different. In particular, semantic retrieval is 
localized to left prefrontal cortex and episodic retrieval to the right prefrontal cortex.356 Episodic 
memory and autobiographical memory also have different neuroanatomical organization, being 
associated with different brain areas.357 Episodic memories are represented in the occipital lobes, 
and in the posterior parts of the temporal lobes, whereas autobiographical memory is represented 
in more anterior locations. Autobiographical memory is distributed over wide area in the brain 
including networks in frontal, temporal and occipital lobes as well to midbrain structures in 
hippocampus, amygdale, fornix and thalamus. 358 Therefore, it is assumed that these two systems 
are not quite the same. 
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Why deal with autobiographical memory 
 
Out of the multiple functions and kinds of memory, I focus here on episodic memory and 
especially autobiographical memory. Indeed, episodic memory formation is relevant to other 
memory systems as well because they all share common processes like encoding, storing, and 
retrieval. Moreover, different memory systems closely interact. However, there are four main 
reasons to concentrate on episodic memory. 
First, different kinds of memory behave differently. While brain substrates of procedural 
memory remain unchanged and relatively permanent over a life cycle, the brain substrates of 
declarative memory, which includes episodic (autobiographical) and semantic memory, appear to 
change over time. Autobiographical memory is even more susceptible to manipulation359 and to 
various kinds of errors than semantic memory. 
The second reason concerns the relation of memory to veridicality. Memory systems involve 
different kinds of knowledge. For instance, procedural memory is the implicit acquisition of non-
symbolic skills that does not require awareness and stems from accumulated practice and 
experience. Thus, issues of truthfulness are not relevant to this type of memory. In contrast, 
episodic and semantic systems are declarative and propositional as they are kinds of knowledge 
that can be verified as right or wrong. 
The third reason relates to differences between episodic and semantic memory. Semantic 
memory is factual knowledge about the world, concepts, rules, and language, which does not 
refer to the time or context of learning. In contrast, episodic memory is accompanied by the 
experience of remembering. It identifies the specific time, place, the context in which the 
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experience occurred, and, as a result, is the only type of memory which provides an epistemic 
authority on our own past. Semantic memory also entails truthfulness, but we share this 
knowledge with others. 
Fourth, episodic memories are the only ones with direct reference to the past. As Tulving points 
out, “episodic memory is the only form of memory that, at the time of retrieval, is oriented 
toward the past: retrieval in episodic memory means ‘mental time travel’ through and to one’s 
past. All other forms of memory, including semantic, declarative and procedural memory, are, at 
retrieval oriented to the present.” 360 On the other hand, it might seem that procedural memory is 
realized in the present but also oriented towards the future. We learn skills to exercise them more 
effectively in the future. 
 
Cognitive neuroscience of constructive memory 
Both episodic and autobiographical memories exhibit forgetfulness, errors, inaccuracy and 
distortions. These malfunctions are of the upmost importance for memory researchers because 
they provide evidential basis for studying the extent to which memory is not a literal 
reproduction of the past, but, rather, a generative and constructive process.361 The fact that 
memory is a constructive process provided further evidence that episodic and autobiographical 
memory’s operation do not necessary represent past experiences accurately but serves additional 
complex functions.  
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Researchers frequently characterize memory malfunctions with the Constructive Memory 
Framework (CMF), which deals with memory distortions where human memory fails to 
reproduce reality. There are various factors that affect, modify and distort episodic and 
autobiographical memories. These factors include age related memory loss, Alzheimer disease, 
or brain injuries. However, as was mentioned above, I do not deal with memory disorders, the 
states where memory goes wrong, but, rather, with autobiographical memory distortions that take 
place all the time and are considered as normal and even necessary. Due to their constructive 
nature, episodic and especially autobiographical memories are susceptible to various kinds of 
recurrent distortions.362 Examples of these distortions include false recognition, confabulation, 
bias, misattribution, error, illusion, and suggestibility.363 These distortions derive from the 
subject’s attention level, beliefs, goals, attitudes, motivations, intentions, expectations, senses of 
self, emotional state, and age. They also derive from cultural values, social demands,364 the need 
to form coherency, and likewise. 
Constructing a memory is a complex operation of multiple, sometimes contradictory 
informational components. Because multiple sources of conflicting information confront the self, 
various defense and strategic mechanisms (such as ignoring, repression, suppression, 
compensation, confabulation and rationalization) are invoked to form consistent interpretations. 
Although these defensive mechanisms generate consistent interpretations, they do so at the cost 
of inducing memory distortions. Researchers claim that some types of memory distortions 
emerge as byproducts of memory’s constructive and adaptive nature. Ironically, they claim that 
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memory malfunctions reflect a healthy memory system—not a memory disorder or flawed 
system. For example, Schacter and other researchers show that patients with memory disorders 
do not have increase but instead a reduction in errors such as false recognition.365 Likewise, 
people with left frontal lobe damage show a reduced ability to deny, rationalize, fills memory 
gaps, or confabulate.366 This evidence demonstrates that false recognition and other memory 
malfunction are manifestations of memory’s constructive processes. Can we infer from this that 
memory disorders which decreases memory’s constructiveness also reduce adaptive 
competence? 
Thus, memory malfunctions are an inherent part of healthy memory operations and do reflect 
their constructive processes367 in which variety of factors both intrinsic and extrinsic to the 
experience itself determine the memory. In other words, different processes interact and 
intervene to form the content of a memory, only part of which stems from the original 
experience. Brian Smith describes this complex process of how new perceptions are 
unconsciously integrated into memory. He illustrates how memories have both dynamic and 
transient states in order to show that memories are in perpetual state of modification that occurs 
without us noticing these changes or being able to compare memories to the original experience:  
“Not only is it impossible to compare our memories with the events of which they 
are the memories; but because the present is, as it were, always slipping away 
from us into the past we cannot even compare our memories with what purport to 
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be the effects of the original events (or, more properly, with our inferences from 
those ‘effects’). For what I am comparing must always be, not the memory itself 
but my memory of that memory. Suppose that today I remember building, a short 
while ago, a castle in the sand. Tomorrow I go to the beach and there it is. I say 
‘Yes just as I remembered it yesterday’. But how do I then know it is just as I 
remembered it yesterday? The sight of the sand castle itself may well influence 
my memory of my previous remembering.”368  
When current perceptions do not correspond to our previous ones, the earlier memory adjusts in 
light of the later encounter. As a result, the old memory is swallowed by new impressions. 
Usually, the earlier memory adjusts so quickly that we are not aware of the adjustment or even 
that there was an incongruity. Even though this adjustment process occurs continually, episodic 
and autobiographical memories are endowed with subjective state of awareness that engenders a 
strong belief and a feeling of confidence in the reliability of our memories. However, there is no 
necessary correlation between this confidence and the reliability of the memory. Often, people 
can have high confidence not only in inaccurate memories, but also in memories of events that 
never happened. Emotional attachment does not indicate the veracity of the memory either since 
people can feel strong attachment to inaccurate memories as well.369 When we recollect, we are 
not conscious of these memory reconstructions. This reconstruction process is inaccessible for us 
even if we dwell deeply on the process of recalling, since even reflection does not necessarily 
lead to a better understanding of the components involved in the process of memory 
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construction. In addition, current brain imagining studies of truth-false recognition indicate that 
accurate and inaccurate memories depend on some of the same underlying brain regions.370 
Thus, the close relationship and the difficulty of separating between real and false components of 
memory may stem from the fact that overlapping brain regions support both true and false 
memories. 
The ways that memories can be constructed 
Psychologists list a variety of memory distortions. Schacter, for example, has proposed the idea 
that memory’s imperfections can be classified into seven basic categories or ‘sins’, 371 ranging 
from instances of absent-mind and forgetting to misattributions, false recognition, and 
suggestibility.372 In the following, I will delineate some of the central causes that effect and 
distort memories. 
Forgetting 
The most prevalent source of memory fallibility or impairment is due to forgetting. 
Neuroscientists debate whether complete forgetting is possible, or whether forgetting stems from 
the inaccessibility to retrieve memories. If complete forgetting does not exist, then forgetting can 
mean either that information was not stored in the long term memory,373 or alternatively, that a 
storage failure occurred with inability to retrieve stored information due to absence of a retrieval 
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cue.374 Forgetting also refers to states when memories fade over time and fall “into the 
bottomless abyss of oblivion,” as William James phrases it, 375 and even if memories remain, they 
become more generic over time. Most forgetting, however, stems from informational 
interference, when new information interfere with old information (retroactive interference), or 
when old information inhibits the ability to remember new information (proactive 
interference).376 Schacter, for example, characterizes three general types of forgetting: 1) 
transience, which designates the decreasing accessibility of information over time, 2) absent 
minded, which occurs when the lack of attention led to shallow encoding and 3) blocking, which 
occurs with the temporary inaccessibility of stored information.377 In terms of neurobiology, 
forgetting is due to the weakening of synaptic connections that store the information. Thus, 
whether forgetting is total or partial, it can vary, and is involved in all other types of distortions. 
Bias  
Bias is an inclusive concept that encompasses a variety of distortions of encoding due to relying 
on previous knowledge. Both perception and encoding depend on categorizations, schemas, 
attitudes, perspectives, and the availability of preexisting knowledge. This preexisting 
knowledge takes the form of guidelines or scripts for events of daily life, which guide our 
attention, help us perceive, organize, process and interpret information. In daily life, we use 
scripts for events such as going to a restaurant, cinema, hotel, office. For example, the script for 
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going to a restaurant follows a specific etiquette: first, you enter the restaurant, then wait for the 
host to sit you in a table, after which you get a menu, order a meal, eat it, ask for a check, pay 
and tip the server and so forth. Having these preexisting scripts makes the world more 
predictable, allowing expectations to be formed of how things will enfold and facilitating the 
handling of unexpected events. With no supporting schema, the encoding of an event will 
generally be poor since this experience will have not fit with prior knowledge that enables good 
understanding of the experience. 
However, schemes and preexisting knowledge may also alter or distort our memory378 since 
schema, while helping us perceive, also yields selective encoding and recalling.379 This 
selectivity occurs because schemas filter perceptions of events, infusing the knowledge base into 
the encoding of an event.  Knowing the likely sequence of an upcoming event leads us to expect 
a specific structure and to incorporate our expectations into a new memory—even when the 
expected event did not occur.380 We pay less attention to familiar situations and falsely 
interpolate typical expectation even when they did not take place. We are unaware that we 
encode and interpret events through prevailing knowledge. Thus, the nature of memory is 
constructive since it relies on previous knowledge that was not part of the event.381 Schemes help 
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encode familiar events, however, experiences that violate schemas might invoke a very good 
encoding since we pay more attention to unexpected violations of schemata.382  
Retrospective bias 
Retrospective bias, a subtype of bias, refers to the unconscious retrospective reconstruction of 
the past according to current knowledge, schemes and beliefs.383 Schemes and biases not only 
help us encode experiences but also reconstruct parts of past experiences that cannot be 
remembered. This process may integrate aspects of a schema into the memory of an event, even 
if these aspects did not occur, because we expect these regular schematic features. For example, 
watching a film, a person may recall seeing a weapon such as a knife in a murder scene, even if 
there was none because existing schemas suggest that murder scenes almost always contain a 
weapon.384 Memories are also edited in the light of later experiences and reconstructed to 
conform current beliefs and attitudes.385 Retrospective bias occurs when people make 
retrospective judgments about the past or when there is inconsistency between past and present 
knowledge.386 In order to achieve consistency, we make retrospective revisions, changing our 
memories of the past according to current knowledge, beliefs, ideology, attitudes, feelings, and 
perspectives. People, for example, incline to see their past views much closer to their current 
views and opinion as they reconstruct the past in order to match it to the present.387A memory of 
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an outcome of an event, for example, suppresses and conceals the process of our attitudes, 
feelings, and opinions that we went through before we knew what the outcome would be 
because, in retrospect, people tend to see an outcome as inevitable and to repress or forget what 
they actually thought about at the time. The present is integrated unconsciously in the way we 
recall the past. Retrospective bias can be problematic when we adjust the past experiences to the 
current state since these distortions reduce the range of feelings, attitudes that encompassed the 
original experience. Although it has these problematic implications, retrospective bias plays a 
role constructing a unitary sense of self, reconciling the past with the present, the subject of the 
next section. 
Retrospective bias in the service of the ego 
  
We tend to view ourselves in a biased manner as our self presentation is shaped by social and 
cultural conceptions, phase of life, job and age processing, (old people have different biases than 
young people have).388 In addition, retrospective bias can serve additional purposes such as 
supporting one’s positive self-perception in self-enhancement bias. We represent the 
remembered experiences in a way that benefits our current perspectives, needs and ideologies. 
We view ourselves positively and therefore tend to reconstruct and distort the past in order to 
maintain a more favorable view of the current self.389 People also tend to attribute more control 
to themselves, representing random outcomes as stemming from their choices. Thus, people 
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over-emphasize the role of their skills, insights, and plans in their success rather than to 
coincidence and luck.390 According to Michael Ross, people adopt one of two implicit theories to 
guide how they recall and organize personal memories over time—either through the self’s 
perceived transformation over time, or with its stability. In other words, we construct the past as 
the same or different from the present. The tendency to represent the past as different from the 
present happens for those who, for example, want to highlight their self-improvement or to 
elevate the past in the light of the deteriorating present. Alternatively, attitude towards stability 
reflects the willingness to see ourselves consistent. Overall, according to Ross, people tend to 
exaggerate and fabricate the extent to which their lives have either changed or remained the 
same.   
Interpretations  
Interpretation plays an essential role in determining what memory will represent. Relying on 
schemas, the process of interpretation goes beyond actual experiences; interpretation can reduce, 
enhance, or modify an experience through elaboration, explanation, justification, and reasoning. 
Interpretations sift and conceal details which were not associated with the selected meaning.391 
Thus, people remember experiences according to the meaning they assign to them, a process of 
reasoning that might lead to remembering false information. 
Mood dependent memory 
Mood at time of encoding and recall also influences our memories as our emotional state shapes 
what we will tend to remember. Remembering sad memories is more likely during sadness, and 
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remembering happy memories occurs during time of happiness. Present mood also influences 
our perception of past memories. For example, if a person experiences pain in the present, it is 
likely that he will recall past experiences and attribute to them a similar level of pain. In another 
example, having a fight with a friend might evoke negative emotions and memories towards this 
person. Emotional states like depression invoke similar past experiences such as suffering and 
failure, and will result in a negative self-conception.392 However, memory is mood dependent not 
simply because we will tend to remember sad memories during sad states, but also our whole 
perspective modifies the way we see other memories or remember past events which were not 
necessarily sad at the time. We alter and reconstruct our memories to match our current mood 
because this mood influences the way we recall the past. The mind mixes current feelings with a 
past memory, creating a whole new experience of the event.393 Moreover, when new information 
is encoded, this process might trigger associated information or memories which are then 
blended with the new memory.  
Source amnesia  
Source memory “refers to the processes that allow people to remember when, where, and how a 
memory was acquired.”394 Remembering in cognitive science refer to retrieval of information, 
however not every retrieval information remembering. Remembering is a retrieval of information 
associated with a specific past event395 and an important component of it is recalling the source 
information. Recalling the source of information distinguishes between remembering from 
knowing, another form of retrieval. When we recall the source of information and have a sense 
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of self in relation to an experience, this experience, when retrieved, becomes an episodic 
memory and when we do not recall the source of information this experience is defined as 
knowing, and marks semantic memory. Thus, remembering and knowing are two different forms 
of awareness, two ways of accessing and relating to the past. While remembering is personal, 
detailed, and implies a specific relation between past and present, knowing is less personal and 
occurs when we are familiar with a piece of information but do not remember specific details 
about its acquisition. Knowing does not convey the feeling of re-experiencing, rather gives the 
knowledge of the existence of the experience. The remembering-knowing distinction also 
depends on how we attend an event in the first place, whether it was consciously encoded or not, 
but also influenced from the way we retrieve it.396 Indeed, much information that we would 
spontaneously categorize as memories function as knowledge because we may know many 
details about ourselves but do not remember experiencing or first perceiving these details. While 
in knowing, the source of information is not relevant to the knowledge, in episodic memory, the 
information’s source is an integral part of the memory. 
Source amnesia in episodic or autobiographical memory occurs when we confuse the source of 
an experience (where, when and how the experience was obtained) and mistakenly misattribute it 
to a different origin.397 Retrieving fragments of an episode but not recollecting how or when the 
fragments were acquired can result in various kinds of memory distortions such as fusing 
information and components from different memory sources. People forget the source of the 
information and confuse the original and new information. Source amnesia can also lead to an 
inability to distinguish between imagined and actual events. As Schacter claims, “the ability to 
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recollect source information lies at the heart of our ability to distinguish memories from fantasies 
and other products of our imagination.”398 Memories of imagined scenarios or events become 
integrated into our autobiographical memories as we forget their original source.399 We become 
convinced that our memories represent events that we had experienced, when really these 
memories actually derived from an imaginative source. 
Unintentional plagiarism (implicit memory) serves as example of source amnesia. Implicit 
memory is the non-conscious retrieval of information without being aware that the information is 
relied on or derived from past experiences.400 That is, unconscious plagiarism is generated when 
we forget the real source of an idea and misattribute it to ourselves. As a result, we can believe 
that an idea is novel and ours when we have already encountered it. Thus, we attribute novelty to 
something familiar which we have encountered somewhere else but forgot about that. Déjà vu is 
another example of a similar distortion that shows a symbiotic relationship between reality and 
imagination. Déjà vu occurs when one misattributes a current experience to the past,401 resulting 
in a feeling of strong familiarity with the experience. Source amnesia, when in combination with 
other factors, produces a variety memory distortions such as misattribution, misidentification, 
imagination inflation—the topic of a later section.402 
                                                
398 Schacter, Searching for Memory 116. 
399 Schacter, Searching for Memory, 114. 
400 Schacter, Searching for Memory,161-191. 
401 Schacter, The Sevens Sins Of Memory, 89. 
402 Schacter, et al., “The Cognitive Neuroscience of Constructive Memory,” 134. Johnson M. K., Hashtroudi S., 
Lindsay D.S, “Source Monitoring,” Psychological Bulletin, 114, (1993): 3. 
  
141 
Semantic association and gist-based distortion 
According to network models, each neuronal node connects to many other nodes and when one 
node is activated, it is likely that associated nodes will be activated as well.403 This occurs, for 
example, in gist-based distortion. Gist-based distortion derives from failure to remember 
distinctive features of different but similar or overlapping experiences. Substantial similarity 
between experiences produces common meaning and, as a result, might bring about inability to 
separate these distinct experiences, binding them as a unified memory.404 Though the semantic 
meaning of these memories may remains the same, the specific features of the experience 
become blurred and distort the experience.405 Thus, the inability to distinguish between real 
experienced information and relying on general gist (semantic association) can bring about false 
recognition. Semantic intrusions can also refer to the false recall of information that one never 
experienced but is invoked because it is related to experiences that took place.406 Often, repeated 
events blend into each other as they become indistinguishable and absorbed into a generalized 
memory event.407 Indeed, unique events are usually better remembered than repeated ones.  
Misattributing and False Recognition    
Misattributing refers to when information from different sources combine to form a synthesized 
memory. It can derive from semantic overlap, source confusion, failure to distinguish between 
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different memories, or the implicit association between similar but distinct memories.  408 For 
example, it can arise because of limitations in what is encoded at an event. It can happen in a 
different direction, when we falsely attribute a memory to our imagination, when this memory is 
a true memory, or, alternatively, when we attribute an imagined scenario to our memory. It 
refers, in other examples, to attributing the wrong time or place to a memory or to remembering 
events that never happened.  
Post event misinformation  
Post event information can affect the way one remembers past events.409 At the time of retrieval, 
the past is reconstructed with reference to new information, experiences, or environment. When a 
person stores an experience but later encounters contradicting information, a process of 
adjustment occurs. Partial or entire internalization of the later information takes place and 
changes the original representation.410 This process of post event memory adjustment occurs 
non-consciously and we remember the combined memory after the integration process is 
complete.411 Sometimes, the original and the later information are both stored, but the person 
remembers only the second information. Joseph LeDoux illustrates this process, how a memory 
changes and is reconstructed during a retrieval process. He gives an example of a situation where 
someone goes to a court to testify about a crime that he witnessed. On the day of the crime, the 
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person gives his description of what happened to the police, who then take a record of his 
experience. However, a few days later when he goes to the court, he tells something completely 
different to the judge, a description which matches what he read in the newspaper. 412 As he read 
the article about what happened, he modified and updated his memory about the event. After this 
modification, it remains hard to distinguish what actually happened from what was incorporated 
through post event information. Joseph LeDoux provides another example, illustrating what 
occurs when we meet someone at a party and form a positive first impression, but when later find 
out that he is a murderer, our memory is immediately revised. In light of new information, we 
might even remember opposite things and tell ourselves that from the first second we noticed 
that something was suspicious about this person. In these ways, the current environment 
determines our memories and perspectives.  
Suggestibility 
Suggestibility is another kind of distortion that partially connected source amnesia and 
misattribution. Both misleading post event information and suggestive investigation can interfere 
with accurate recollection of an actual event, leading to incorporation of misleading information 
from external sources into personal memories and thereby fostering false memories.413 People 
are more prone to suggestive influences when they cannot fully recall an event and what is 
suggested to them seems plausible.414 Misleading information can be acquired through reading of 
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a newspaper, watching news, being interviewed, or when sitting in courthouse during a trial. 
Recovered memory therapy (RMT) offers numerous examples of misguided information.415 
Police interrogations and scientific experiments can also induce people to incorporate suggested 
information about events that never happened into memories.416 
In RMT, psychotherapists, who subjects believed were treating repressed memories of childhood 
sexual abuse, developed instead False Memory Syndrome (FMS) in their patients. 
Psychotherapists, while seeming to guide the restoration of repressed memories, actually 
generated false traumatic memories. This study of post event suggestive information has 
important implications in police interrogations, when suggestive questions may alter people’s 
memories and influence eyewitness testimony. For instance, leading questions often function as 
cues that interfere with the process of retrieval, distorting memory through the misinformation 
effect or by mixing misleading with the original information.417 Under pressure, suggestive 
guidance is even more distortive because subjects feel the need to satisfy and please the 
interrogator, as is shown in many legal cases. Overall, studies have shown that guided 
misinformation can very easily blur the boundaries between reality and imagination. Thus, when 
pressure is placed on people to remember suggested information or events, people tend to ease 
their criteria for attributing events to memory. The social pressure leads to loose criteria for 
memory source monitoring. Therefore, when receiving suggestive information and under social 
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pressure, one is more likely to experience false memories and the absence of refuting evidence 
facilitates the integration of false information.418 
Imagination inflation  
Another reason for memory distortion stems from interaction between remembering and 
imagining. Imagination and visualization can create vivid details or memories of events that 
never happened. The ability to look back, reconsider, or reflect on the past exceeds beyond the 
real event toward the possibility, counterfactual thoughts, the as if, the might have been and 
toward the might will be. We use imagination to cope with our memories, to imagine how we 
should have done differently in order to plan how we should react in the future. However, the 
extent to which imagination is involved in remembering exceeds our awareness; counterfactual 
thoughts are integrated in memories themselves that we are sure correspond accurately to the 
past. The involvement of imagination in examining and thinking about the past guides the way 
people make sense of it (through counter-factual thinking, what-if scenarios, etc), but it also 
changes memories.419  
Imagination also comes to memory’s aid and fills in gaps when forgetting and lack of 
information occur. Every time we are confronted with inconsistent information, external counter-
evidence, and a reality that is incompatible to other memories, we add information to 
complement the event, reconciling the gaps and providing a coherent story. In their book, The 
Development of Autobiographical Memory, Markowitsch and Welzer describe an experiment 
which shows that when subjects are missing information, they tend to fill the gaps without being 
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aware that they added information. They describe an experiment in which they showed subjects a 
film in which some short sequences were excluded. In one of the scenes, a person gets up from 
bed and, in the next scene, is fully dressed. The other sequence jumps from a scene in which a 
woman picks up a perfume in a store to a shot where she wipes if off her wrist. Although the shot 
of the woman spraying the perfume is missing, when showed the missing scene, the subjects 
falsely identified having seen it, as did the other set of subjects misremember seeing the man get 
dressed.420 Such absence forms gaps that are filled automatically and without our awareness to 
make our conscious experiences comprehensible and palatable. We are sure that we saw or 
experienced the additional details rather than imagined them. We create an outline of 
proceedings and then fit in false events and descriptions that corroborate with the general outline. 
Memory cannot provide us with all necessary details and, in many cases, we have only a 
fragmented picture of complex events. To provide coherent story, we then add details to 
complement the event. These details can be taken from external sources or from our own 
imagination,421 and can lead to a new interpretation of the remembered experience. However, 
imagination does not only involve supplementing missing information, but also can produce 
entirely false autobiographical memories. Indeed, studies show that people can develop both a 
belief in and memory of an event that definitely did not happen simply by imagining its 
occurrence.422 By and large, imagination inflation refers to situations in which imagining an 
event leads to a belief that the event actually took place, inducing a false autobiographical 
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memory.423 False memories are created when events that were originally imagined or intensely 
thought about are experienced as real in memory. Illustration of imagination inflation can be 
drawn from Hume who describes the habitual liar that starts to believe to his lies. Hume indeed 
refers to a deliberate act of lying which transforms lies into memories that are accompanied with 
belief in their veridicality: 
“As liars, by the frequent repetition of their lies, come at last to remember them; so 
the judgment, or rather the imagination, by the like means, may have ideas so 
strongly imprinted on it, and conceive them in so full a light, that they may operate 
upon the mind in the same manner with those, which the senses, memory or reason 
present to us.”424  
Contemporary neuroscientists do not attribute imagination inflation to liars, but to an 
unconscious state in which intensive imagination leads to the belief that the imagined event did 
occur. Imagination inflation can occur even when there is no overt social pressure, and when 
hypothetical events are imagined only briefly. 
One particularly famous study of imagination inflation, Loftus’s “lost in the mall” study, 
examined whether it is possible to "implant" entire false memory for an event that has never 
happened. In her experiment, Loftus induced people to believe that they had been lost in a 
shopping mall when they were young children, even while this did not occur to them. The 
participants were provided with descriptions for four memories, three of them were true while 
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the forth (of being lost in a shopping mall) was false. They were asked to write about the events. 
After a while some of the participants started to develop a memory about being lost in a 
shopping mall. They were very confident about the memory and could provide additional details 
and emotions for the experience.425 Thus, people can develop both a belief in and a memory of 
an event that definitely did not happen simply by imagining its occurrence.426  
What is it about imagining an event that causes people to believe that it really happened? There 
are two main explanations for imagination inflation. The first is source confusion, a process in 
which content and source (the circumstances in which information was learned) diverge.  In 
source confusion, details are falsely attributed to actual experience rather than imagination427 as 
this creates a false memory. The second explanation for imagination inflation is familiarity. If we 
imagined an event, and this fantasy contains plausible details about the context and setting of the 
event, we will be prone to believe that the imagined scenario is a memory of an actual event. 
Fictitious experiences, when they are imagined intensely and repeatedly, become more familiar. 
Through repetitive imagining of the occurrences, people may begin to see vividness and validity 
in the stories. In turn, this familiarity misleads us to see them as memories of actual external 
event. Thus, people can incorrectly attribute the increased familiarity of imagined events to 
actual external events, incorporating it into autobiographical memories. Imagination inflation is 
the product of overlapping source confusion and familiarity mechanisms. It seems that some 
people are more likely to inflate than others; tendency toward imagination inflation has to do 
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with a predisposition to both hypnotic suggestion and dissociation (i.e., tendency to lose 
awareness and confuse fact with fantasy).428  
While source confusion and familiarity are attributed as causes for imagination inflation, it is not 
clear, however, what underlying mechanism drives imagination inflation, nor is it known under 
which circumstances imagining recent autobiographical events might boost confidence that they 
occurred.429 However, it is assumed that many of the same neural networks must be active in 
both the construction and retrieval phase for imagined and experienced events (a point will be 
discussed later). Visual imagery and visual perception activate some of the same brain region, 
explaining why visual imagery can be confused as remembered visual perception. Some of 
studies show that true memories contain more sensory and perceptual details than do related false 
memories.430 However, experiments and neuroimaging studies have shown that there is an 
extensive overlap in the brain regions that support true and false memories431  as, for example, in 
false memories that derived from a general similarity and in gist-based false recognition.  
Confabulation 
Confabulation occurs when people produce completely false memories and narratives of events 
that never occurred. It is often used to refer to people with neurological or psychiatric disorders 
such as schizophrenia and is associated with damage to the prefrontal cortex and related regions. 
Due to neurological damage, the self constructs confabulated and erroneous stories that can 
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range from mundane to fantastic narratives. Studying patients with split brain shows that the left 
and right cerebral hemispheres are responsible for different actions, and also behave and react to 
information differently and independently of how the other hemisphere experiences it. The right 
hemisphere, for example, handles nonverbal information such as images and spatial locations 
and the left hemisphere handles language and symbols. While the right hemisphere remembers 
and represents objects or experienced events, it represents reality literally. In contrast, the left 
hemisphere provides interpretations, explanations, and rationalization to make sense of actions 
organized by the right hemispheres.432 The left hemisphere fills and compensates gaps. It tries to 
form coherency and to put things in context, being responsible for incorporated information that 
fits the gist and forms a coherent picture.433 Thus, it is the left hemisphere which confabulates by 
recognizing imagined scenarios as memories. Confabulation is accompanied by strong feeling of 
remembering even when the “remembered” event does not correspond to any experience in 
reality. People with neuropsychological disorders can confabulate stories so consistent and 
coherent (usually subordinated to a specific theme) that they can sometimes only be refuted by 
relatives. In this sense, the confabulating person is characterized with deficit of self- awareness. 
When patients are confronted with the implausibility of their stories, they usually follow with 
another confabulated explanation. Confabulation is believed to be derived from deficits in 
information retrieval and is generated by a deficit in linking time and place of actually 
experienced events. However, confabulation does not only occur to people with brain injuries, as 
researchers have extended the phenomenon to refer to memory distortion in healthy people as 
well. Healthy people confabulate all the time; most of the time these confabulations are minor 
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and indiscernible. Yet there are cases when confabulation features whole false narratives (like in 
imagination inflation).  
Confabulation shares many characteristics with all other memory distortions produced by healthy 
people and, as a result, can be seen as an exaggeration of the constructive process of normal 
remembering.434  This phenomenon is also called False Memory Syndrome (FMS). A good 
example of confabulation in people without brain injuries is the psychotherapy example outlined 
above, where subjects recovered of repressed memories of sexual abuse that apparently never 
happened. Therapists implanted these confabulated memories in vulnerable people by providing 
a narrative of events that never happened. Déjà vu is another example of memory 
confabulation.435 Indeed, the distinction between confabulation and construction is ultimately not 
clear. Both normal remembering and confabulation involve reconstruction in order to form a 
plausible and coherent story. It is not always possible to identify in healthy people when 
confabulation takes place, since the confabulated narratives are coherent and commonsense. In 
healthy people, the left hemisphere is likely responsible for interpreting events and for changing 
representations in order to provide a coherent context, but we are not aware to this kind of daily 
confabulation. 
Memory formation 
Memory errors, distortions, and modifications offer researchers an open a window into the nature 
of the human memory process and suggest that memory is a reconstructive process. The 
constructive memory framework (CMF) tries to specify the psychological processes that encode, 
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store and retrieve memories, showing how errors in memory, which are a natural part of its 
operation, can come about. There are many factors that can distort memory, and several types of 
distortions often occur concurrently. However, this range of memory distortions does not exhaust 
the full spectrum of modifications that effect memory. In the last section, I did not deal with all 
possible memory distortions because I intended to provide an overview of the research on the 
functional basis for memory construction. The research on the nature of constructive memory 
extended from functional studies to the identification of the underlying neural mechanisms of 
memory. Neuroscientists who focus on brain substrate of remembering and learning have begun 
to examine the process of memory formation and the patterns of persistent changes that are 
induced by neuronal and synaptic plasticity. These neuroscientists explain the mechanism of 
neural substrate that underlie and correlates with memory’s behavioral and cognitive 
manifestations.  
Memory is not only divided to different types, but also is distinguished by different phases; the 
phases are divided from its first constitution to its later actualization: encoding, retaining, and 
retrieval. These stages interact with each other as, for instance, encoding influences storage that, 
in turn, impacts retrieval that affect new encoding. In the following, after I discuss these phases, I 
will focus on two theories most relevant to constructive aspects of memory: the multiple trace 
theory and reconsolidation theory. These prominent and closely linked theories shed light on 
memory formation and constitution as it underlies the cognitive psychologists’ conceptualization 
of constructive memory. 
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Encoding –persistence – retrieval 
Encoding refers to the initial acquisition of information, the process of transforming experiences 
to neural representation.436 Michael H. Hasselmo defines “encoding as the neural mechanisms 
which form persistent representations of events for later retrieval.”437 Memory depends on the 
way we encode information, which, in turn, depends on perception and on the interaction 
between new and previously encoded representations. The neural activity associated with 
perception, comprehension, and attention serves and enables memory encoding. Some 
neuroscientists claim that encoding is not distinguished from perceptual process. It is also not 
clear when encoding ends and stabilization or storing begin (I will come back to this question 
later).  
What is clearer is that encoding converts an experience into an “engram.” Engram refers to an 
internal representation of an encoded experience that emerges from learning and is the physical 
manifestation of the memory trace438 in the brain.439 Engrams may also have a core which is 
responsible for the persistence of essential memory features over time.440  
Remembering depends on persistence of these traces, on lasting modifications in neural 
representation or behavioral expressions as a result of experiences. However, memory traces can 
be persistent even if they are not revealed in behavior and are hardly conscious. Scientists have 
not yet identified the mechanisms of persistence for each specific type of memory, nor is it now 
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possible to differentiate persistence from retrieval. The engram, the stored fragmentary remains 
of an experience, is not yet memory; the existence of an engram does not necessarily result in the 
manifestation of a memory but provides necessary (physical) condition for memories to 
emerge.441 That is, persistence of an engram is itself not sufficient to be defined as a memory; 
memory also depends on an access to the engram and for this, retrieval is required.442 Retrieval 
refers to a process that actualizes and reactivates stored information. Thus, we can see the 
distinction between persistence and retrieval by referring to the availability and accessibility of 
information.443 Accessibility depends on the retrieval conditions, on availability of appropriate 
retrieval cue that interact with encoded information (engram).444 Retrieval cue refers to particular 
information in the current, external or internal environment that invokes stored information. The 
cue prompts and activates a memory trace when it matches the encoded memory.445 Successful 
retrieval depends on the similarity or the degree of overlap between encoding and retrieval.446 
When the trace is combined with appropriate cue, retrieval occurs and is expressed in conscious 
remembering. The specific way in which we encode an event determines which retrieval cues 
can induce restored memories. Neuroscientists term this encoding specificity principle. 
Elaborative encoding, for example, is likely to yield a higher probability of recall than non-
elaborative encoding since elaborative encoding responds and enables access to a wider variety 
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of retrieval cues.447 However, if we encounter the right cue, non-elaborative encoding can be 
invoked as well. Adding to this general feature of retrieval, there are two types of retrieval cues: 
feature cues and context cues. First, features cues are content of the original memory or related 
content that trigger recall. Second, context cues involve information that derives from the setting 
or environment in which a memory or learning occurred which can trigger the recollection of a 
memory. In this second type, the context cues can be external or internal. External context 
includes details such as the surrounding and place a memory was encoded. In contrast, internal 
context cues include one’s physiological and psychological state upon encoding (such as being 
drunk, excited, scared, or depressed).448 Neuroscientists maintain that remembering is easier 
when the new context matches the internal or external context of the initial experience. Thus, our 
own state of mind can serve as a cue for remembering. It is, for example, useful to return to the 
same setting where an experience first happened to facilitate remembering, or to be in the same 
physical or mental state as when the event originally took place. For example, when people drink 
alcohol at the time of initial encoding, it is likely they will better remember their experiences 
when they are again same intoxicated state.  
The state of an engram determines extent to which a cue must be involved the time of retrieval. 
When the engram is fresh and rich, this engram itself might be the dominant component for 
recollection. In this case, relatively little retrieval information is needed to elicit the engram and 
retrieval cues will play minor role in triggering and shaping the experience of remembering. 
However, if an engram stems from our remote past, then the role of the retrieval cue will be more 
prominent and this cue and its properties will greater determine the recollective experience. 
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Thus, the role of the retrieval cue will depend on the temporal distance of the stored engram from 
the present.449 While researchers traditionally held that retrieval cue functions as a stimulus that 
awakens and arouses a memory, they currently maintain that the role of a cue is not only to 
activate or arouse a memory, but also “to yield a new entity, a new recollective experience that 
differs from either of its constituent.”450 Thus, retrieval cues, as much as past representations, 
determine the subjective experience of remembering. This new interpretation attributes the 
retrieval process a more dynamic function in the formation of a memory since such processes 
actualize information, rather than repeating or reiterating past experience. Schacter compares this 
dynamic function to the work of paleontologists, who reconstruct the bones chips of a dinosaur. 
The dinosaurs’ bones are combined in accordance to a general knowledge of how dinosaur 
should be reconstructed, just as our memories are constructed and reconstructed as the engram 
and cue combine to yield a new recollective experience. Retrieval occurs when relevant intrinsic 
networks become activated by relevant extrinsic stimuli, and when these different information 
sources integrate to form a meaningful memory.  Because every retrieval integrates intrinsic and 
extrinsic information, the retrieval process is ongoing as the memory information is encoded 
once again at retrieval. 
 Thus, retrieving a memory trace is followed by a re-encoding event that involves a new process 
of consolidation-reconsolidation. As Susan Sara writes, “Remembering is an activity similar to 
perceiving, in the sense that it involves the apprehension and comprehension of contemporary 
stimuli in the light of past experience.”451 In this way, re-encoding and retrieval are not separate 
processes, but instead are deeply interconnected and involve the same neural substrates because 
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the location of the neuronal change induced in the initial encoding also has to be activated during 
retrieval.452 That is, retrieval itself is a new encoding, a new mental event that differs from the 
initial encoding. The interaction between re-encoding and retrieval involves constructive and 
reconstructive processes, again highlighting the dynamic and reconstructive character of memory 
as a whole.453  
Retrieval is influenced by multiple mechanisms and factors like, for example, the initial state of 
the engram, depth of encoding, retrieval context, interaction between engram and cue, etc. 
Failure of retrieval can originate from many factors such as the absence of retrieval cue, which 
itself can be derived by variety of factors such as interference, memory repression, competition 
between information, etc. Lacking an appropriate cue can hinder accessibility to memory and to 
a failure of retrieval. Failure of retrieval does not mean that the memory is forgotten, but that the 
specific cue that was present during encoding is not available and, therefore, that the information 
is not accessible. Failure of retrieval does not only lead to the absence of memory but can also 
lead to partial or entirely false memories.454 In these cases, failure of retrieval is generated by the 
way engram and cues interact. For example, retrieval cues can potentially match different but 
similar memories, thus evoking memories other than the memory meant or information that does 
not pertain the original experiences and resulting in inaccurate memories that blend elements of 
different experiences.455   
                                                
452 Michael E. Hasselmo, “Encoding : Models Linking Neural Mechanisms to Behavior,” in Science of Memory: 
Concepts, 125. 
453 John M. Gardiner, “Retrieval: On Its Essence and Related Concepts,” in Science of Memory: Concepts, ed. 
Henry L. Roediger III, Yadin Dudai and Susan M. Fitzpatrick, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007),221. 
454 Michael, Davis, “Forgetting: Once Again, It’s All About Representations,” in Science of Memory: Concepts, ed. 
Henry L. Roediger III, Yadin Dudai and Susan M. Fitzpatrick, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 318. 
455Schacter, “The Cognitive Neuroscience of Constructive Memory,” 131.  
  
158 
Memory is believed to be organized as a web in which features from different memories are 
associated. This “spreading activation” theory in fact explains how memory errors may occur. 
Representations of learning and memory are embedded in the brain by the strength and width of 
the neuronal connections.456 When a cue activates a memory, it is likely that it also activates 
related features and ideas strongly associated with the memory. These connections and 
associations can result in importing and binding adjacent features that belong to other memories. 
Through these dense connections, different memories can become associated at the time of 
retrieval. However, these connections can also have the opposite effect, suppressing and 
inhibiting activation of weak associations and preventing them from being brought to awareness.  
The multiple-trace theory (MTT)  
Current models assume that an initial encoded experience is generated by separate processes, and 
that no single anatomical location contains a complete record of a specific memory. In this view, 
memory representation components are distributed widely across different parts of the brain as 
mediated by multiple neocortical circuits. 457 Each circuit handles a distinct component of the 
original experience such as the visual, auditory, taste, tactual, and motor sensations. Researchers 
assume that the integration of these components takes place within the medial temporal regions. 
For instance, Scahcter writes, “the medial temporal region contains instructions that specify how 
to assemble the puzzle; eventually, the instructions are shifted over to cortical regions that 
contain all the component pieces of the puzzle.”458 These researchers also conjecture that the 
hippocampus instructs the neocortex how to bring together the components that make up a 
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specific memory.459 This means that the hippocampus does not contain the content of episodic 
memories itself, but that it continues to maintain information on how to activate and unify 
disparate episodic memory features from different cortical regions. The hippocampus functions 
as an index that activates and connects different features, acting as a ‘convergence zone” 460 that 
guides, directs, handles and integrates different kinds of informational components in separate 
cortical regions. Each encoded experience has an index that binds its different components that 
are kept separately. The index accomplishes this work through pattern completion processes that 
activate and bring together a memory trace. But this index process also entails that the 
hippocampus supports pattern separation. As the hippocampus binds the different part of a 
memory trace it also separates between similar but different experiences.  
 Thus, retrieval of a past experience involves a process of pattern completion in which the 
rememberer, when presented with a cue, pieces together the distributed information from 
different locations. 461 Phenomenally, remembering appears to the observer as a unified 
experience, just like perception itself appears unitary, but in fact each experience is sustained by 
multiple neural cognitive systems.462 Morris Moscovitch, who maintains that the retrieval 
process is much more crucial than the other phases, clarifies the process of memory recovery 
with reference to finding a book in the library. He writes, “While the whole book is located in a 
specific place and picking the book is picking all that is included in it, retrieval process is more 
like assembling the pages of a book which may be scattered in different locations in the library. 
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Finally, unlike a call number which is distinct from the book itself, retrieval cues and processes 
interact with the engram and influence the memory which is recovered. Depending on the 
interaction, some ‘pages’ of the memory may be missing, others may be placed in the wrong 
sequence, still others may be imported from other books which are related in some way to the 
cues and the engrams, and some of the cues themselves may be incorporated into the memory 
that is recovered and change the engram on which it was based.”463 Recovering a memory occurs 
when the hippocampus brings together scattered information from different brain locations. The 
reactivation of features spread over different location involves the complex process of collecting 
all parts of a stored experience. The interaction between a cue and a memory representation can 
add/eliminate information from the encoded engram, import related information from other 
engrams, change the order of encoded the information, and so on. Binding a faulty feature to the 
original engram may results in various memory distortion such as source failure—the failure to 
remember the how and when the episode took place.464 In short, according to the MTT, 
remembering something is not like storing a file on the computer, which remains the same from 
the moment we closed the computer at night to the next morning when we open it again. Rather, 
every time we access a memory, we come up with different results.  
Reconsolidation Theory 
Memory recovery is not only integration of a retrieval cue with the dissipated components of a 
memory trace but there are additional aspects that determine the subjective recollective 
experience. Current neuroscientists claim that, at the time of retrieval, a memory again enters an 
unstable state, after which it goes through another process of stabilization and reconsolidation. 
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Memory consolidation refers to the process that stabilizes a memory trace after the initial 
acquisition (encoding). This consolidation process converts an unstable short term memory 
(STM) trace into a more stable long term memory (LTM) trace,465 rendering temporary traces 
into persistent memories.466 Thus, a memory becomes gradually resistant as time passes and is 
less susceptible to disruptions through the consolidation process.467Although their functions are 
unambiguous, it is not clear when encoding ends and consolidation begins, or even whether 
consolidation is part of encoding or whether consolidation and encoding are separated 
processes.468 Lila Davachi distinguishes between encoding and consolidation, claiming that 
encoding occurs when one consciously attends to an event, while consolidation occurs when 
one’s attention is turned away from it.469  
During consolidation, a memory is susceptible to change or disruption, but when a memory 
becomes long-term, it also becomes more stable. At the anatomical level, memory consolidation 
is the process by which memory becomes independent of the hippocampal region and spreads to 
other regions in the neocortex (cf. multiple trace theory). Indeed, the hippocampus does not store 
information for extended time but is involved in the process of stabilizing memories until they 
are transferred for more permanent storage in various locations in the cerebral cortex. While the 
hippocampal system serves as temporary memory storage because hippocampal synapses can 
change quickly, the neocortex serves as permanent memory store since neocortical synapses 
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change slowly.470 As Squire and Alvarez have noted, “Apparently, as time passes after learning, 
there is gradual reorganization within long-term memory storage whereby the importance of the 
hippocampal formation gradually diminishes and a more permanent memory system develops 
independently of this region.”471 
The emergence of these long-term storage systems manifests itself at two different levels of 
memory consolidation and organization:472 cellular or synaptic consolidation and the systems 
consolidation.473 Cellular or synaptic consolidation refers to the stabilization that occurs in the 
nodes of neural circuits, synapses, or neurons. New memories undergo stabilization through the 
formation of new synaptic circuits. This stabilization process is completed within minutes, hours, 
or days after learning and the time window of circuit susceptibility may range from seconds to 
hours. In this susceptible phase, engrams are more sensitive to forgetting and changes.474 The 
system consolidation refers to the circuit level that involves the reorganization of the memory 
trace475 in which memories gradually change the anatomical localization of the trace.476 System 
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consolidation engages neural circuits different from those that were used for encoding memory 
traces at earlier stages of their existence.477 In system consolidation, memory storage shifts from 
the hippocampus to the neocortex when fully consolidated. This process is called system 
consolidation as the memory moves from one neurological system to another.478 This process is 
longer than synaptic consolidation and can endure weeks, months, years, and even decades.479 
Engrams that consolidate over long time periods become more resistant to certain kinds of 
interference such as environmental and behavioral distractions, and drugs and brain damage 
(including cerebral trauma, electroconvulsive shock, and protein synthesis inhibitors). System 
consolidation most commonly refers to declarative memory, but may exist in non-declarative 
memory as well. 
 
In the past, researchers claimed that memory consolidation takes place only once. It was believed 
that after consolidation, memories are stable, resilient to disruption, and stabilized in final 
form.480 According to these researchers, each time you recall a memory, you activate the same 
trace over and over again. In short, the initial idea among memory researchers was that 
consolidation stabilizes memories in a reliable way.  
However, the theory of memory has been changed radically in the last two decades. Currently, 
neuroscientists, focusing on neural processes and mechanisms of memory persistence (such as 
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synaptic strength and plasticity),481 emphasize the dynamic and complex nature of memory. 
These neuroscientists claim that memories are always in a state of change and constant 
adjustment as memories are not permanently stored, but enter a transient and labile state during 
retrieval. 482 Thus, memory retrieval behaves like re-encoding; the instability of the encoding 
process exists again at the time of memory activation.483 The engram returns to short-term active 
state when memories are vulnerable to distortions.484 Some neuroscientists who deal with 
reconsolidation theory maintain that the act of retrieval can itself cause amnesia since the 
connections between the synapses underlying the trace become weakened. Thus, retrieval, by 
itself can disrupt an established memory trace.485  
The susceptibility of memory to modification during reconsolidation depends on various factors 
such the age of the memory, task specificity, strength of initial learning, and strength and number 
of prior reactivations. For example, when the memory is weak, it is more susceptible to 
disruptions, and the stronger the reactivation of a memory, the more it becomes labile.486 Due to 
these findings, neuroscientists have assumed that when a memory is reactivated, it must undergo 
                                                
481 Plasticity became a central component in describing the way memory works. Plasticity refers to the fact that the 
nervous system has the ability to adapt or change as a result of experiences. The experiences modify the nervous 
system and as result it brings about different behavior. As for memory, the neural plasticity (the cellular properties 
of the cells and their connections) change as a result of experience. 
482 Yadin Dudai, “Molecular Bases of Long-Term Memories: a Question Of Persistence,” Current Opinions in 
Neurobiology, 12,(2002): 211-216. Yadin Dudai, “Predicting Not to Predict too Much: How the Cellular Machinery 
Of Memory Anticipates the Uncertain Future”. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 364, 
(2009):1255-1262. See also Cristina M. Alberini, “The Role of Reconsolidation and the Dynamic process of Long-
Term memory Formation and Storage,” Front Behav Neurosci, 5: 12 (2011).  
483 Lynn Nadel, “Consolidation: The Demise of the Fixed Trace, in Science of Memory: Concepts, ed. Henry L. 
Roediger III, Yadin Dudai and Susan M. Fitzpatrick, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 179. 
484 The state of the trace determines its vulnerability.  The premise is that memories in an inactive state are less 
vulnerable to disruptions than memories in active state. However, this assumption generates controversy whether it 
is indeed true that inactive memories are less susceptible for intervention and only the active state of the trace is 
inductive to vulnerability. 
485 Nader K., “Memory Trace Unbound,” Trends in neuroscience, 26, (2003): 65-72.  
486 Alberini, “Mechanisms of Memory Stabilization: Are Consolidation and Reconsolidation Similar or Distinct 
Processes?” 54. 
  
165 
additional phase of consolidation (known as “reconsolidation”) to persist.487 Thus, consolidation 
takes place not only after new learning (encoding), but also after every recall (memory 
retrieval).488 The molecular mechanism that stabilizes memory is required after every time we 
recall.489  
The functional significance of the labile phase of reconsolidation is not fully known. Generally, 
researchers assume that the reconsolidation process reinforces and sustains the reactivated 
memories,490 allowing new information and learning to become associated with already 
established and reactivated memories.491 Indeed, during reconsolidation memories do not just 
remain as they were but change to allow the integration of new information.492 Reconsolidation 
is thus a manifestation of a larger memory updating mechanism that adapts the reactivated 
memory to new circumstances.493 From neurobiological point of view, this adaption mechanism 
permits new experiences and information to modify existing neuronal connections and networks.  
The adaptation mechanism of reactivated memory traces is possible because of enhanced 
plasticity state of neuronal circuits that encode the memory trace or parts of it. 494 In this way, 
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plasticity refers to the fact that inherent in nervous system is the ability to adapt or change as a 
result of new experiences, learning, and remembering. Changes in synapses, (the fundamental 
storage element in the brain) enable reconsolidation and adaption. While synapses allow for 
change and modification as plastic and flexible, they also facilitate storing and stability since 
synapses convey and maintain memory information.495 Thus, as John Sutton formulates it, the 
neuroscience of memory postulates two coexisting but contradictory features: “distinct transient 
patterns of activity, and composite, enduring, but modifiable dispositional states.”496 On the one 
hand, synaptic flexibility allows for the persistence of lasting impressions on neural circuits, 
while, on the other hand, it also enables change and modification.497  
Still, it is not clear whether reconsolidation recapitulates consolidation. Researchers investigating 
reconsolidation have come to no consensus about whether consolidation and reconsolidation are 
separate or corresponding processes. They have investigated whether their function and 
mechanism overlap,498 whether the labile state of the trace is the same in both cases, and whether 
both phases engage the same brain areas, molecules, and pathways. The results of these studies 
appear to point to contrasting conclusions, with some memory systems seeming similar and other 
more distinct.  From the findings that support the idea that reconsolidation is distinct from 
consolidation, researchers have concluded that reconsolidation and consolidation are 
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characterized by different mechanism because the two processes require either different 
molecular mechanisms or involve different brain circuits.499 Some of these studies found that 
consolidation and reconsolidation of episodic memory do appear to engage the same molecules 
and mechanisms, but that the brain areas involved in consolidation are not required for 
reconsolidation.500 According to Tronel, for example, reconsolidation is distinct from the initial 
consolidation, since protein synthesis occurs in different brain areas for these two processes.501 
In addition, the formation of a memory and its maintenance following reactivation seems to have 
distinctive temporal molecular requirements.502  
 
In contrast, other researchers suggest that these two processes are similar.503 In this line, studies 
found that both processes require protein synthesis, involve the same brain area, and are impaired 
by the same inhibiters. The results of Nader et al. and Debiec et al. indicate that, although the 
consolidation and reconsolidation networks seem to be different, some brain regions could 
participate in both. They found evidence that the same molecular mechanisms and pathways 
mediate both consolidation and reconsolidation. Alberini recapitulates these contradicted 
findings, claiming that consolidation and reconsolidation share common molecular mechanisms, 
but “are distinct processes because they require, with some degree of overlap, the activation of 
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different brain areas and circuits. In most cases, regions involved in consolidation are not 
required for reconsolidation.”504 Although consolidation and reconsolidation might be separated 
processes, the encoding and retrieval correlate. Hasselmo maintains that the location of physical 
changes occurring during the encoding of episodic memory have to be reactivated at retrieval. In 
other words, retrieval activity is induced by the same synapses or neurons that were modified 
during encoding. However, retrieval can be also induced by different synapses and neurons in 
cases when “the locus of the memory has shifted due to reactivation processes during 
consolidation. Different supporting structures may separately supplement either encoding or 
retrieval, but the neural substrate for storage must be shared unless some consolidation process 
has shifted the substrate.”505 Thus, reconsolidation is not a faithful replay of consolidation. It 
might share some mechanisms and even functions with consolidation, but the neural process of 
consolidation is different than memory retrieval.506   
Thus, memory recovery is a complex process that is not only composed of collecting disparate 
memory traces, but involves integrating them with new incoming information and experiences. 
Memory traces are modified and reconstructed with use as memory retrieval involves a process 
of adjustment and revision, adjusting past memories with new perceptions and future 
anticipations. 507 Yadin Dudai writes, “Because reactivation of the trace commonly occurs in an 
altered context, it results in newly encoded hippocampal traces, which, in turn, bind new traces 
in the neocortex. This results in multiple traces that share some or all the information about the 
                                                
504Alberini, “Mechanisms of Memory Stabilization: Are Consolidation and Reconsolidation Similar or Distinct 
Processes?” 54. 
505 Hasselmo, “Encoding: Models Linking Neural Mechanisms to Behavior,” 125. 
506, Norman E. Spear, “Retrieval: Properties and Effects Science of Memory: Concepts, ed. Henry L. Roediger III, 
Yadin Dudai and Susan M. Fitzpatrick, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 216. 
507Dudai, “Predicting Not to Predict too Much: How the Cellular Machinery Of Memory Anticipates the Uncertain 
Future,” 1255-1262. 
  
169 
initial episode.”508 Integrating new components into the activated engram thus forms a new 
version of the original episodic memory.509 “A neural network combines information in the 
present environment with patterns that have been stored in the past, and the resulting mixture of 
the two is what the network remembers.” 510 The changes are part of a natural process where the 
memory trace undergoes various modifications that we cannot necessarily consider as errors or 
fabrication, but rather, stem from normal brain activity. Reconsolidation theory not only 
validates the constructive framework of memory, but it goes further, asserting that memory 
traces are modified and reconstructed repeatedly upon every retrieval. Every time that we 
activate a memory trace we change and update it.511 Like during initial consolidation, interfering 
in the process of reconsolidation can strengthen, erase, weaken, and alter memory 
associations.512 Reconsolidation theory provides a dynamic, constructive, and plastic view of the 
adaptive nature of the nervous system513 and demonstrates that a memory is not a literal 
reproduction of the past, but instead an ongoing constructive process, an adaptive organism that 
conflates past and present. Thus, memory reactivations, whether implicit or explicit, have at least 
two functions: they are necessary for memory stabilization, but they also allow the integration of 
new and old information. 
This view of memory retrieval undermines the epistemological status of memory, as it does the 
distinction between memory and imagination. If recovering a memory is a construction 
assembled from fragmentary past pieces, then our memories are far from being veridical 
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representation of the past. Rather, they are generative presentations intimately connected to 
ourselves in our current conditions. This also raises the question about whether generative 
memory processes differ from imagination. Does the difference between these two cognitive 
capacities derive only from different levels of awareness? That is, while in imagination we are 
aware that we construct and modify reality, in memory we modify and construct without an 
awareness for this constructive process. In the next part I will deal with the epistemology of 
imagination and the distinction between these two cognitive concepts. 
 
Imagination 
Introduction: Contemporary definition of the concept imagination 
Western philosophy exhibits an unresolved difficulty in defining the ontological and 
epistemological status of imagination. Imagination performs a wide range of different functions 
and activities while involving many diverse forms of thought. Going beyond perception, 
imagination enables us to visualize, think about, and represent what is absent. Imagination can 
represent a host of real or fictive objects in any time—past, present, and future. Intuitive 
conceptions of imagination imply that it is a mental process distinct from memory and 
knowing.514 In these conceptions, the typical referent of imagination is fictional, not actual, and 
is considered to deviate from objective reality. Urmson writes, “Thus it seems to me in general 
right to say that what characterizes imagination is that it does not set out to resemble concrete 
events rather than that it has to avoid such resemblance.”515 Therefore, it seems natural to define 
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imagination as a fictional representation, an alternative to factual reality. Indeed, imagination 
contains representations that cannot be real that are random, unfocused, and unplanned. 
However, defining imagination as disconnected from the real world results in a narrow notion of 
imagination that does not encompass the variety of its features. Fantasies and imaginary are only 
one manifestation of imagination’s general ability,516 imagination is not strictly defined by 
fictiveness, having many other facets and forms that are compatible with reality and belief. For 
example, since the content of imagination derives from perception, an imaginary image may 
significantly resemble the content of a previous perception. In that sense, imagination can 
coincide with memory, even if this resemblance is not necessarily present in all situations. 
Imagination then can be characterized by fictive attitude or intention, but, can also reflect really 
existing phenomena. Because imagination involves these diverse phenomena, it is a polysemous 
concept, entailing an array of meanings, manifestations, and experiences. The various uses of 
this concept are manifest in a range of derivative cognates such as image, imagine, mental 
imagery, imaginary, and imaginative, each of which imply differing cognitive processes and 
references.517 Some cognates correspond only to an exercise of fictional representation, while 
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others imply perceptual and memory images. For example, the words “imagery” and 
“imagining,” although sometimes used interchangeably, refer to different things, both of which 
are involved in the notion of imagination. Mental imagery involves sensory imagining of the 
kind involved in perceiving. It refers to a “quasi-perceptual experience: experience that 
significantly resembles perceptual experience (in any sense mode), but which occurs in the 
absence of appropriate external stimuli for the relevant perception.”518 Thus, imagery is a 
sensory image that can involve forms of thought—perception-image, dream-image, memory-
image, expectation–image, wishing-image—that vary in their proximity to standard 
imagination.519 Imagery, then, is defined as production of mental images associated with 
perceptions, and it can be also related to other cognitive process such as memory, expectations, 
and dreams. For these reasons, imagery is an instance of imagination but is not strictly identified 
with imagination. In contrast, imagining can be imagery and visual but it need not involve 
imagery; to the contrary, it can comprise propositional attitude and narrative, aspects not found 
in imagery.520 This example shows how imagination has several functions and is manifest in 
various ways. As a result, it may be difficult to identify the full scope of imagination, for it is 
hard find an experience in which imagination is not somehow involved. As Berys Gaut puts it 
“The notion of imagination is slippery to handle than that of creativity. Part of the problem is that 
it has a variety of uses, not always closely related to its core sense.”521  Whereas cognitive 
psychologists divide memory into different systems and mechanisms, it is not clear whether the 
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multiple manifestations of imagination derive from a single mechanism or from multiple 
systems. Although imagination has many different manifestations, currently, it is still defined as 
a unitary concept, a single, general capacity. It is not classified and categorized by its variety 
functions and expressions. There is no taxonomy of its multiple manifestations and functions. At 
the same time, however, there is no unified theory of imagination, perhaps because constructing 
a clear conception of imagination faces countless difficulties. Indeed, it is hard to distinguish 
characteristics or features of imagining from other cognitive state because imaginative 
experience almost always involves or depends on other cognitive activities. In turn, because 
imagination has multiple manifestations which are not categorically distinct from other forms of 
mental reflection, it defies attempts either (a) to provide a unified account or definition of 
imagination, or (b) to distinguish it from other mental activities. Many questions thus remain. 
Does imagination involve a single faculty? Do all manifestations of imagination employ the 
same cognitive capacity, even though imagination serves different needs and has different roles? 
Are the different functions of imagination engaged in different cognitive processes? Does 
imagination take part diffusively in all other mental states? What is the ontology of imagination? 
How can we define its epistemology? How we to determine whether objects belong to 
imagination or to other processes such as memory?   
Although imagination has not yet been differentiated into types, philosophers and cognitive 
psychologists have come to different conceptions of what imagination is. While philosophers try 
to delineate the concept of imagination, cognitive and neuroscientists examine the ways in which 
imagination is involved in other cognitive processes both phenomenologically and functionally. 
They investigate the roles that imagination may play in representing the past, understanding the 
self, empathizing with others, visualizing hypothetical situations, and envisioning the future. In 
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this chapter, I will investigate the epistemological status of imagination and its interaction with 
the process of remembering. In order to produce an inclusive clarification, we must examine 
psychological, neurobiological and philosophical perspectives. The creative feature is central 
ingredient in imagination. However, I will not deal here with the relationship between creativity 
and imagination since the focus of this research is to consider involvement of imagination in 
factual cognitive processes and especially in remembering and memories—not the role of 
imagination in creative endeavors that are clearly and intentionally distinguished from the real. 
Indeed, creativity derives from the constructive nature of imagination that, in turn, stems from 
the constructive nature of episodic memory, but creativity’s intentionally inventive feature 
distinguishes it from the real while other expressions of imagination might be strongly connected 
to the real in memories and in other cognitive processes. Thus, the focus of this chapter will be 
on imagination as it is assimilated in cognitive acts other than creativity. 
The ontology of imagination  
Traditionally, imagination was contrasted to perception. According to Hume, the difference 
between imagination and perception is one of degree and not of nature, thus they differ in force 
and vivacity.522 However, like with memory, criteria used to define imagination (such as 
intensity, vivideness, voluntariness, and lack of relation to reality) were always disputed and did 
not successfully capture the varieties of imagination. What is relatively clear is that imagination 
is an imitative and reproductive function that enables the construction of mental images or 
proposition. In imagination, attention is directed away from the current external situation and is 
instead focused towards an internal representation, allowing one to form, conjure up, combine, 
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and organize mental images into novel combinations and coherent representations. An 
imagination always involves an object or set of objects that correlates with the imagined content. 
We do not imagine something general, but something particular captured through specific 
sensory modality such as visualizing, audializing, smelling, testing, kinaesthetic, and so on. 
These modalities can be combined (e.g. visual imagery can accompany motor imagery), though 
they rely on different neural systems.523 By combining forms of real or unreal sensory input, we 
are able to represent what is absent, whether what is absent exists, is not present, or is fictional. 
For this reason, imagination does not have to be fictional, but can instead coincide with the 
representations of past occurrences or can be compatible with factual and real circumstances. 
Kendal  L. Wallton writes, “Most imaginings are in one way or another dependent on or aimed at 
or anchored in the real world.”524 Or, for example, according to Stephan M. Kosslyn et al., 
“mental images are internal representations that are based on information stored in memory.”525 
However, whether imagining is fictive or compatible with the real, conjuring up sensory images 
is not a necessary condition for imagining to occur, since imagining can also happen 
linguistically. The Aristotelian view, which suggested that mental images serve as inner pictures, 
has been endorsed by subsequent philosophers.526 However, in the 1980s and 1990s, a debate in 
cognitive psychology and philosophy occurred about the ontological status and the 
phenomenology of imagination (termed “mental imagery”). This “imagery debate” concerned 
the nature and the constitution of mental images, about which two theories emerged – the picture 
theory and the “weak percept”, or linguistic theory. The picture theory likens mental images to 
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pictures and holds that our images represent in the manner of pictures. By contrast, the “weak 
percept” theory defines imaginings by means of linguistic description and propositional attitude. 
It claims that images represent in the manner of language.527 Thus, although picturing and 
visualizing are central form of imagination, imagination can, according to this theory, also be 
conceived in a non-sensory way and manifested through linguistic description.  
The “variety” definition of imagination 
Philosophical attempts to define imagination deal with the multiple abilities of imagination. 
Edward S. Casey, in his phenomenological account of imagination, maintains “that imagination 
is an autonomous mental act: independent in status and free in action.”528 He defines imagination 
by two features which distinguish it from other cognitive capacities. The first characterization is 
that imagination “is easily accessible to the imaginer and it is almost always successfully 
executed.”529 Casey maintains that we can imagine whenever we want to, and that imagination is 
also available as an alternative to perceiving, remembering, or reflecting. He claims that, while 
other cognitive capacities usually exhibit a discrepancy between the initial intentions and their 
realization, in imagining, we manage to imagine exactly what we intend. However, these two 
characteristics fail to define imagination or to distinguish it from other cognitive processes. 
Furthermore, imagination is not independent from other cognitive acts. Even when our 
imagination depicts a fictional scene, it relies on and utilizes content from episodic and semantic 
memory. Indeed, imagination can be an alternative or supplement to other cognitive acts such as 
remembering, reflection, and thinking, but it is not necessarily so. It can coincide partially (but 
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also entirely) with these cognitive acts. Thus, a mental image is not always a pure imagination, 
distinct from other cognitive acts, but can also engage with these acts. 
 We also must add qualifications to Casey’s second criterion, that imagination is always 
successfully executed. Most notably, what is the criterion for “successful imagination” and how 
can we determine if all forms of imagination have an initial intention? It might be that 
imagination in the form of fantasy (such as sexual fantasy) aims to compensate unfulfilled 
wishes, and thereby satisfy initial intentions. Moreover, there are many imaginations which are 
not necessarily regulated by our intentions and therefore do not realize initial intentions, but, 
rather, produce unconscious or unintended results. The intention that triggers or promotes an 
imagination is not necessarily initially determined, or might be determined and constructed 
concurrently during the process of imagination itself. In addition, when an intention is initially 
determined, it does not necessarily imply that an imagination is available; instead, relevant 
imaginary may be inaccessible and the imagining may be unsuccessful. One can fail to produce 
imaginative thoughts, just as one can fail to remember certain facts or events. Discrepancies can 
also emerge in imaginations, just as they can in memories, expectations, and predictions. 
Therefore, Casey’s criteria of success or accessibility are not compelling characteristics. 
However, in contrast to his earlier statement such as those quoted above, Casey later states that  
“By imagining, we ascertain nothing that we did not know beforehand in some 
respect. What we take to be in the imagined object or event is only what we 
already, explicitly or implicitly know about it. Imaginative experience is 
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inherently circular in this regard, with the consequences that in imagining we 
cannot claim to confront anything radically new.”530  
While he once claimed that imagination “is an autonomous mental act,” here, he claims the 
opposite—that imagination is not independent capacity, but depends on previous knowledge and 
other cognitive activities such as perceiving and remembering. Thus, not only does imagination 
depend on these processes, it is also not clear how we can distinguish imagination from 
remembering. Casey claims that imagination, which is based on preexisting knowledge, 
combines images in an original way and therefore leads to different representations. However, 
this description is not very different from the way current neuroscience describes episodic and 
autobiographical memories. Neuroscience maintains that episodic memories are organized 
dynamically and that every retrieval leads to the unconscious linking of different elements and 
thus to different representations. For this reason, Casey does not provide a criterion that would 
define imagination and distinguish it from other cognitive capacities, especially memory. He also 
overlooks the fact that imagination has variety of expressions and it is not only a connection of 
images, but also collaborates with episodic memory to represent what is possible or likely to 
happen. In addition, he later writes, 
 “It only shows that imagination may enter into close alliances with kindred acts 
such as memory and anticipation: the imaginer can draw on memory just as he 
can enact imagining in the context of anticipating.”531 
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Still, even though Casey claims that imagination incorporates elements from memories and 
anticipations, he insists that imagination is an independent mental act. However, how we might 
distinguish incorporation from dependency is not clear, since without cooperation with other 
faculties, imagination could not operate. 
Casey looks further to identify imagination’s eidetic structure, and its essential features. He 
singles out six features that are most pertinent to imagination.532 He divides these features to 
three pairs. The first complementary pair is spontaneity and controlledness. Imaginations are 
characterized either as spontaneous, controlled, or both by the imaginer. Imaginations either 
appear on their own accord, spontaneously, or are consciously initiated and controlled by the 
imaginer.533 The second pair of traits is self-containedness and self-evidence. By self-
containedness, Casey means that an imagination does not refer to or imply other acts or content. 
Each imagination is self-enclosed; it does not depend on other elements for its wholeness. Self-
contained memories do not imply other mental content and do not require additional details to 
clarify the imagination. Self-evidence is derivative of self-containedness, and means that the 
elements in the imagination are identifiable. The last pair of features is indeterminacy and 
possibility. Indeterminacy refers to indistinct or indeterminate content. For example, the 
background of an imagination might be vague or amorphous. When imaginations are 
characterized by vagueness, they can be indefinite, even if we recognize the central objects and 
can identify them. Possibility, in contrast, it means that the imagined content is possible (but not 
necessarily actual). Although Casey does not refer to imaginations as real or actual, he does 
characterize imaginations based on their plausible characteristics. These features, however, are 
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not unique to imagination, and are also involved in other mental activities such as memory. They 
might describe some aspects of imagination but are not exclusive to imagination and therefore do 
not distinguish it from other cognitive processes. 
 In contrast to Casey, who focuses on the phenomenology of imagination, Leslie Stevenson 
provides a broader concept of imagination. In a paper entitled, ‘Twelve conceptions of 
imagination’ Stevenson illustrates the flexible and even contradictory epistemological character 
of imagination’s aspects. Imagination’s 12 conceptions range from referring to the ability to 
think of something real which is not presently perceived, to the general ability of thinking and 
entertaining mental images, to, in turn, the ability to imagine and invent creative and fictional 
objects and events. Stevenson extends his definition of imagination so much that it encompasses 
with other cognitive acts such as remembering, conceptualization, supposition, and even thinking 
itself. For example, the first conception coincides with the way we understand memory, 
expectation, or anticipation. He writes,  
“The ability to think of something that is not presently perceived, but is, was or 
will be spatio-temporally real.” 534  
Stevenson’s first conception states that imagination is about something which is not presently 
perceived, but exists and is real. Imagination is thinking about things that took place in the past, 
take place in the present, or will take place in the future, but are currently absent from the 
perceptual field. This conception refers to an event or object which  
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“is real enough, but cannot presently be perceived by the subject—it may be in 
the past, or though presently existing it may be spatially inaccessible, or perhaps it 
does not yet exist, but is forthcoming in the future.”535  
That is, the first conception of imagination coincides with memory or with expectations for the 
future. We imagine something that is real but just not actually present before us in the spatio-
temporal world. Stevenson apparently provides clarification for the memory/imagination 
dichotomy. He writes that imagination  
“is an indirect causal connection between one’s previous encounter(s) with the 
object and one’s present thought of it”.536  
Imagination, in a sense, relies on indirect information that one has received from other time, 
information that can also be in the form of inferences. This distinction, however, does not rule 
out the possibility that memory and imagination are sometimes congruent, since both episodic 
and semantic memories can also be indirect representations of past events. From Stevenson’s 
first conception, a sub-definition is derived: 
 “1a. The ability to think of something that one has previously perceived (but is not 
currently perceiving).”537 
This sub-definition refers to the function of memory more explicitly. Stevenson attributes 
imagination realness and existence—the same features of memories, which are representations of 
                                                
535 Stevenson, 239. 
536 Stevenson, 239. See also G. Evans, The Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 121-138. 
537 Stevenson, 239. 
  
182 
previous experiences. The first conception has further ramifications that refer for example to 
semantic memory: 
 “One can also think of things one has only heard about by testimony. In such 
cases there is a causal connection which is yet more indirect (the information 
may have passed through many minds, perhaps over centuries): 1b.The ability to 
think of something that one has never perceived, but which others have 
perceived and told one about.”538  
This definition of imagination relates to semantic memory, which is defined as knowledge that 
was transferred to us without us directly experiencing it. He writes, 
“In another kind of ‘absence,’ one thinks of something that one infers must have 
existed, or must exist elsewhere, or will exist in the future. Such is the stock in 
trade of cosmologists, geologists, paleontologists, archaeologists, detectives, 
investors, and weather forecasters: 1c. The ability to think of something that one 
has never perceived and that no one has told one about, whose existence one 
infers from perceived evidence by induction, or scientific method in a wider 
sense.”539  
Stevenson’s third conception is here relevant as it characterizes imagination as false memory,  
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“(3) The liability to think of something that the subject believes to be real, but 
which is not.” 540 
This conception refers to cases in which we imagine something and our belief is committed to its 
realness in a mistaken and false fashion. This conception indicates problems in distinguishing 
false memory and imagination. Criteria six suggests an even more general conception of the 
imagination, 
“(6) The ability to think of anything at all.”541  
This conception attributes imagination with the general ability to think. This may be so since 
thinking itself implies holding in mind something independently from the phenomenon’s 
existence in the world. Stevenson also attributes to imagination  
“The ability to think of something that one has never perceived and that no one 
has told one about, whose existence one infers from perceived by induction, or 
scientific method in a wider sense.”542  
This criterion defines imagination as the ability to think, and to infer insights and generalizations. 
Other concepts of imagination described by Stevenson refer to its fictional and creative element 
and to aesthetic experience. Conception 8 is another general conception that includes functions 
that are ascribed to memory, 
“The ability to form perceptual beliefs about public objects in space and time.”  
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This criterion claims that imagination forms belief on the basis of perceptual 
experience.543 The general common characteristic of all these conceptions is  
“The ability to form beliefs, on the basis of perception, about public 
objects in three-dimensional space which can exist unperceived, with 
spatial parts and temporal duration.” 544  
Overall, then, Stevenson's twelve conceptions are so broad so as to include many other 
cognitive processes. These twelve conceptions of imagination suggest that imagining 
might encompasses all forms of thinking that considers things not present to the senses, 
all forms of reflections and thinking except perceiving. As a result, Stevenson’s definition 
may offer necessary conditions for imagining, but does not identify sufficient conditions 
that would define imagination as a process unique from remembering and inferring. 
In contrast to Stevenson’s inclusive definition, Berys Gaut provides a stricter notion of 
imagination.545 Gaut mainly discusses the relation between imagination and creativity, 
but also describes imagination as false belief or misperception: 
“In one such use, to say that I imagined such and such is to say that I falsely 
believed it, or to say that I misperceived something: for instance, to say that I 
imagined the coat rack to be an intruder is to say that I misperceived the coat rack 
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as an intruder. In this use, imagination involves false (propositional or perceptual) 
beliefs.”546  
He then describes two components of imagination that are relevant here. He defines imagination 
in terms of lack of commitment to belief and action. As discussed in the Husserl chapter, Husserl 
claims that mental acts can share the same content, and therefore what distinguishes different 
representations of the same content is the way our consciousness intends the object—i.e. the 
relation between the act of intention and the experience. Cognitive acts intend events or objects 
differently, and it is the act of intention (the “apprehension”) that determines the individual’s 
relation to an experience and, in turn, distinguishes one mental process from another. In using 
slightly different terminology, Gaut maintains that mental acts involve a certain “propositional 
attitude” or “mode of presentation.” He attributes to intention different meaning than did 
Husserl: for Husserl, intention means the way our mental acts are directed towards objects or 
experiences, while for Gaut, intention is an attitude such as belief or imagination. Gaut contrasts 
the propositional attitude of imagination with the propositional attitude of belief and intention. 
Belief involves a commitment to the truth of a mental proposition, whereas intention involves a 
commitment to action, since to intend something is to commit oneself to act in a certain way.  
Using these ideas, Gaut identifies the propositional attitude of imagination as a proposition 
without commitment to the truth or falsity of an imagined scenario, and to its existence or non-
existence. Imagination is thus an intentional state free of commitments to truth and action. Thus, 
whereas remembering entails commitment to the past existence and veracity of its content, Gaut 
defines imagination as cognitive activity lacking such an attitude of assertion. In imagination, the 
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individual is not committed to the veracity vs. falsity and existence vs. non-existence of the 
imagined content. Gaut writes,  
“to believe a proposition is to be committed to its truth. Belief therefore aims at the truth; 
moreover, this end is intrinsic to or constitutive of belief: a propositional attitude counts 
as belief only if it has that end. (Of course, belief may not succeed in achieving this end – 
there are false beliefs – but belief is what it is because it has this end). It is the fact that 
belief has the intrinsic end of truth… it is because belief aims at the true that it is properly 
responsive to evidence, that is, to reasons for holding something to be true.”547   
And,  
“Since assertion is strictly speaking a speech-act, not a propositional attitude, ‘assertion’ 
should be understood in terms of commitment to the truth or falsity of a proposition 
(alethic commitment) in the way just outlined. These equivalent ways of presenting the 
view all have an important corollary: it is possible both to believe that p and to imagine 
that p, since one can consistently have the two distinct propositional attitudes towards the 
same proposition.” 548  
Here, Gaut makes a distinction between imagining and believing. In belief, the individual is 
committed to the truth (or falsity) of the mental content, while in imagination, no such 
commitment exists. Thus, Gaut argues that we cannot believe something without being 
committed to its truth or existence, but we can imagine something without such commitment.  
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This formulation, however, raises the question whether the criteria for imagination indeed 
identify and distinguish it from other cognitive acts. In Gaut’s formulations, imagination, among 
others, entails false belief, a misperception of the reality where a belief does not correspond with 
reality. However, false belief, even if it stem from misperception, involves a commitment to the 
truth and existence of mental content. In Gaut’s example—confusing a coat for intruder—
imagination and belief coincide. Thus, since false belief is an instance of imagination, this 
example shows that I can imagine something while being firmly committed either to its existence 
or non-existence, truth or falsity. However, not only does imagination in the form of false belief 
exhibit commitment to veracity and existential status, moreover, it seems that there are few 
situations when the individual is not committed to the truth or falsity, existence or non-existence 
of imagined content. For example, if we imagine an idea or invention that has not yet been 
invented (such as a cloth with various possible functions such as regulating the temperature of 
the body) we would be committed in our imagination to its inexistence. We know that such 
objects are imagined and do not exist. Or, in another example, after a soccer game in which our 
performance was bad, we might imagine ourselves scoring a goal. However, we are fully 
committed to the epistemological state of this imagination, which we definitely know is false. It 
is true that in some cases, we might have doubts about the existence or non-existence of an 
imagined scenario, but even in these cases, there is commitment to insecurity regarding the truth 
value and existence of the content.  
Thus, Gaut’s criteria do not enable us to distinguish cases when we are committed to truth and 
existence in believing and imagining. Characterizing imagining as a state in which there is no 
commitment to existence or non-existence and truth or falsity of its content excludes imaginings 
for which we are firmly committed. There are many instances of imagining in which we are 
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committed to the non-existence or falsity of the imagination. We are committed to the falsity of 
objects such as unicorns, and to narratives such as Little Red Riding Hood. In short, if we follow 
Gaut and characterize imagination as a state in which there is no commitment to the existence or 
nonexistence, truthfulness or falsity of its content, we must exclude imaginings that one firmly 
identifies as existing or non-existing, true or false, even though there are many such instances 
(such as the above unicorns and stories). Furthermore, in another example, a sexual fantasy of 
marital infidelity has no bearing on our real commitments, and on other occasions, there are 
imaginings to which we are partially or entirely committed as true and exist. Thus, we may 
imagine a future ecological catastrophe and insist that it can very plausibly take place.  
Together, both Stevenson and Gaut define imagining as a form of thinking. While Stevenson 
defines imagining as thinking of something that is not present to the senses, Gaut defines 
imagining as thinking of something without commitment to its truth or falsity, existence or non-
existence. Gaut’s definition of imagining distinguishes it from perceiving and remembering, but 
also excludes instances of imagining when we are committed to an imagining’s existence or non-
existence, truth or falsity. These definitions, then, fail to provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions for designating something as imagination. They do not provide us with an exclusive 
definition of imagination, nor do they present effective criteria by which we can identify 
instances of imagination. 
Multiple cognitive manifestations of imagination 
The general and wide-ranging definitions philosophers attribute to imagination derive from its 
multiple manifestations and functions. Imagining does not denote a specific kind of mental 
activity, but, rather, involves different cognitive processes and experiences. Imagination, for 
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example, has been used as a synonym for visualization, entertaining thoughts, conceiving, 
assuming,549 simulating, pretending, supposing, and daydreaming.550 Stretching its boundaries 
further, philosophers and cognitive scientists also often consider imagination to be involved in 
drawing inferences, thinking of possibilities, pretending, guessing, suspecting, speculating, and 
forming desires, beliefs, interpretations, and counterfactual alternatives to reality. However, even 
this list does not exhaust imagination’s many uses and functions. Imagination is also involved in 
cognitive processes such as remembering, future planning, speculating, anticipating, and 
expecting. We use imagination to think up new possibilities, offer fresh perspectives on what is 
familiar, make fruitful connections between apparently disparate ideas, elaborate original ways 
of seeing or doing things, project ourselves into unusual situations, and so on. Imagination is also 
linked with false perceptions, false belief, confabulation, distortions of the past, and mistakes of 
memory. Though in many cases, these activities are interchangeable, with imagination being 
congruent with these processes, imagination as a concept is not fully identical with these 
concepts. To the contrary, imagination is not equivalent with these attitudes, but is assimilated, 
incorporated, and involved in these cognitive processes. It is not clear whether all these self-
projective processes derive from imagination, thus, whether they are forms of imagination or 
whether they have close relationship with imagination but remain distinct processes. However, 
whether they are forms of or simply engage with imagination, these cognitive processes exhibit 
different degrees of belief and commitment. That is, imagination exhibits different limitations 
and constraints that are determined by the specific form of reflection associated or involved with 
the imagination. The link between imagination and the specific form of reflection determines its 
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constraints. When imagination, for example, is linked with anticipations or expectations, it is 
constrained to form specific predictions that are logically induced from previous experiences. 
When imagination involves counterfactual alternatives, it is mostly restricted to late and 
reasonable counterfactual possibilities rather than early or impossible ones. For example, for a 
sequence of events leading to an injury, people will imagine alternative events which are both 
late in the sequence and reasonable rather than early or more fanciful alternatives (a topic that we 
will later consider). In other forms of imagination (such as fantasy), imagination is not similarly 
constrained by temporality or reason and is instead constrained by other factors (such as 
emotional needs). Likewise, in hallucinations and illusion, imagination draws us from reality and 
distorts the distinction between the real and the imagined. Thus, hallucination and delusion entail 
attributing the imagined content with the belief that the imagined events took place, leading to a 
false perception or false memory of the past event. This form of imagination lacks a rational 
structure and is a feature of disordered perception (e.g. schizophrenia).551 Thus, because 
imagination is engaged with multiple cognitive processes, it is also employed in multiple 
functions, each of which has unique constraints.  
Just as it entails many cognitive functions, imagination serves a range of practical activities. For 
example, we use imagination to cope with our environment and past experiences in a more 
developed, prepared, and creative way, and to come to grip with painful feelings or difficult 
situations. According to Zeno Vendler, imagination saves us from solipsism by enabling us 
conceive of other minds.552 Imagination enables us not to be tied only to our own consciousness 
but to penetrate and understand other minds via inter-subjective transference. Imagination helps 
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us transcend ourselves and to imagine how it must be like somebody or something else, and to 
imagine the feelings, sensations, and emotions of others.553 Imagination, according to Vendler, 
also helps consider what is or is not possible, thereby serving as a crucial tool in imagining 
possible future situation. It provides us the ability to envision and accommodate to possible 
events of the approaching future. Thus, it enables us to think of possibilities beyond the evidence 
that stems from immediate knowledge, to modify the present and shape the future. Gregory 
Currie and Ian Ravenscroft emphasize a similar element of imagination, characterizing it in 
terms of “projection” and “perspective- shifting.” They describe imagination as the  
“capacity to put ourselves in the place of another, or in the place of our own 
future, past, or counterfactual self: seeing, thinking about, and responding to the 
world as the other sees, thinks about, and responds to it.”554  
Imagination enables us to repeat and examine past experiences, allowing us to rearrange and to 
better understand them. In this way, imagination is part of the adaptive mechanism that draws 
from the present and enables us to form mental alternatives, predict or plan the future, and 
rethink the past for future uses. Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft also maintain that 
imagination is the realm where one can represent goals and entertain possibilities or desires.555 
These imaginations are generative fantasies of desirable scenarios, some of which are 
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incorporated into our life.556 Currie and Ravenscroft also characterize imagination as a substitute 
for other attitudes and cognitive acts such as perception, memory, belief, and desire. They write,  
“it [imagination] involves the having of states that are not beliefs, desires, or 
perceptions but are like them in various ways.”557  
Or  
“an account of imaginative projection requires us to give an account of a range of 
states that are imaginative substitutes for beliefs, desires and perceptions, and 
possibly for other things as well.”558  
For them, imaginations imitate and reproduce other states such as perception, belief, decision, 
and experience. Imaginations can be perception-like, belief-like imaginings, and so on. Indeed, 
Currie also writes  
“imaginings are essentially simulative states - states which mirror some of the 
features of other mental states, of which they can be regarded as 
counterparts.”559  
An example of when imagination serves as a substitute representation for sense experience is 
when, before I go to the dentist, I imagine the pain that I might have. This imagining functions as 
a substitute for the expected sensual experience of pain. Even though this imagining is a 
substitute, the emotions that are involved in it are not necessarily less intense than the emotions 
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involved in the “real” mental state. Imagination also functions to supplement partial perceiving. 
When we see an object, we see it only partially from a specific position. We can see one side of 
this object, but not the concealed parts. However, even though our perceptions are necessarily 
limited, we still perceive objects in a holistic way because imagination supplements the missing 
perceptual field. Relying on preexisting knowledge from semantic memory, we imagine the 
elements absent from our perceptual field in an automatic and unconscious process. 
Imagination does not only allow us to project other situations and possibilities, but also fulfills 
emotional and narcissistic needs. We narrate and form a sense of self by imagining our past with 
additional attitudes and perspectives. According to psychoanalysis, imagination is defined as 
fantasy that serves as a camouflage and defense against repressed and unbearable illicit desire.560 
Fantasy represents these unconscious drives and desires, providing escape from external reality 
as it gives compensation for unfulfilled needs and substitute gratification for unresolved or 
repressed wishes.561 Thus, imagination serves emotional purposes, providing narcissistic needs, 
and enabling ego enhancement. Fantasy serves still other pragmatic emotional purposes such as 
providing solace in pain or helping to cope with difficult situations. Likewise, fantasy has a 
creative and adaptive emotional function. Ethel Spector Person writes,  
“Fantasy plays a role in guiding the choices and adaptations we make and the 
relationships we form. Fantasies are among the most powerful of the 
catalysts that infuse and organize our lives, dictating romantic, familial and 
professional goals, fueling behaviors, engendering plans for the future.” 562  
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 Thus, due to imagination’s intangible characteristics and the fact that it is engaged in variety 
cognitive processes and functions, philosophical accounts of imagination denote a general ability 
whose the only agreed characteristic is that it entails thinking of something that is not present to 
the senses. However, for this reason, philosophical attempts to define imagination do not provide 
necessary and sufficient conditions for something being imagination. Rather, these broad 
definitions include other cognitive acts as well. 
Shifting from philosophical accounts of imagination to current cognitive and neuroscientist 
examinations, we find that these cognitive definitions include aspects both similar and different 
from philosophical accounts. Indeed, neuroscientists also provide general definition and 
delineate imagination in contrast to perception. It is a mechanism that maintains content that 
differs from the immediate experiences. For example, according to Agnati F. Luigi et al., 
 “Imagination usually indicates the faculty of creating mental images and 
constructs of a novel character, a capability that appears to be especially 
developed in humans .... we speculate that it can be the result of a “tinkering” that 
combines and modifies stored perceptual information and concepts leading to the 
creation of novel “mental objects” that are shaped by the subject peculiar inner 
world.”563 
However, unlike philosophers, neuroscientists do not investigate imagination as a general 
faculty, or concept, but instead dismantle it to various functions and forms. Neuroscientists do 
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attribute to imagination a variety of roles and functions, but examine only one of these aspects at 
a time, framing the general imaginative activity and linking it to a specific process. Alan 
Richardson describes the current attitude of cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists to 
imagination as utilitarian approach.564 
He writes,  
“Yet this human imaginative capacity seems strangely attenuated—one might 
even say tamed—in the accounts of many cognitive scientists, some of whom 
deliberately seek to render the imagination rule bound and quotidian.”565  
Here is not the place to consider whether this description of imagination as attenuated is 
accurate. However, this attitude shows the inability of scientists to investigate or tackle 
imagination as a general ability or faculty. Therefore, neuroscientists do seem to dismantle the 
general capacity of imagination and examine its discrete functions in relation to other cognitive 
acts and processes. Yet splitting imagination into various separate cognitive functions does not 
resolve the question whether there are different kinds of imagination, or whether imagination’s 
different functions are manifestations of a single faculty. In the following, I examine the 
cognitive processes that are involved with imagination. 
Self-projection 
One manifestation of imagination is self-projection, a function that underlies various mental 
processes. For example, self-projection entails imagining the self in other times, with other 
perspectives, or through alternate situations. It is the ability of temporarily 
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“setting current reality to one side and constructing a situation model pertaining 
to a different spatio-temporal locus.”566   
For Currie and Ravescroft, self-projection is  
“the obvious function of the imagination: enabling us to project ourselves into 
another situation and to see, or think about, the world from another 
perspective.”567  
Thus, it is the  
“capacity to put ourselves in the place of another, or in the place of our own future, 
past, or counterfactual self: seeing, thinking about, and responding to the world as 
the other sees, thinks about, and responds to it” 568  
Likewise, according to R.L. Buckner, and Daniel C. Carroll,  
“self projection has many uses and underlies the flexibility of human cognition and 
behavior; it equips us with abilities to make social inferences and anticipate the 
beliefs and actions of others.” 569  
According to these thinkers, then,  self-projection refers to the ability to shift perspective from 
the immediate present towards the past and the future and to alternative perspectives, aiding in 
problem solving, planning tasks, simulating possible situations, and imagining what others think. 
It involves imagining scenarios beyond the here and now to other times and places. Buckner and 
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Carroll attribute four cognitive abilities to self-projection: remembering the past (episodic 
memory), thinking about the future (prospection), conceiving the viewpoint of others (theory of 
mind), and, lastly, navigation. These four forms rely on autobiographical information and are 
constructed to consider an alternative perspective, or, in the case of theory of mind, a mental 
simulation that considers another individual’s perspective.570 Cognitive scientists hypothesize 
that the multiple forms of self-projection probably share a common brain network. This network 
involves frontal and medial temporal parietal lobe systems that are linked to planning and 
episodic memory. They hypothesize that this network enables mental exploration of alternative 
perspectives that are based on our past experiences.571  
Imagination as supposition 
Supposition is a specific manifestation of self-projection. It is a constructive non-pictoral form of 
alternative representation that involves thinking of possibilities, general assumptions, 
hypotheses, expectations, and anticipations. In short, supposition allows for representations that 
exceed beyond the here and now towards the possible. It is related to expectations about that 
something is supposed to be or happen. In contrast to pure imagination that entertains fictive 
representations, supposition assumes more commitment to certainty than imagination as it is 
bounded to a specific state of affair. We entertain hypotheses, expectations, and anticipations 
usually only if they seem plausible and reasonable.  
There is, however, some debate about the precise relationship between supposition and 
imagination. Alan White argues against the view that imagination and supposition are equivalent, 
maintaining that supposition lacks the features characteristic of imagination. He argues that, 
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while imagination denotes the ability and the capacity to visualize what is not present to the 
senses, supposition is not judged in terms of capacity, since we cannot refer to supposition in 
terms of success or failure.  White maintains that we do not fail or succeed in supposition while 
we can fail to imagine an event or image.572 According to White, another difference is that, while 
imagination can be characterized by vividness, richness, dullness, or originality, supposition 
cannot be attributed these features. There is no poor, original, or inventive supposition, but there 
can be poor, original, or inventive imaginings.573 Another criterion used to distinguish 
supposition from imagination is that supposition is or is not justified as false or true. When an 
imagined scenario is clearly reasonable and possible, we tend to think of this act as one of 
supposing, rather than imagining. Supposition is something that we agree or disagree with and 
view as plausible or implausible, justified or unjustified. It can be mistaken or accurately 
predictive. Thus, suppositions which are oriented toward the future are constrained by logical 
and inferential relation to the past. Commitment to a hypothesis is justified by a preceding past, 
whereas pure imagination can reflect a possibility that cannot necessarily be inferred from the 
past or the current state of things, and, therefore, may represent an impossibility. Just as 
supposition is constrained by deduction from the past and the logical relation of this deduction to 
assumptions about the future, pure imagination is also constrained. However, it is constrained not 
necessarily by relying on logical inference from the past, but, rather, by the logical relation 
between the different components of the given imagination. One can easily conceive of a wrong 
supposition, but a wrong imagination requires more clarification. At the very least, these forms 
of failure have different implications, since a wrong supposition means failure in prediction, 
while a “wrong” imagining may mean straying from the individual’s initial intention to imagine 
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a specific thing. Imagination is beyond the dichotomy of true or false, of being justified or 
unjustified.574 
Irrespective of whether White’s criteria are true and succeed at distinguishing imagination from 
supposition, it is important to mention that White’s criteria do not rule out that supposition is a 
type of imagination which specifically complies with the constraints of logical justification. 
Overall, then, these features do not exclude the possibility that imagination and supposition are 
partially equivalent, and that there may be cases where supposition and imagination are 
interchangeable and therefore indistinguishable. However, since imagination is a broader concept 
and phenomena, the two are not identical. Supposition entails rational and causal relations 
between a real past occurrence and a possible future occurrence, whereas pure imagination is not 
constrained by commitment to either the real past or future. Moreover, we most often refer to 
ourselves in supposition, since we feel more confident about the realness of our past experiences, 
a confidence not matched when imagining the experiences of others. When considering others’ 
experiences, we will refer to mental process as imagining. For example, when we will ask 
someone, “What do you suppose you will do if you see a person lying on the pavement in the 
middle of the day,” he will probably raise some hypothesis and suppositions, but when we ask 
the same question about a third-person observer, saying, “Can you imagine what that observer 
will do if he sees someone lying on the pavement in the middle of the day,” we would not 
consider this process supposition. This example shows that, even though supposition and 
imagination both can refer to hypothetical situations, supposition entails commitment to lived 
experience, while imagination is freer, having fewer of such commitments. 
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Imagination as counterfactual alternative 
Imagination also enables us to form and think of counterfactual alternatives to reality—how an 
event might have turned out differently. According to N.J. Roese, et al, counterfactual 
alternatives  
“are imaginative constructions fabricated from stored representations, typically 
embracing a blend of traces from both episodic and semantic memory.”575  
Counterfactual imaginations counter established facts derived from episodic memories. 576  They 
exceed real experiences with conscious thoughts that consider what might have been.577 This 
form of imagining occurs by consciously reconstructing episodic memories (in contrast to the 
unconscious construction of episodic memories that occurs continually). Roese et al. maintain 
that counterfactual imagination also makes use of semantic memory, since this form of 
imagination is drawn from our general conceptual knowledge about the world.578 Combining 
elements from memory and imagination, counterfactual reconstructions may be motivated by the 
emotional need to overcome tragic occurrences, dissatisfaction, or disappointment. They also 
involve changes in the representation of reality, changes that account for how occurrences could 
have turned out differently. Counterfactual imaginations are, in turn, conceptualized as 
conditional propositions such as “only if”. Yet like other forms of imagination, counterfactual 
imagination has constraints and limitations. Counterfactual imaginings consider true imaginative 
possibilities, as opposed to impossible or fantastic events that could never happen. Indeed, 
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people create possible alternatives that make minimal alterations to the factual past. Thus, 
counterfactual imaginations are bound to the possibilities existing within rational reality.579 
Usually, counterfactual alternatives modify only one aspect of the past that seems to be 
especially crucial for the outcome being reconsidered. This crucial aspect is usually an event 
occurring late in the causal chain of occurrences.580 Counterfactual alternatives need not only 
reconsider significant events, but can also reconsider mundane happenings. In all forms of 
counterfactual reconsideration, the construction process generates new representations that are 
unconsciously stored and preserved. 
Prospection: Imagining future scenario  
Another manifestation of imaginative self-projection is prospection—the act of thinking and 
imagining a possible future.581 Closely related to supposition, this process consists of imagining 
the upcoming future of others or ourselves and requires mental projection into future situation. 
Cognitive neuroscientists who study the neural mechanism underlying episodic memory 
conjecture that the neural system allowing the reconstruction of episodic memory (i.e. the ability 
to flexibly recombine and reassemble the stored components of episodic memory) also underpins 
the ability to mentally simulate future scenarios, whether temporal or hypothetical pre-
experienced events. 582 Thus, imagining future scenarios and constructing hypothetical situations 
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have much in common with the reconstructive process of episodic memory: both past and future 
experiences draw on information stored in episodic memory and engage some of the same neural 
regions.583 Thus, the act of projecting into the future and imagining of what might be is a form of 
episodic prospection that parallels to episodic memory of the past. This prospective ability has 
also been called mental time travel in order to emphasize the generative ability of this cognitive 
process that allows for shifting beyond the present to relive, examine, or repeat our past, and, 
alternatively, to project forwards, imagining, foreseeing, planning and shaping a potential 
future.584 Because we incorporate elements from the past and present to shape memories of past 
events according to expectations regarding the future, mental time travel into the past shares 
cognitive resources with mental construction of potential future episodes.585 Tulving and other 
neuropsychologists refer to this subjective awareness of one’s protracted existence across time as 
“autonoetic consciousness.” Simulation of future events can be divided to several forms. Just like 
for memory, we can classify prospective memory into memories of episodic, specific and 
particular events, and to semantic prospective knowledge. Thus, mental time travel into the 
future might include the planning of some specific events such as a meeting, dinner party, or a 
job interview. However, mental time travel to the future also includes prospective semantic 
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knowledge such as knowing that some event, like the sunset, will occur.586 Thomas Suddendorf 
maintains that  
“the mental reconstruction of past events and construction of future ones may 
have been responsible for the concept of time itself, and the understanding of 
continuity between past and future. Mental time travel allows us to imagine 
events at different points along this continuum, even at points prior to birth or 
after death.”587  
Overall, episodic memory and imagining the future share phenomenological characteristics and 
activate similar parts of the brain.588 Imagined prospective experiences are associated with 
increased activity in many of the same brain areas that support episodic and autobiographical 
memories.589 These brain networks include the hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, posterior 
parietal cortices, and middle temporal cortices,590 regions that facilitate reassembling the 
constituent features of a memory,591 predicting the future, imagining, and navigating. In the 
constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, neuroscientists explain the reconstructive 
characteristic of episodic memory vis-à-vis its adaptive features for the future. Schacter, for 
example, writes that the constructive nature of episodic memory functions to  
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“allow individuals to simulate or imagine future episodes, happenings and 
scenarios. Since the future is not an exact repetition of the past, simulation of 
future episodes requires a system that can draw on the past in a manner that 
flexibly extracts and recombines elements of previous experiences. Consistent 
with this constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, we consider cognitive, 
neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence showing that there is 
considerable overlap in the psychological and neural processes involved in 
remembering the past and imagining the future.”592  
Both constructing of past events and imagining the future involve reactivation, and integrative 
manipulation of semantic, contextual and sensory components shared across multiple episodic 
memories. While both require the flexible integration of many elements, prospection and 
memory also, as we have seen, reflect the workings of the same core brain network. Thus, 
remembering the past and imaging the future take place in the same structure alternatively 
known as the remembering-imaging system or the remembering-imagining window.593 In this 
system, anticipated future experiences and specific memories of recent experiences constitute a 
window of episodic consciousness that functions to keep us tightly connected to our current 
goals and plans. Mental time travel provides flexibility to reconstruct the past and imagine the 
future in order to increase future survival chances, using past experiences adaptively to imagine 
perspectives and events beyond those that emerge from our immediate environment. Thus, the 
purpose of mental time travel is to enhance our biological fitness in the future by helping us shift 
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from past to future to better cope with our surroundings.594 Because information about past 
experiences is useful only to the extent that it allows us to anticipate what may occur in the 
future, mental time travel cannot be defined with reference to veracity of its content. In a word, 
past events are remembered, modified, and adjusted to the coming future, implying that 
memories used for prospection are neither wholly true nor false. Thus, episodic memory extends 
the individual’s temporal perspective via prospection, taking place in the present but allowing for 
the imagining of the future for purposes that are imbedded in both the present and the future. 
Furthermore, consistent with the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, neuroscientists 
have found direct links between processes underlying memory distortions and those underlying 
mental simulations of the future. Neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies also support the 
idea that memory errors reflect the healthy operation of constructive processes supporting the 
ability to remember what has actually happened in the past. Thus, this prospection system 
enables us to simulate the future but also creates memory errors and distortions that reflect the 
adaptive operation of a healthy memory system. 
Deficit in episodic memory impair the ability to imagine 
The dependence of prospection on episodic memory can be identified by studying patients with 
damage to the hippocampus and related structures in the medial temporal lobe (MTL).595 This 
insight has been supported by studies which examine patients with deficits in episodic memory, 
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and have found that deficits in recall abilities impair the ability to imagine new experiences.596 
The amnesic patient H.M., for example, was also impaired at planning and making predictions 
about his own future. This was also the case of K. C., who suffered from total loss of episodic 
memory as a result of closed head injury that damaged a number of brain regions, including the 
medial temporal and frontal lobes. K. C. was unable to plan or envision his personal future for 
any time period—not for the next day, month, or year.597 This state is not unique to H. M. and 
K.C but characterizes other amnesic people.598 Amnesic patients who are unable to answer 
questions about past events have been found to be equally unable to say what might happen 
tomorrow. This suggests that imagining prospective future event depends on and shares common 
neural processes with episodic memory, since a deficit in episodic memory deprives one of the 
ability to use experiences of the past, and, as a result, deprives one of the ability to foresee, plan, 
and imagine future experiences. The two deficits mirror each other, being mutually 
complementary aspects of temporal integration.599 One serves a temporally past reflective 
function, the other a prospective one. Thus, remembering the past and imagining the future are 
closely related functions of a single cognitive system, or at least, kindred functions that overlap 
significantly and share many of the same neural mechanisms.600  
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The constructive nature of episodic memory, while enabling simulation of the future, is probably 
also the mechanism underlying imagination’s general constructive and generative ability. 
Neuroimaging studies support this hypothesis, and provide insights into the extensive overlap in 
the brain regions that support true and false memories. These studies show that false and true 
memories depend on the same neural processes and regions, and that brain activity is similar in 
both of them.601 Thus, memory distortions stem from many of the same neural processes as true 
memory. Due to repeated misinformation, false memories may be equally likely to ignite the 
sensory apparatus of the brain as true memories and, as a result, once false memories are 
implanted, it is often hard to rid them from memory. These findings have led neuroscientists to 
the conclusion that memory imperfections reflect the operation of a constructive and even 
creative process. Although memory errors may seem dysfunctional, they actually reflect normal 
memory functioning. In a related line of research, Dalla Barba et al. have found that patients who 
confabulate about their personal pasts also confabulate about their personal futures.602 These 
researchers suggest that episodic and autobiographical memories are biased, flawed and distorted 
in order to preserve a coherent sense of self.603  
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Memory and imagination 
The boundary-crossing between memory and imagination 
 
As discussed above, imagination is engaged in multiple forms of representation. It is not 
restricted to the fictive, but can also represent what has actually happened or might happen. In 
this way, imagining can take on many forms of real or fictive mental content. Recalling, on the 
other hand, seems to be more limited to existing past occurrences and therefore implies realness 
and knowledge. Thus, when we talk of remembering something, we imply that what is 
remembered actually happened and is in that sense true.  
 
However, despite this one distinction between memory and imagination, it is by no means clear 
how to distinguish between them. Indeed, I can imagine something that actually happened, and, 
alternatively, can claim to remember things that had not actually happened. Moreover, memory 
and imagination depend on each other, and mutually engage in many other cognitive processes. 
Imagination is involved in remembering the past and remembering the past involves and enables 
imagining and predicting the future, conceiving of other consciousnesses, and imagining 
counterfactual scenario. In fact, memory and imagination are mutually involved in every 
cognitive act. Thus, the intuitive distinction between memory and imagination does not reflect 
the real function of each cognitive process and the dependence of both of them on each other. 
Both imagination and memory are cognitive capacities which alter, compound, dissociate, and 
reconstruct mental content and are mixed together in various types of representations, reflections, 
simulations, and introspections. Thus, imagining and remembering can partly or entirely 
coincide, since imagination can function as an equivalent to memory and, alternatively, 
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remembering relies on imagination to construct coherent memories. Both emerge by rearranging 
of past experiences and can be triggered by the same cues to generate the same images. We use, 
for example, imagination in order to recall past experiences, just as memories can trigger new 
imaginings. Thus, while it is relatively easy to distinguish perceived reality from imagined 
reality, it is quite difficult to distinguish imagined from remembered reality because imagination 
and remembering are interwoven in the same acts. Indeed, often, our feeling of knowing that 
accompanies memories is unsubstantiated. Much research has show that we mistakenly ascribe 
memories to the imagination and vice-versa.604 
 
Intuitively, we can ascribe different features and functions to each mental state, but, as we have 
seen, in many cases, these features and functions are not easily distinguished, leading to several 
questions about the nature of memory and imagination. Are our mental events memories, 
judgments, or imaginations when we reflect on a past event, when memory deviates from the 
past (either consciously or unconsciously), or when we judge the past differently than we did 
when first experiencing that past? How do memory and imagination differ as two kinds of 
representation? Can we speak about faithful memories even though they are in perpetual state of 
modification? Are memory and imagination distinguished by their motivational components? 
What is the exact epistemological status of memory? How does the neurobiological model of 
memory impact the way in which we conceive of and relate to our past and even to external 
reality? In short, key questions remains about whether there is a necessary and sufficient 
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criterion that would identify instances of memory as distinguished from imagination. In what 
follows, I describe philosophical and neuroscientific attempts to answer these questions.  
 
Criteria to distinguish between imagination and memory 
From Aristotle to today, the similarity between imagination and memory has led most 
philosophers to try distinguishing between them in terms of the characteristics of these mental 
representations. The supposition was that when we remember or imagine we entertain an image. 
And since memory and imagination can both attend an identical image, these philosophers often 
argue that what distinguishes between them is the quality of the image (i.e. whether it is vivid, 
intense, etc).605 However, there are several reservations to make about this kind of classification. 
First, imagination and memory do not necessarily employ images, and can be manifested 
propositionally. Thus, criteria such as vividness cannot distinguish these two mental states when 
in propositional forms. Furthermore, even if imagination and memory were only exercised in 
terms of images, the characteristics of images cannot provide us with sufficient criterion to 
distinguish the content of these two cognitive acts, since vividness and other characteristics of 
images can be shared by both and can be modified over time. Second, the characteristics of 
image cannot be a criterion to distinguish remembering from imagining since criteria such as 
vividness and intensity are established inductively. That is, if the current image is vivid, we 
would deduce that it is a memory-image, and, alternatively, if the image is not vivid, we would 
deduce that it is imagination-image. However, deduction does not reveal differences in their 
underlying cognitive processes, but assumes this difference ex post facto. Therefore, this 
classification cannot indicate whether any given image is imagination or memory. Third, other 
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criteria that do not deal with the quality or features of the image do not satisfy either. While 
Williams James defines memory as image that refers to the past -  “It is the knowledge of an 
event or fact, of which meantime we have not been thinking, with the additional consciousness 
that we have thought or experienced it before,”606 -  he acknowledges the possibility that two 
representations can be the same. Thus, representations of memory, imagination, or desire can 
coincide. However, what constitutes a memory representation is, according to James, an 
additional consciousness. Memories require not only  
 
“a general feeling of the past direction in time, but it must be also attended with a 
feeling of “warmth and intimacy.”607  
 
James suggests that a feeling of belief accompanies memories but not imagined past events: 
  
“the object of memory is only an object imagined in the past (usually very 
completely imagined there) to which the emotion of belief adheres.”608  
 
Thus, the images of memory are accompanied by kind of awareness such as warmth and 
intimacy and belief.  
 
Like James, Russell also does not distinguish between memory and imagination using their 
content or quality but by the individual’s relation toward the representation. For Russell, it is the 
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individual’s attitude that determines which type of representation it is, whether it belongs to 
imagination, memory, or another mental state. Russell again defines memories as images that are 
accompanied by feeling of familiarity and sense of “belief- feeling” that the representation 
indeed refers to an existing past experience.609  
    “Memory-images and imagination-images do not differ in their intrinsic 
qualities, so far as we can discover. They differ by the fact that the images that 
constitute memories, unlike those that constitute imagination, are accompanied by 
a feeling of belief which may be expressed in the words "this happened." The 
mere occurrence of images, without this feeling of belief, constitutes imagination; 
it is the element of belief that is the distinctive thing in memory.”610 
He later writes,  
“So, in memory, the pastness lies, not in the content of what is believed, but in the 
nature of the belief-feeling. I might have just the same images and expect their 
realization; I might entertain them without any belief, as in reading a novel,” 611  
Russell does not overlook the possibility of being mistaken about the pastiness represented in the 
image. He is aware that imaginary representations can have a misleading feeling of familiarity 
and be accompanied by a feeling belief. He also does not ignore the fact that determining 
whether a cognitive act is a memory is itself an act that occurs now and not in the past. That is, 
designating a memory as a memory cannot guarantee that the remembered past event did, indeed, 
                                                
609 Russell, The Analysis of Mind, 186. 
610 Russell, The Analysis of Mind, 176. 
611 Russell, The Analysis of Mind, 176. 
  
213 
take place. Therefore, he maintains that representations ascribed with misleading belief in their 
veracity will be regarded as memories as well.  He writes,  
“In investigating memory-beliefs, there are certain points which must be borne in 
mind. In the first place, everything constituting a memory-belief is happening 
now, not in that past time to which the belief is said to refer. It is not logically 
necessary to the existence of a memory-belief that the event remembered should 
have occurred, or even that the past should have existed at all. There is no logical 
impossibility in the hypothesis that the world sprang into being five minutes ago, 
exactly as it then was, with a population that "remembered" a wholly unreal past. 
There is no logically necessary connection between events at different times; 
therefore nothing that is happening now or will happen in the future can disprove 
the hypothesis that the world began five minutes ago. Hence the occurrences 
which are CALLED knowledge of the past are logically independent of the past; 
they are wholly analyzable into present contents, which might, theoretically, be 
just what they are even if no past had existed. 
I am not suggesting that the non-existence of the past should be entertained as a 
serious hypothesis. Like all sceptical hypotheses, it is logically tenable, but 
uninteresting. All that I am doing is to use its logical tenability as a help in the 
analysis of what occurs when we remember. 
In the second place, images without beliefs are insufficient to constitute memory; 
and habits are still more insufficient. The behaviourist, who attempts to make 
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psychology a record of behaviour, has to trust his memory in making the record. 
"Habit" is a concept involving the occurrence of similar events at different times; 
if the behaviourist feels confident that there is such a phenomenon as habit, that 
can only be because he trusts his memory, when it assures him that there have 
been other times. And the same applies to images. If we are to know as it is 
supposed we do--that images are "copies," accurate or inaccurate, of past events, 
something more than the mere occurrence of images must go to constitute this 
knowledge. For their mere occurrence, by itself, would not suggest any 
connection with anything that had happened before.”612 
Russell does not argue that correlation between a memory and a previously existing past is a 
necessary criterion for an image to be a memory image. Rather, he suggests that mental 
representations attributed with a “feeling of pastness” and “feeling of belief” are considered 
memories. In addition, Russell invokes context as a criteria to distinguish memory from 
imagination. By context, he means placing the remembering event in time order, and in temporal 
relation with other events.613 Remembering the context in which an event occurs provides the 
memory of that event with links to other events or occurrences, thus providing continuity 
between successive events. The context of a memory and its relation to other memories help us 
to organize this memory.  
Brian Smith expands upon Russell’s context criterion. Smith maintains that, while an 
imagination does not develop a contextual setting, memory is characterized by associating 
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memory images with other images that include contextual and background information.614 
However, even though memories possess contextual frameworks, Smith argues that the 
difference between imagination and memory is “one of degree rather than one of a kind.”615 For 
Bartlett, the distinction between remembering and imagining is that 
“in remembering a man constructs on the basis of one ‘schema’, whereas in what it 
commonly called imagining he more or less freely builds together events, incidents 
and experiences that have gone to the making of several different ‘schemata’ which 
for the purpose of automatic reaction, are not normally in connexion with one 
another.” 616  
However, as Bartlett continues,  
“even this difference is largely only a general one, for as has been shown again 
and again, condensation, elaboration and invention are common features of 
ordinary remembering, and these all very often involve the mingling of materials 
belonging originally to different ‘schemata.’”617 
In a related vein, according to Vendler, the difference between imagining and remembering is 
that, while remembering is confined to one’s own past or to facts that have been learned in the 
past, imaging extends to all possible experiences.618  
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Kendall L. Walton maintains that many features of imagining and recalling are the same. For 
example, recalling and imagining can be both deliberate and spontaneous, and we can be active 
and passive in both cognitive states. Yet, according to Walton, deliberate and spontaneous 
memories are distinguished from deliberate and spontaneous imagination. While we ascribe 
credibility to both deliberate and spontaneous memories, we ascribe credibility only to 
spontaneous imaginations.  This difference is because for deliberate imagination, we are often 
aware that we have constructed it, whereas spontaneous imaginings, according to Walton, “tend 
to be more vivid than deliberate ones”619 and “have a life of their own.”620 They are  
“likely to be more ‘vivid’ or ‘realistic’ experience. One which, in its independence 
of the will, is more like actually perceiving or otherwise interacting with the real 
world.”621  
In this way, Walton claims that spontaneous imaginings tend to be more vivid and realistic than 
deliberate ones. He maintains that it is harder to vividly imagine things when one knows that 
they are fiction than when one spontaneously imagines and is unaware of the dependence of his 
imaginings on him. The spontaneous, involuntary, or unintentional imaginings feel less 
dependent on the person who imagines them and seem to resemble the real experience.622 When, 
for example, an imagination spontaneously evokes a strong sense of fear, this emotion 
strengthens the vividness of imagination so much that it is difficult to distinguish between 
imagination and a real occurrence. The example given earlier by Gaut (about misperceiving the 
coat rack for intruder) shows how fear can generate vivid imaginations which are 
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undistinguished, at least for an instant, from real occurrences. Dreams and illusions are extreme 
examples of this process. For these phenomena, imagining and perceiving come together so that 
confusion may emerge about whether a mental event is one or the other. Furthermore, if a certain 
imagining that is associated with fear is repeated, this imagination will eventually become 
incorporated into memory. Thus, spontaneous imagining is also a case that might be difficult to 
distinguish from recalling. Imagination and memory cannot be distinguished from each other by 
the feature of being either voluntary or compulsively, since both capacities have these states. 
Walton maintains that another difference between recalling and imagining is that in imagining, 
one imagines oneself while bracketing off his whole self. In imagining, one considers and 
visualizes one specific aspect of the self, while excluding parts of the self not relevant to the 
imagining. This exclusion occurs in order to enable us to imagine something which is 
disconnected from the real world and the totality of the individual’s preferences and needs. In 
memory, this exclusion does not happen, since in it, the rememberer does not subtract or add 
information about himself, memories encompassing the whole self in the remembered 
experience. Upon closer examination, however, it is clear that this kind of bracketing also takes 
place in remembering, since one can repress, forget, change, and distort past events according to 
emotional needs. However, memory and imagination do seem to differ in relation to shame. 
While when we imagine something that trespasses our concepts of morality, we tend to feel 
shameful about vocalizing this imagination and having others know about it. However, in 
remembering immoral experiences, we might feel shame, but it will be joined with feeling of 
guilt, since the actions did not only occur in the realm of thinking but also in external reality. 
Even so, this difference does not provide us criterion to distinguish memory from imagination 
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since it is deduced from the present feeling and does not guarantee that we are not confusing 
memory for imagination.   
Casey suggests five criteria to distinguish imagination from memory. Some of these criteria echo 
those posited by Husserl, James, and Russell, criteria such as (1) rootedness in perception, (2) 
link to the past, (3) retentionality, and (4) familiarity and (5) belief. By rootedness in perception, 
Casey means that remembering relies on previous perceptual experiences. In contrast, 
imagination does not, according to Casey, encompass imaginings of real past events. By link to 
the past, Casey refers to the temporal character of memory, how memory remains persistent over 
time and how memories generate continuity between past occurrences. Casey writes,  
“The temporal field that in which remembered content is presently given to one is 
ultimately continuous with the particular temporal field within which this content 
was first experienced at an earlier and precisely datable point. For both the original 
field of experience and the present field of recollections (which may resemble each 
other only insofar as it is the same object or event that is experienced and 
remembered ) form part of a  single temporal continuum. No matter how distant in 
time the two fields may be from each other, we are assured that intermediate fields 
serve to connect the original field with the one in which our remembering now 
occurs. The resulting continuum from past occurrence to present remembrance 
provides a unified foundation for the persistence of remembered material.”623  
                                                
623 Edward S. Casey, “Imagination, Fantasy, Hallucination and Memory,” in Imagination and its Pathologies, Ed. 
James Phillips & James Morley, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003), 68. 
  
219 
According to Casey, memory borrows its content from perception and has temporal character. It 
exhibits persistence and continuity with the experience on which it is based. Imagination, on the 
other hand is not attached to any original experience. It does not persist over times and is not 
confined to past or real.624 Its content lacks stability, persistence, and temporal continuity. 
Although Casey argues that the relationship of memory and imagination to the past distinguish 
memory from imagination, both memory and imagination are of the present. Thus, any 
systematic theory of memory must show how memories show connection and continuity to 
original previous experiences—a task Casey leaves unconsidered. Moreover, the connection and 
continuity criteria must be inductive, since if we feel that there is continuity and persistence, we 
deduce that mental act is a memory, even if there is no proof that this act indeed correlates with 
the actual past. Casey’s third criterion, retentionality, is divided to two components—
retentiveness and retentional fringe. Retentiveness is the capacity to retain and recall experience. 
Retentional fringe is the moment immediately preceding a memory that still clings to the 
perception of the present.625 That is, by rententionality, Casey means the ability or the capacity to 
retain a past experience in the mind. It is the basis for recollection and it does not have to be 
explicit.626 However, it also includes retention in the Husserl’s sense of the immediate past, the 
just past experience whose affect still lingers in the present.  According to Casey, this 
retentionality generates feelings of continuity and does not exist in the imagination. Familiarity, 
the forth feature of memory, means that remembering is accompanied with a feeling of 
acquaintancy that gives us a sense that the experience did occur in our past. This criterion is 
similar to James’ “warmth and intimacy” criterion or to Russell’s feeling of familiarity, and it 
                                                
624Casey, “Imagination, Fantasy, Hallucination and Memory,”  65. 
625 See also the chapter on Husserl. 
626 It might be similar to priming.  
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indicates a “personal relationship with the content of past experience.”627 In the last criterion, 
belief, Casey refers to the fact that remembering is accompanied by belief that the memory relies 
on previous experiences. We do not assign such beliefs to imaginings, whose existence we 
generally take to be wholly mental. Here, Casey disregards the ability of some imaginings to 
become integrated into memories, leading us to consider and believe in their past actuality. He 
also disregards the fact that imagination can be accompanied by a feeling of familiarity and 
misleads us to refer to imaginings as memories. While Casey does not deny that memory and 
imagining possess several common features, he resists submitting that imagination and memory 
are different only in degree.  
Gaut, as already mentioned, does not specify how remembering and imagining differ, but, rather, 
identifies the difference between imagining and believing, arguing that the difference between 
the two stems from how we are committed to their truth or falsity, existence or non-existence. 
For example, I cannot believe something without being committed to its truth or existence. While 
when I remember, I am committed to the truth of what I remember, I can imagine something 
without such commitment to the truth, falsity, existence, or non-existence of the imagined: 
“Imagining that p, is a matter of entertaining the proposition that p. Entertaining a 
proposition is a matter of having it in mind, where having it in mind is a matter of 
thinking of it in such a way that one is not committed to the proposition’s truth, or 
indeed to its falsity. In contrast, the propositional attitude of believing that p involves 
thinking of the proposition that p in such as way as to be committed to the 
proposition’s truth. One can put this point in slightly different but equivalent ways. 
                                                
627 Casey, “Imagination, Fantasy, Hallucination and Memory,” 70. 
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Instead of talking of entertaining the proposition that p, one can talk of thinking of the 
state of affairs that p, without commitment to that state of affair’s (actual) existence. 
Or some make the point in terms of unasserted thought: to entertain the proposition 
that p is to think of p, but without ‘asserting’ that p. Since assertion is strictly 
speaking a speech-act, not a propositional attitude, ‘assertion’ should be understood 
in terms of commitment to the truth or falsity of a proposition (alethic commitment) 
in the way just outlined. These equivalent ways of presenting the view all have an 
important corollary: it is possible both to believe that p and to imagine that p, since 
one can consistently have the two distinct propositional attitudes towards the same 
proposition.” 628 
Yet it seems that there are a few reservations to make regarding Gaut’s statements about 
imagination and belief. As already discussed, we cannot consider the state of imagination 
to be beyond commitment to existence or truth. Imaginings are almost always associated 
with the belief that they are truth or false. In other imaginings, we might have doubt 
regarding to their truth value and existence—however, this doubt does not derive from lack 
of commitment, but, rather, lack of knowledge. Furthermore, some of our memories are 
falsely committed to the truth even while they do not accurately represent the truth. Thus, 
Gaut’s criteria do not enable us to distinguish cases of believing and imagining something 
when we are committed to its truth or existence.  
                                                
628 Gaut, “Creativity and imagination,” 148–73. 
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Neuroscience challenges the distinctions between memory and imagination 
Attempts to distinguish between imagination and memory often disregard the complexity of 
these two mechanisms. They also do not take into account the complex and interrelated 
processes and functions of memory and imagination. As Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft 
wrote, in a different context, we can have several factive attitudes towards our mental content.629 
Memory is not necessarily the only mental process to contain a factive attitude, for imaginings 
can contain a factive attitude just as memories can be false. Attempts to distinguish between 
remembering and imagining by referring to various criteria—their  resemblance or lack of 
resemblance to actuality, commitment or lack of commitment to truth, intention, belief, 
circumstances, context, familiarity, vividness, link to the past, etc.—provide us with several 
necessary criteria for distinguishing memory from imagination which, however, are not 
sufficient to distinguish between them. Thus, even though these criteria are pertinent, they are 
not absolute, but a matter of degree. Indeed, memory is generally associated with true belief, 
commitment to existence, and truth, while imagination is generally characterized by the opposite. 
Furthermore, often, we may strongly believe in the accuracy of a memory, but can be wrong in 
this belief. One can claim that when a mental event is ambiguous, memory and imaginations can 
be distinguished by supporting evidence. However, such evidence does not always exist to 
clarify this ambiguity. Moreover, when external evidence is available, this evidence does not 
necessarily provide us with the ability to distinguish between memory and imagination, since 
external evidence is often, according to theories of memory construction, integrated into 
memories. In the following I will dwell on three central criteria that are used to distinguish 
                                                
629 Currie and Ravenscroft, Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology, 7. 
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between memory and imagination, and will examine these criteria more thoroughly. These 
criteria are belief, familiarity and finally intentionality. 
Belief 
 
Belief is a prominent criterion used to distinguish memory from imagination. From Hume 
onwards, thinkers highlighted belief to define memory, ground its authority, and clarify its 
epistemological status. Remembering and imagining, it was claimed, manifest belief differently. 
Remembering is accompanied by the belief that the remembered content represents a true 
previous past occurrence, whereas imagination is either not accompanied by such belief, or, 
alternatively, is accompanied by the belief that the imagined content is definitively not based on 
real occurrence. However, this distinction simplifies the complexity of the functions of these 
cognitive acts. Neuroscientific theories of memory formation challenge the privileged 
relationship between memory and truth, showing that memories do indeed rely on belief, but not 
necessarily on truth. Memory does not necessarily serve the past, but, rather, serves the needs of 
the present and expectations about the future. Beliefs attached to memories can be far from truth, 
while imaginings can consciously or unconsciously be compatible with truth and belief. Thus, 
both can, in a sense, be imaginary, just as both can have actuality, and their content can coincide, 
be integrated, and sometimes even be the same. However, the distinction between memory and 
imagination is not simple since both have a range of states, each of which involves different 
functional characteristics and entails different levels of belief. For instance, the degree of belief 
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can determine the level of certainty in its reality.630 Furthermore, not only does each cognitive 
act engage various levels of belief, but studies in cognitive psychology have shown that belief 
and high confidence in a content of a mental representation do not necessarily correlate the real 
epistemological status of this representation. There are many cases in which we mistakenly 
attribute a representation to memory when it is in fact an imagination, or, alternatively, attribute 
a representation to imagination when the source is memory. Therefore, illustrating the various 
forms of belief that are involved in imagination and in memory will help us understand whether 
we can use them as distinguishing criteria. 
Imagination and belief 
The relationship between belief and imagination varies according to the type of imagination 
involved, of which there are roughly four forms: (1) pure imagination; (2) imagination involved 
in forms of projection such as prospection, expectation, supposition, etc; (3) hallucination and 
illusions; and (4) imaginations that engender false beliefs, misperceptions, or misremembering.  
(1) Pure imagination is not constrained to rationality or to an exact representation of reality. In 
pure imagination, beliefs enter an “offline” state to enable formation of an enclosed belief that 
serves the imagination. In pure imagination, our usual and everyday beliefs are suspended to 
enable the free creation and generation of representations. In this state, we are aware that we 
abandon beliefs and withdraw into an internal imaginative which does not reflect real occurrence 
past, present, or future. Thus, we are fully aware that these imaginings are our own purely 
fantastic creation. This, for example, occurs in sexual fantasy, or when we fantasy our desired 
                                                
630 Theodore R, Sarbin, Believed in Imaginings: A Narrative Approach, in Believed in Imaginings: The Narrative 
Construction of Reality, Ed. Joseph de Rivera & Theodore R. Sarbine, (Washington D.C.: American Psychological 
Association, 1998), 22.   
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future. Pure imagination is also expressed in creative works such as novels or works of art. In 
sum, pure imagination appears when we withdraw from our beliefs in the process of generating 
new representations.  
(2) A second form of belief is when imagination involves various cognitive acts such as 
simulating, supposing, planning, expecting, counterfactual imagining, wishful thinking, forming 
goals, planning, etc. This form of imagination represents what is plausible, rational, and 
especially connected to previous occurrences. Thus, for this form of imagination, the individual 
commits to and believes in the truth or plausibility of the imagined. However, this commitment 
is usually accompanied by some degree of uncertainty –in contrast to false memories, which 
occur when one falsely believes that a mental representation captures a past experience and when 
one is therefore committed to the truth of this representation. 
(3) The third and extreme type of belief involved in imagination is manifested in hallucinations 
and illusions. In this kind of imagination, the individual attributes to an imagination belief in its 
actuality and realness. According to Theodore R, Sarbin, such imaginings are accompanied with 
feeling of realness and high degree of involvement. By high degree of involvement, Sarbin 
means that these imaginings have a high convincement, such as is the case in believing in God 
and in “ecstasy, mystical experience, religious conversion and sexual union.”631 When this belief 
is strong, the imagining is interpreted as equivalent to veridical perceptions (as is the case when 
people believe God talks to them). Interaction between imagining and belief occurs when one 
mental state is replaced with another one, when “a mental state of one kind (an imagination) 
                                                
631 Sarbin, Believed in Imaginings, 25.   
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presents itself to the subject as a mental state of another kind (belief).”632 However, while Sarbin 
and Currie separately describe the interaction between belief and imagination as the result of 
mental disorders, or as a result of experience of transformation, high involvement of belief and 
confidence in imaginations also take place in more mundane, daily experiences (as we saw when 
considering the phenomena of imagination inflation and the constructive memory framework). 
Confusing imagination for memory can be a trivial state occurring for a healthy person, and does 
not necessarily have to entail a state of schizophrenia or hallucination. These daily false beliefs, 
in turn, leads us to the forth form of interaction between imagination and belief. 
(4) The fourth type of imagination-belief interaction is habitual and unconscious. We integrate 
imaginative components into autobiographical memories in a way that makes it impossible to 
distinguish the imagined components from the genuine memories. Such integration underlies 
small, mundane changes and also more crucial modifications of memories. This integration can 
take the form of false interpretation, misattribution of details not part of the original experience, 
and whole invented representations of events that did not happen. Thus, the role of imagination 
in episodic and autobiographical memories varies from the integration of minor imaginative 
components into memories to the generation of whole imaginative representations assigned with 
credibility and true belief.  
This integration also happens, for example, when we reconstruct autobiographical memories. 
Imaginations merge with our memories when we reconstruct and fill out missing information 
inferentially,633 even as we are unaware that the additional information is supplemented by our 
imagination. This interaction between imagination and belief is distinguished from hallucinations 
                                                
632 Currie, Imagination, Delusion, and Hallucinations, in Pathologies of Belief,175. 
633 Currie and Ravenscroft, Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology, 13. 
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and illusions mainly because it integrates imaginations into our autobiographical memory in a 
rational and realistic way. It completes lacking details and helps us construct a coherent story 
about ourselves. While illusions and hallucinations stem from neurological disorders and clearly 
depart from the reality, false beliefs are mundane and a natural byproduct of the integration of 
memory and other cognitive processes. Indeed, in our everyday life, imagined representations are 
infused in our memories and are assigned credibility. In these cases, imaginings are transformed 
into memory representations via belief and confidence in its credibility. And, as neuroscience 
shows, there are many mundane cases when the attitude of imagination confuses us and relates 
inappropriate belief to representations. Thus, belief can be so strong that it results in the 
conviction that the content of the imagination had actual past reality. These insights are further 
reinforced by imagination-inflation studies. These studies have shown that imagining an event 
increases belief that it happened and creates false memory about the event.634 One of two 
explanations that neuroscientists provide for imagination-inflations is familiarity. Intensive and 
repetitive imagination generates feeling of familiarity regarding the imagined thing. We imagine 
something many times until it became very familiar and then we assign a belief that it really took 
place. Thus, familiarity misleads us as we see imaginations as memories of actual occurrences. 
Familiarity is, incidentally, the same criterion used by James, Russell, and Casey to distinguish 
memories from imagination. However, neuroscientists and these imagination-inflation studies 
have undermined the use of such criteria to distinguish memory from imagination. The question 
is thus whether imagination and memory can be distinguished at all, since neuroscience shows 
that our belief in the validity of memory is often unwarranted. Questions remain about whether 
                                                
634 Giuliana Mazzoni& Amina Memon, “Imagination can Create False Autobiographical Memories,” Psychological 
Science, vol 14 no. 2 (March, 2003): 186-188; Goff, L. M., & Roediger, H. L., “Imagination Inflation for Action 
Events: Repeated Imaginings Lead to Illusory Recollections,” Memory & Cognition, 26, (1998): 20-33. 
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these cognitive capacities can be distinguished if our beliefs mislead us about their 
epistemological status and if beliefs are attached to memories which go through unconscious 
process of reconstruction. Can we distinguish between true memory belief and false memory 
belief, between memory and imagination, even when these two mental states are both 
accompanied by belief?635 
Memory and belief 
Memories also vary in degree of beliefs attached to them. For example, some beliefs are very 
low-grade beliefs, while others are taken for granted, even when there is no evidence to support 
this confidence. In contrast to semantic memory that we share with others, we are the only 
authority to provide statements on autobiographical memory. However, we are often not in the 
position to defend our beliefs, since we cannot go back to the past and justify or verify our 
current beliefs. Even when we do have supporting evidence, it does not necessarily validate the 
belief, even if it correlates to what seems to be the past. As was also mentioned above, even if 
supporting evidence might support the current belief, it is very plausible that this supporting 
evidence itself has already been integrated into the memory, influencing and constructing a new 
belief but does not necessarily represent the real past occurrence.636 Thus, unconsciously, we 
integrate apparent supporting evidences from the present into a memory that changes due to 
natural alterations in perspective and interpretations. Generally, relying on present perception-
justification might verify the modified memory, but not necessarily the original experience.637 
Neuroscience, then, leads us to the view that memories, like imaginings, are misattributed true 
                                                
635 On false memories and false beliefs see for example Tom Smeets, Sebastiam Telgen, Jame Ost, Marko Jelicic 
and Harald Merckelbach, “What’s Behind Crashing Memories? Plausibility, Belief and Memory in Reports of 
Having seen Non- Existent images,” Applied Cognitive Psychology, 23: (2009): 1333-1341. 
636H. h. Price J. Laird and J. N. “Wright, Symposium: Memory-Knowledge,” Aristotelian Society, Supplementary 
Volumes, Vol. 15, What can Philosophy Determine? (1936): 16. 
637 See the example of the sand castle given by Brian Smith. 
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belief. In this way, neuroscience eliminates the opposition between true memory beliefs and false 
memory belief, since all autobiographical memories entail, in sense, false beliefs. Recalling is in 
some degree always falsely believed, for this the recall never is exactly like the original 
experience and goes through various modifications without our awareness so that we falsely 
believe that memory represents events exactly the way we experienced them. There is also 
always the option that what we remember stems, in fact, from imagination, and also the opposite 
possibility that what we imagine is actually based on memory. Since imagination entails false 
belief and remembering integrates imaginative components then we are faced with the problem 
of how to distinguish them. The implications of this question are different when recalling is 
opposed to fictive imagining and when it is opposed to imagining in a sense of falsely believed. 
The difference between these two types of imagining is, of course, between believing and not 
believing in the content of the mental representations. In pure fantasies, we have awareness that 
the representations are fictive, while in false belief, we have exactly the same belief or awareness 
as for true memory belief. The ontological status of true and false belief might be different, but 
their epistemological status is the same. Again, I am not referring to states of pure fantasy when 
our beliefs are in an “offline” state, but, rather, am claiming that distinction between true 
memory beliefs and false memory beliefs is, at best, weak and, at worse, misleading, since every 
memory belief is itself a combination of imagination and remembering. Imagination is always an 
ingredient in the process of remembering, and we cannot oppose imagination and remember by 
referring to belief. Memories are in a perpetual change; they are prone to influences, distortions, 
and deceiving; they are never the same and never result in fully accurate representations. 
However, we still attribute to memories belief and view them as accurate representations of our 
past.  
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The interaction between imagination and memory does not only occur when we activate a 
memory and integrate new information at the time of recalling, but is already operative at the 
time of encoding. Urmson, for example, provides an example of when individual interpretations 
and judgments at the time of encoding are involved in the formation of belief. In these contexts, 
it is difficult to know whether the mental event is to be attributed to remembering or imagining:  
 “Thus 'I imagined myself to be disliked by everyone present' might mean that I made up 
for myself a little fairy tale in which I was the black sheep of the party, or it might mean 
that I wrongly believed that everybody present disliked me.”638   
In case that the judgment of himself as the black sheep of the party is a false judgment, this is a 
combination of memory and imagination. It is partial imagination since the ontological state was 
different and it was not true. The interpretation or the judgment of the situation modifies the real 
towards an imagined one. On the one hand, this experience does derive from memory, since the 
speaker recalls an experience that he really had irrespective of whether his interpretation was 
wrong or right. The epistemological status was different if the speaker was aware of the fictive 
quality of his interpretation: if he believes that this happened and his mental representation was a 
genuine recollection (even though that the event did not happen), this forms a false memory 
belief. 
Recollections of autobiographical memories contain unconscious false beliefs that are infused in 
different phases. Yet we still consider these memories to be true, even if the reconstructive 
process of memory means that they are fused and integrated with varieties of information in 
different phases such as during the acquiring, storing, and retrieving of a memory. The question 
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is whether we can oppose true recollection to imaginings we falsely believe, since the 
epistemological status of both is the same; we are not aware of the involvement of imagination in 
the process of (1) understanding the experience and (2) remembering it. False recollection must 
be opposed to recollection given that the events represented in false recollections did not happen, 
but since I am not aware of this fact, I recognize the representations as recollections. In that case, 
a memory is composed of imagination with awareness or belief of it being a memory. 
Imagination acts as a remembering- like imagining.639 Thus, the integration between imagination 
and memory actually causes unjustified belief to become justified belief. Alternatively, since 
memory is a dynamic process, it implies that there it is no justified memory belief. Thus, the 
neuroscience of memory formation leads to skeptical conclusions about memory by undermining 
the justification of true memory belief. In turn, to further examine these distinctions, in the 
following, I discuss the various theories of memory belief and justification. 
Belief and justification 
Believing is not necessarily congruent with knowing, since one can believe without knowing 
whether a state of affair is true. One can also follow Russell’s hypothesis that the world came 
into a being five minutes ago and maintain that a memory belief is independent of the past 
occurrence. According to Russell, in order to account knowledge of the past, memories are 
accompanied with a feeling of familiarity and belief. Consequently, we would count both false 
and true memory beliefs as memories so long as they were accompanied with such feelings. In 
short, according to Russell, memory beliefs do not necessarily entail relying on past experiences. 
                                                
639 I am following Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft’s terminology. Currie and Ravenscroft, Recreative Minds: 
Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology, 12.  
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Therefore, according to Russell, an imagination–image accompanied by a feeling of familiarity 
and belief will be regarded as a memory. 
Likewise, according to the foundationalist theory of memory belief justification, the reason for 
believing in a memory as a memory is determined by the justification I had when I originally 
formed the belief in the past,640 the justification depending on the initial circumstances. 
Therefore, according to this theory, an apparent memory belief is justified (even if it is not 
actual). Another version of the foundationalist theory—the preservation theory—claims that 
memories are attributed the generative capacity of justification that, unlike perception, also 
functions as a preservation source for justifications.641 Put differently, memory does not generate 
new justifications for a belief, but merely preserves whatever justification we previously had for 
it. Thus, the justification for a memory belief is determined at the initial formation of a memory 
and, from then on, is preserved. That is, a memory belief is not changed during an interval from 
t1 to t2, since the belief associated with a memory is sustained from the initial formation to the 
later recall. There are several reservations to make regarding both the foundationalist theory and 
the preservation theory. The foundationalist theory, like Russell’s approach, implies that an 
initial false and unjustified belief will be counted as a justified belief, since an apparent memory 
is justified as a memory belief regardless of whether this belief is actually justified. Michael 
Heuer puts forward a dualistic theory that accommodates to and improves upon the foundational 
and the preservation theories. The dualistic theory, he claims, avoids the implications of 
unjustified belief (as in Russells’ hypothesis that the world sprang into being five minutes 
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earlier). Heuer maintains that every belief encompasses two degrees of justification—
justification that involves the initial formation or adoption of the belief and a justification that is 
involved in retention.642 He maintains that the dualistic theory succeeds in maintaining both 
justifications: the justification in the circumstances of the initial acquisition and at the time of 
recalling. However, neuroscience casts doubt on both memory as a belief-generating process and 
process of belief preservation, for it shows how the process of memory and belief formation are 
both dynamic. For example, the theory of episodic memory challenges the preservation theory, 
since episodic memory and attached beliefs are modified over time.  
 As neuroscience shows, we might believe one thing at t1 and different thing at t2, as the passage 
of the time unconsciously transforms a memory and, as a result, beliefs.  Beliefs retained from an 
earlier experience do not necessarily go through the same adaption process as memories and, if 
they do, we are not aware of this process. Thus, findings in neuroscience challenge 
foundationalist theories since, even if a belief is justified in the past, this initial belief does not 
guarantee that the current belief is justified since the memory itself went through a series of 
unconscious modifications. In addition, if the belief is itself adjusted to correspond with 
memory’s current content, then this belief no longer represents the original memory, but rather 
the new modified memory. It follows, then, that this new belief no longer corresponds with the 
original memory belief, but with the modified memory, since this belief is itself involved in the 
same reconstructive process as memory. At the time of recalling, we have a modified 
justification connected to the current modified memory.  
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Another attempt to justify memory belief is inferential. According to this account, if my 
expectations are fulfilled, this gives evidence the fact that the related memory is justified. The 
fulfillment of expectations, according to Michael Huemer, confirms that the knowledge was 
based on memory and that my memories are highly reliable.643 However, inferring from the 
fulfillment of expectations disregards the natural process of incorporating expectations into 
episodic memories at the time of recalling. Episodic memory is formed, modified, and adjusted 
according to current circumstances, expectations, and anticipations. At the time of recalling, 
episodic memories internalize expectations and anticipations regarding the future and these 
memories are changed according to these factors. Thus, since memories internalize expectations 
and anticipations, we generally feel that our expectations are fulfilled even if they are not. 
Fulfillment might come about as a result of the modification process itself in order to adjust the 
past to the present and to what we expect will be the future. Because we are not aware of the 
revision process, we falsely perceive our current state to be exactly our past state of mind. 
Therefore, we also falsely assume that our expectations are fulfilled instead of perceiving that 
past is adjusted to our current expectations. The inferential argument thus ignores the revision 
that takes place unconsciously and leads us to problematically connect the current memory to the 
past instead of connecting it to more relevant states such as the present and future. Fulfilled 
expectation does not necessarily prove that the knowledge relies on memory, since these 
expectations may rely on imaginary functions such as supposition, or on new integrated 
information. Moreover, there are cases when our expectations are not fulfilled, however, this 
does not necessarily imply that our memories were not reliable. 
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Another attempt to justify memory belief is through coherentism. According to coherentism, one 
memory belief is justified by other apparent memory beliefs. If a memory belief is consistent 
with the general system belief, and if the various details of the individual memory cohere with 
the general sense of belief, then this memory it is justified. However, this theory also does not 
take into account the dynamic formation of episodic memories. Memories change perpetually, 
incorporating other details and accommodating to other changes. The reconstructive process 
might cause a true memory belief to being modified and becoming to a false memory belief in 
order to cohere with other inaccurate memory beliefs. In sum, philosophers often speak about 
original memory belief, belief maintenance, and about lack of conflict in the belief system. 
However, they overlook the dynamic character of memory, how it undergoes changes every time 
retrieval occurs. Therefore, the way memory is structured leads to an unjustified memory belief. 
Neuroscience not only undermines the epistemological status of memories themselves but also of 
beliefs that constitute the subjective conviction about the truth of memories.  
Belief reflecting the present rather than the past 
To understand the misleading quality of memories, we also need to understand the processes and 
functions of beliefs and the relation between memory and belief. A central question is whether a 
belief follows the unconscious process of construction or whether belief is separate from 
construction. In the latter case, belief and memory would be linked only at the time of recalling, 
when a memory attains conscious form. However, if the fusion of memory and belief takes place 
at the time of recall, this suggests that these two cognitive processes are separate, having distinct 
epistemological realms, and that belief does not reflects the real status of autobiographical 
memories. However, if belief is a part of the constructive process of memory and is also 
modified like memory, the question becomes whether belief reflects the process of modification 
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or whether it eliminates traces from previous phases. If a memory belief reflects the various 
modifications a memory goes through, then this modification process might cause multiple and 
possible contradicting representations. However, if a belief eliminates previous phases of belief, 
it does not matter whether a belief follows the process of change or if it appears only at the last 
stage after the memory is already formed. The ordinal character is not important, since whether 
the belief is joined at the last conscious phase or whether the belief exists all the time but 
eliminates the previous phases, both represent only the current state. Our belief reflects the 
present memory with all associated information added during reconstruction, possibly creating a 
discrepancy between a belief and a past. The conclusion of this finding is that belief does not 
have bearing on our real past, but on the current memory representation. That is, memory 
representation mislead us when they are accompanied by the belief that the knowledge that we 
maintain on our own past is as it happened, when in fact this knowledge is a mix of components 
only one of which is the past event as experienced. This raises the question whether this 
confusion is due to the fact that we do not know that memory does not represent the past or 
whether another factor is responsible.  
Neuroscientific explanation of the unified self 
Not only we are mislead to believe that our memories represent the past as it is, but we feel that 
our memories are coherent and consistent. Memories represent experiences but do not show the 
underlying processes of changes that these memories go through. Indeed, rationalization and 
confabulation are, at the very least, engaged in the normal functioning of episodic memory and, 
overall, are an inherent part of our memory as a whole. Yet despite these facts, we feel that our 
memories are unified and reliable. What are possible neuroscientific explanations for this 
confusion? Why do we have the feeling that our memories are unified and coherent and that our 
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self is unified? Is the feeling of unity an illusion? What might be the reason for this unified 
experience?  
Neuroscientists such as Michael S. Gazzaniga believe that the brain’s left hemisphere is 
responsible for this unified experience.644 He suggests that the “interpreter” function, attributed 
to the left hemisphere, is the answer for why we perceive ourselves and our past as unified. 
According to Gazzaniga, the right hemisphere remembers and represents the reality literally, 
while the left hemisphere tends to falsely recognize and confabulate, not having the capacity to 
discern gaps of time and space if they occur. The left hemisphere thus confabulates since it tries 
to form coherency by interpreting seemingly contradictory memories or information. As an 
interpreter, it is responsible to form a narrative and coherent interpretation for the varied and 
incongruent information. It forms coherent narratives by ignoring certain information and is 
responsible for our belief about our memories.  
Split brain studies give evidence for these differences in hemisphere functions. In patients with 
split brain (when left and right cerebral hemispheres are separated), these two hemispheres have 
different responsibilities for different actions and behave separately, without awareness of how 
the other hemisphere reacts to information. While the right hemisphere provides literal 
descriptions about external reality, the left hemisphere provides interpretations, explanations, and 
rationalization to make sense of actions made by the right hemisphere.645 However, when the left 
hemisphere does not receive information from the right hemisphere, its reaction to reality is 
confabulated. Without receiving information from the right hemisphere, the left hemisphere 
                                                
644 Michael S. Gazzaniga, Who’s In Change? Free Will and the Science of the Brain, (New York: Harper Collins 
publisher, 2011), 102. 
645 Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory, 157 -158. 
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cannot overcome time and space gaps in the same way it can when the two hemispheres are 
connected. In this way, the left hemisphere seems to create the illusion of the unified self. The 
assumption here is that, in healthy people, the division between the two hemispheres is the same 
as in split brain patients—that the left hemisphere probably behaves as the interpreter and is 
responsible for changing representations so that they cohere with the present context, whereas 
the final mental interpretation created by input combined from two hemispheres. This means that 
literal representations succumb to what Gazzaniga has dubbed the “interpretator.” However, this 
kind of confabulation remains unconscious and becomes clearly manifest only in people with 
split brain.646 In short, split brain studies show that our conscious experiences of episodic and 
autobiographical memories are constructed by unconscious process. We are unaware that our 
interpretations stems from absent information, unaware of the role the left hemisphere plays in 
suppressing information in order to create a coherent interpretation of reality. Of course, without 
interpretations, we could not create meaning out of strictly literal representations, but, however, 
we think that our perspectives and memories represent reality literally often even when presented 
with evidence to the contrary. Incorporating key findings from neuroscience, we can describe the 
action of the left hemisphere in relation to the right hemisphere as the unconscious of the 
conscious, as the process that underlies and enables the creation of conscious meaning. The 
interaction between these hemispheres enables us to create a unified image of ourselves that is 
formed by combining of literal representation of reality with interpretations and manipulations of 
contradicted component.  
                                                
646 Gazzaniga, Who’s In Change? Free Will and the Science of the Brain, 81 -83. 
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Intentionality 
It is not possible to distinguish memory from imagination by belief since belief does not track the 
constructive process of memory and the involvement of imagination during this constructive 
process. If memory and imagination are not distinguished by quality of their content or by belief, 
what other criteria might help us distinguish between them?  
While these two cognitive capacities can coincide and represent the same content and emotional 
effect, one might claim that their intention differs. One possibility to resolve this deadlock is to 
define cognitive acts according to one’s inferential relations to their content, Husserl’s terms, by 
its intentionality. Casey, who follows Husserl, maintains that intentionality is the principle that 
underlies and defines each mental act. Every mental act has own structural properties of 
intentionality, and every mental act intends objects in a different way. The intentionality of 
imagination is “could be,” “might be,” or “cannot be,” while, in memory, we refer to the 
represented content as having happened. If an image or linguistic expression is associated with 
the imaginary, it is imagination and if it is associated with the past, then it is memory. 
Representations can thus refer to different kinds of awareness and be regarded, one time, as a 
memory and, at another time, as imagination, even if these two representations are exactly the 
same phenomenally. Thus, what distinguishes between memory and imagination is their 
underlying attitudes and awareness. For Urmson, the initially intended and chosen attitude 
indicates the criterion for success and fulfillment, and, as a result, determines the type of the 
representation. He writes, 
 “The answer that I have to offer to the original question is by now, no doubt, 
sufficiently obvious. We do not have to look for any special features of our mental 
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pictures or of the tale we tell, nor need we ascertain their relationship to reality or to 
anything else. All we have to do is to know what criteria of success are applicable, 
and that is a question which depends upon our own intentions...We are imagining if 
some such criteria of success as general verisimilitude, or interestingness are the 
relevant ones.”647 
Urmson emphasizes the intention of the mental event and whether the intention was fulfilled. If, 
when we intend to recollect, then the intended event is recollection, while if we intend to 
imagine, then the intended event is imagination even if it may resembles or be identical with a 
representation of a past event. Intentions are determined by our awareness and conscious goals. 
However, what if I had no intention, or if it was automatically exercised without my awareness? 
It may appear that I meant to represent a past occurrence, but I could actually not really represent 
past occurrence but instead imagine an alternate event. Intention alone is thus not a sufficient 
criterion for a cognitive act, and linkage between intention and belief isnecessary. Intention and 
belief are not separated, but often operate together. It is not clear whether belief determines the 
way we intend the content, or whether it is intention that determines the belief. However, not 
only does belief fail to serve as the criterion distinguishing memory and imagination, but also 
intention does not enable this distinction. If belief determines the intention then, when the belief 
is false, the intention is also false, but there is no way to know of this falsity. Alternatively, if 
intention first determines the attitude we attribute to the content, and is only then accompanied 
by belief, belief does not have an immediate relation to the content but it is mediated by the 
attitude.  
                                                
647 Urmson, Memory and Imagination,  87 -88. 
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Neuroscientific findings regarding memory formation have destabilized the notion that episodic 
and especially autobiographical memories can be justified as a source of factual truth, 
challenging the way we understand the process of remembering. If neuroscience does, indeed, 
undermine the veridicality of memory, do these findings mean that memory has additional 
functions? What might these functions be? What might be the role of memory repression or 
inhibition?  
Function - The process of adjustment 
As emphasized, neuroscientific theories of memory provide a new framework for rethinking 
memory. This framework might suggest that we should shift our attitude towards episodic and 
autobiographical memory away from broadly epistemological to being functional. Addressing 
why memory involves a constructive process of piecing together bits and pieces of information 
rather than something more akin to a direct replay of the past raises the hypothesis that a 
veridical representation of the past is not the optimal functioning of human memory system. This 
raises further questions about whether memory may have other roles as well. Does memory’s 
flexibility give us benefits at the expense of accuracy and trustfulness? What is the function of 
memory if it does not store and retrieve exact replicas of experience? 
Accuracy is far from being the functional goal of memory. Recollecting meets other needs such 
as the wish to give a good impression, to reconstruct the past in a way that we desired it, to create 
self consistency, etc. The reconstructive mechanism of episodic memory serves general and 
fundamental purposes that enable these needs. Researchers who grappled with this issue have 
proposed various reasons why human memory, in contrast to video recorders or computers, does 
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not store and retrieve exact replicas of experience.648 One hypothesis suggests that episodic and 
autobiographical memories reconstruct past experiences for present purposes and memory 
distortions reflect the operation of adaptive processes. Neuroscientists do not refer to memory 
distortions in healthy people as weakness or failures of the system, but as byproducts of a more 
adaptive evolutionary mechanism.649 This byproduct reflects a tradeoff between the ability to, on 
the one hand, accurately represent the past and, on the other hand, adapt and adjust memories to 
new circumstances. That is, we forget and distort our memories of the past in order to adapt and 
adjust to the changing world. In fact, in a world of constantly changing environments, literal 
recall is significantly less important than the need for one’s memory system to reorganize, revise, 
and modify memories to conform to current beliefs, attitudes, and emotional needs.650  
However, adapting the past to the present is not the only function newly ascribed to memory. 
Researchers have shown that memory is not necessarily about the past, but is even more about 
the future. Indeed, while memory is the ability to recall previous experiences, recall itself is not 
solely directed toward the past but is guided by the present for the service of the future. Thus, the 
current hypothesis explaining the function of constructive episodic memory states that this 
function allows individuals to simulate and imagine future episodes, happenings, and scenarios. 
Since the future is not an exact repetition of the past, simulation of future episodes requires a 
complex system that can draw on the past in a manner that flexibly extracts and recombines 
elements of previous experiences—a constructive rather than a reproductive system. Episodic 
                                                
648 Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory, 6, 184; Larry R. Squire, “Memory and Brain Systems”, in From Brains to 
Consciousness? Essays on the New Sciences of the Mind, ed. Steven Rose (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University 
Press, 1998). 
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memory is an open system which allows other elements to be integrated. Thomas Suddendorf 
and Michael Corballis write, 
“The fact that episodic memory is fragmentary and fragile suggests that its 
adaptiveness may derive less from its role as an accurate record of personal 
history than from providing a “vocabulary” from which to construct planned 
future events (and perhaps to embellish events of the past). It may be part of a 
more general toolbox that allowed us to escape from the present and develop 
foresight, and perhaps create a sense of personal identity. Indeed, our ability to 
revisit the past may be only a design feature of our ability to conceive of the 
future.”651  
And, more specifically, Conway maintains that episodic memories preserve information that is 
highly relevant to goal processing, plan execution, motives, outcomes, and evaluations.652 
Episodic memories are integrated into autobiographical memory because of their relevance to 
longer-term goals and, consequently, to the future.653 Alternatively, the process of forgetting 
occurs because of the non-relevance of these memories to future goals. Autobiographical 
memories function to ground and harmonize memories of past experiences with the self and its 
goals. It might be claimed that negative and stressful experiences lead to a reduction of the 
structural plasticity (although even memories of traumatic events such as flashbulb are not 
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immune to error and distortion).654 This may support the idea that the normal function of 
memory is to form constructive, plastic memories since, in cases of traumatic memories, the 
memory system as a whole loses plasticity and is, as a result, far less efficient. If our memories 
would not be modified according to the present or prospective future, a discrepancy would 
emerge. Memories may represent the past exactly as it was, but this representation would not let 
us absorb changes. Since the present itself is in perpetual change, the memory of the past must 
have the same dynamic nature. Consistent with this hypothesis, neuropsychological and 
neuroimaging evidence show that there is overlap in the psychological and neural processes 
involved in remembering the past and imagining the future.655 The constructive episodic 
simulation hypothesis does not imply that the only function of episodic memory is to allow us to 
simulate and imagine future events, nor do neuroscientists believe that its role in simulation of 
the future constitutes the sole reason why episodic memory is primarily constructive rather than 
reproductive. Considerations such as economy of storage are also relevant to understanding why 
the system does not simply preserve rote records of all experience: compressing information into 
a gist-like representation may protect the memory system from overload.656 But overall, the 
reconstructive nature of memory takes on significance as it blurs the border between memory 
and imagination. 
Misconception of memory 
These suggestions lead to further questions about prevailing misconceptions of memory. 
Although it has been several decades since researchers have uncovered the dynamic character of 
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memory, and the view that memory is reconstructive is not new,657 the prevailing idea regarding 
memories is that they are stored changelessly and permanently and that remembering is 
accurate.658 The determination and the certainty that we feel regarding our memories do not 
correspond to the real state of our memories. What is the reason for this discrepancy between the 
neuroscientific view of the reconstructive nature of memory and the layman’s spontaneous 
conception of memory as an accurate representation of the past? Are we deluded by a wrong 
concept of memory? If the answer is yes, another question follows — is it the beliefs 
accompanying our memories that deceive us or our false concepts of memory which misleads? 
The question is whether memory itself plays us false, or whether our concept of memory is what 
plays us false. If we change our idea of memory and will be aware that remembering is a 
complex process that involves various components only one of which is the past events 
themselves, will we experience our memories in a different way?  
It seems that being aware of the dynamic nature of memory will not necessarily change the way 
we experience memory. It might be that memory persistence or readjustment themselves cause 
this faulty belief. Readjustment takes place without conscious awareness as it reorganizes our 
memory coherently and leaves us with the feeling that the representation is faithful and accurate. 
The changes are inaccessible to us unless we take an exact record of our activities as, for 
example, neuro- and cognitive psychologists do in experiments. Readjustments reorganize our 
memory coherently and leave us with the feeling that the representation is faithful and accurate. 
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Memory and belief are not separated, but unified in one process. The feeling of unity and 
coherency is important for maintaining a coherent sense of self, and in cases where belief and 
memory of a past event diverge, cognitive dissonance might arise. 
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Conclusion  
 
Contemporary findings in neuroscience have led to ambiguous ontological portraits of memory 
and imagination and undermined conventional epistemological assumptions about these 
cognitive acts. Neuroscience emphasizes the commingling between memory and imagination. 
Current hypotheses maintain that memory and imagination are closely associated cognitive 
functions that constantly interact. As a result, a memory is never a pure memory or an exact copy 
of previous experience, but, rather, an ongoing dynamic and constructive process that 
incorporates different mental and emotional states at the time of recalling, modifying the original 
experience. Every process of storing and activation (recalling) of a memory fuses the past 
experience with new information as mediated by imagination. Thus, imagining has a central role 
in constructing memories and is integrated in the most mundane memories; it elicits, enhances, 
or confabulates memories. It is an active integrating process that is employed to reconstruct and 
unify already existing memories and thoughts with new information.659 New information, when 
incorporated into old memories via imagination, fills gaps when forgetting, external counter-
evidence, information gaps, or memory contradictions occur. We, for example, fill gaps with 
imaginative construction of what could have plausibly occurred in order to make meaning and 
sense out of experiences that took place. Imagination also engages in a form of interpretation. 
There is no one genuine description or interpretation of past events. We interpret the same event 
in variety of sometimes even contradictory ways. We emphasize one aspect at the expense of 
other aspects. Thus, the past is derived from the temporal perspectives of the present, 
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Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1939): 353-354. 
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perspectives that also shift over time. At different times, we occupy different perspectives. Our 
memories endure, but go through changes of perspectives. It is through the mediation of 
imagination that memories are changed to include new and different factors. On the other hand, 
it is the constructive mechanism of episodic memory that underlies and serves as the resource for 
imagination. Thus, imagination, whether pure imagination or constrained by rational structures, 
derives from and depends on the flexible constructive mechanism of episodic memory. 
Imagination and memory both utilize information that is stored in the episodic memory system 
and organize this information in new ways depending on the demands of the present. Their 
proximity and communal interaction between the two is not only present in acts of recalling or 
imagining. Rather, the close constructive interaction and the collaboration between memory and 
imagination also shape other cognitive acts such as various forms of self projections.  
The neuroscience of memory formation leads us to question our prior assumptions by 
undermining the distinction between memory and imagination and challenging criteria 
commonly used to distinguish between the two. These insights, then, may compel us to shift our 
definitions of memory and imagination away from those based on epistemology and towards 
those based on function and process.  Memory is to be defined as a mechanism that does not 
accurately represent the past, but, instead, represent the past as filtered through the present and 
the demands of the future.    
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